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Introduction 
This book proposes a new approach to the understanding of Marx. 
Unlike the usual approaches, which take him to be a political 
economist, a revolutionary ideologist, or a philosophical humanist, I 
present Marx for the first time as a great systematic philosopher in 
the tradition of Aristotle, Kant and Hegel. Yet I show that Marx's 
philosophical system is distinctive in that he develops it as a 
framework for his concrete social theory and his critique of political 
economy. Thus this book also reveals Marx's work to be a radical 
transformation of traditional philosophy. This transformation is ac-
complished by means of Marx's striking synthesis of systematic phi-
losophy and social theory. 
In this book I reconstruct this synthesis as a social ontology, that is, 
a metaphysical theory of the nature of social reality. Such a metaphysi-
cal theory would give a systematic account of the fundamental entities 
and structures of social existence--for example, persons and insti-
tutions-and of the basic nature of social interaction and social 
change. Such a social ontology is only implicit in Marx's work. Never-
theless, my thesis is that his concrete analysis of capitalism and of the 
stages of social development presupposes such a systematic ontologi-
cal framework. Thus, for example, Marx's account of the transition 
from pre-capitalist societies to capitalism, his theory of surplus value, 
his analysis of technological development and his outline of the com-
munal society of the future cannot be adequately understood apart from 
his metaphysical system, that is, his fundamental philosophical ideas 
about the nature of social reality and the systematic interrelations 
among those ideas. Specifically, an ontology whose basic categories 
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are individuals, relations, labor, freedom, and justice is necessary for 
comprehending Marx's concrete social theory. 
The reconstruction of the ontological foundations of Marx's social 
theory allows us to approach in a new way a fundamental question of 
his work, namely, the relation of the individual to the community. 
There is an apparent dilemma between Marx's insistence on the ideal 
of the full self-realization of the individual and his insistence on the 
ideal of the full realization of community. I shall show that to see this 
as a dilemma, however, is to interpret these concepts of individuality 
and community in terms of the limited forms that they take in both 
social life and social theory under capitalism. Here, as Marx himself 
pointed out, these values appear in a dichotomous form, in terms of the 
opposition between the individual and society. Thus in practical life, 
conflicts arise between requirements of individuality and those of so-
ciety~etween individual rights and preferences on the one hand, and 
social justice and social constraints on the other. This opposition is also 
manifest in liberal social theory, which conceives of society as external 
constraint standing over and against individuality. Against this 
dichotomous view of the individual and society, I interpret Marx as 
developing an ontology that sees the individual as intrinsically social 
and communal, but that also takes the individual to be the fundamental 
entity of society. It is on the basis of a reconstruction of this ontology 
of individuals in social relations that we can resolve the apparent 
dilemma between the ideals of individuality and community in Marx. 
It will be seen that Marx projects a concept of community as consti-
tuted by the activities of free individuals each of whom realizes his or 
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her own possibilities and who relate to each other in terms of mutual 
expectations and goals and mutually enhance each other's individuality .i 
This book is a work of interpretation. Interpretation is understood 
here not as mere exposition or commentary, but rather as critical re-
construction. Such a reconstruction does not simply give an account of 
what Marx said, but aims at the discovery and evaluation of his 
philosophical system. I shall also attempt to clarify what remains 
obscure in Marx's thought and to develop furt.her some of the concep-
tions that are only suggested in his system. This system includes his 
first principles, his method or mode of inquiry, and the conclusions 
that are derived from these principles by means of this method. I would 
claim that such a coherent structure may be discovered in each of 
Marx's theoretical works-for example, in the Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, as well as in Capital. Yet there is 
one work that presents Marx's basic principles and their application in 
an especially complete and integrated way and from which his ontolog-
ical conceptions emerge most clearly. This book is the Grundrisse. 
Here Marx grapples with fundamental theoretical and methodological 
problems and works out his fully elaborated critique of capitalist politi-
cal economy and his theory of the stages of historical development. 
This work was largely overlooked until very recently.' It has now 
become a subject of widespread discussion, although up to now there 
have been no major studies based on it. My reconstruction of Marx's 
social ontology is based primarily on this work. 
I shall argue for five theses: 
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My first thesis is that Marx uses Hegel's dialectical logic both as a 
method of inquiry and as a logic of history. That is, not only is Marx's 
analysis ordered in accordance with a Hegelian dialectic, but the actual 
dcvelopment of historical stages itself is seen to have such a dialectical 
form.!Thus, on the one hand, Marx derives the specific structure and 
development of social forms from the concepts of these forms, but, on 
the other hand, he sees this derivation as possible because the concepts 
are themselves abstracted from the concrete social developmenL, 
My second thesis is that in construing Hegel's logic of concepts also 
as a logic of social reality, Marx becomes an Aristotelian. He holds 
that it is real, concretely existing individuals who constitute this social 
reality by their activity.i 
My third thesis is that in his idea of self-creation through labor as the 
fundamental characteristic of being human, Marx introduces an on-
tological conception of freedom that distinguishes his ontology from 
those of Aristotle, Hegel, and other traditional philosophers,:qAs 
against the view that human beings have a fixed or unchanging nature, 
Marx argues that individuals freely create and change their nature 
through their activity. 2 i~j 
,: My fourth thesis is that for Marx a just community is required for the 
full development of free individuality. Further, the value of free indi-
)(*uality and the value of community are consistent with each other. ii 
,jS,;My fifth thesis is that the Grundrisse constitutes the working out of 
".Marx's early theory of alienation as political economy, Thus Marx's 
analyses of surplus value and of the function of machinery under 
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capitalism and his th7~rl)) crises' cannot be understood without his 
concept of alienatlOli:',1< 
In the following ctl ers, I shall argue for these theses by examining 
four major themes of Marx's work: society, labor, freedom, and jus-
tice. On my interpretation, these themes are not simply aspects of a 
social theory, but fundamental constituents of a systematic philosophi-
cal theory of the nature of social reality, that is, a social ontology. 
In presenting such a social ontology, this book poses a new prob-
lematic for contemporary philosophy, namely the reinterpretation of 
such traditional philosophical disciplines as metaphysics and value 
theory in terms of their relation to social reality. At the same time, this 
ontological approach helps us to understand Marx's work in a new 
way. Therefore it would be helpful at the outset to specify the sense in 
which the term "social ontology" will be used in this book. 
Social ontology may be taken in two senses: (1) It may mean the 
study of the nature of social reality, that is, the nature of the individu-
als, institutions and processes that compose society. This study at-
tempts to determine the basic entities of social life-whether these are 
persons or institutions; the fundamental forms of social interaction; and 
the nature of social change. In this use, society is taken as a specific 
domain of existence, like nature, and social ontology forms a branch of 
general ontology. Or (2) it may mean ontology socialized, that is, a 
study of reality that reflects on the social roots of the conceptions of 
this reality. Thus, for example, the ontology that takes reality to be 
composed of separate, atomistic individuals is seen to have its roots in 
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a capitalist or free market society, in which persons are conceived as 
separate, isolated individuals who are related to each other only in 
external ways. In this conception of social ontology, theories of reality 
are seen as influenced by their social context. Further, the ontological 
categories themselves-for example, individuals and relations-are 
interpreted in the concrete and specific forms that they have in various 
historical social structures. 
These alternative senses of the term social ontology are not mutually 
exclusive. Both may be combined in a third sense that I shall give the 
term and that will guide the interpretation in this book. In this sense, 
social ontology is the analysis of the nature of social reality by means 
of socially interpreted categories. 
In this book Marx is seen as doing social ontology in this third sense. 
Thus, like the traditional ontologists, Marx is concerned with the study 
of the nature of reality; but unlike most traditional ontologists, the 
reality he is concerned with is social reality. Even here, Marx makes a 
radical departure from the tradition: He interprets the ontological 
categories concretely as having social and historical meaning. Thus, 
for example, in Marx's analysis of capitalism, the traditional 
metaphysical distinction between appearance and essence shows up as 
the distinction between the free market and exploitation, in which the 
appearance or phenomenon of exchange is taken to mask the essential 
social relations of exploitation. 
But to read Marx from the point of view of his systematic social 
ontology is to give an interpretation of Marx. Since this book is such a 
work of interpretation, it is important to make clear what an interpreta-
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tion is and also whether the method of interpretation used in this book 
is the most appropriate one for underSUiiiding MarX"s work. 
The most general aim of an interpretation of Marx is to provide an 
understanding of his work. In my view, such an understanding requires 
grasping his work as a coherent whole and not merely as a collection of 
themes and ideas. This requires an ordering of the complex and 
seemingly disconnected elements of Marx's thought. I do this by set-
ting out the structure of Marx's work in terms of his first principles, his 
method, and his conclusions. By focusing on these basic parameters of 
his work, we are able to see the interconnections between the various 
aspects of Marx's argument-for example, between his theory of al-
ienation and his theory of surplus value. This interpretation therefore 
provides a guide for reading Marx. In addition, it enables us to discern 
what Marx's approach would be to issues that he did not deal with 
explicitly by applying his method and first principles to other contexts. 
Such a projection of Marx's own thinking not only permits us to fill in 
the gaps in his work in a way that is plausible, but also to assess the 
fruitfulness of Marx's method in its application to such contemporary 
issues as the theory of economic crises and the character of socialist 
society. 
~~ing of M~s a way of. making elfPlic~_wl!at is impliciUn 
~.\lVork. That is, it elicits from the mass of detail the logical structure 
and development of Marx's argument. This aspect of my approach, 
like the previous one that emphasizes taking the work as a coherent 
whole, is comparable to what is called hermeneutic method. 3 Both 
approaches try to give an internal interpretation of a work by explicat-
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ing the structures and meanings inherent in it and attempt to understand 
it as a whole. 
My interpretation may be compared with hermeneutic method in yet 
another way: in its emphasis on a text. The hermeneutic method de-
pends on a c1~;;e"reading of a text. usually of a single text. Similarly, 
my reading is based primarily on the Grundrisse, the work in which the 
systematicity of Marx's thought emerges most clearly. However, I do 
not consider the Grundrisse as a single text in isolation from the rest of 
Marx's writings. Rather, I see it as one that integrates his earlier 
"humanist" writings with his later political economy and permits us to 
grasp the continuity of his ideas throughout his works. 
One may turn to the special circumstances of the Grundrisse' s com-
position in order to explain its distinctive place among Marx's works. I 
suggest that the Grundrisse is the most evident! y philosophical of 
Marx's works precisely because he did not write it for publication but 
rather for his own self-clarification! In these notebooks, Marx em-
ploys Hegel's dialectical method (with references to Hegel's The Sci-
ence of Logic) as his own method for analyzing capitalism and also 
develops his own philosophical ideas about such topics as freedom and 
history. One may suppose that because the Grundrisse was not intended 
for publication, Marx saw no need to restrain his philosophical reflec-
tions and his use of an explicitly philosophical method and terminology. 
By contrast, in his works intended for publication, for example, Capi-
tal, Marx tended to avoid such an explicit use of Hegel because these 
works had practical or political purposes as well as theoretical ones. 
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That is, they were intended to persuade both the working-class 
readership and the radical intelligentsia of the time. Hegelian language 
and modes of thought were alien to the working-class readers and were 
in disrepute among the radical intelligentsia, who objected to the con-
servative implications of Hegel's "speculative philosophy." 
I claimed above that my interpretation attempts to make explicit 
what is implicit in Marx's work. But it would be incorrect to conclude 
that in explicating his text in this way, my interpretation simply reads 
off what is given in the text. Rather, I would hold that an interpretation 
requires a selection of those features of the work that most clear! y 
illuminate its meaning and structure. In my interpretation of Marx, it is 
his social ontology that I select as the feature that most clearly illumi-
nates his work. 
However, one may ask how such a selective interpretation can avoid 
being a merely arbitrary one that the interpreter simply imposes on the 
work from without. In other words, how can such an interpretation be 
internal to a work? One criterion for such internality, although a prob-
lematic one, is proposed by the hermeneutic school of interpretation. 
In this view, an interpretation may be regarded as internal if it reveals 
the work to be a coherent whole, such that all of its various elements 
are accounted for. But this approach presupposes that any given work 
is coherent because it necessarily exhibits the unity of the author's 
project. It is claimed that such a unity or coherence is the mark of any 
human creation. The difficulty with this view is its circularity, that is, 
it presupposes the very coherence of the work that the interpretation is 
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supposed to reveal. This circularity is acknowledged by the hermeneu-
tical methodologists but is regarded as a necessary feature inherent in 
all interpretation. 
A second criterion that may be proposed for the internality of an 
interpretation is the extent to which the interpretation succeeds in il-
luminating the text for the reader. Here the question is whether the 
interpretation guides the reader to a recognition of the sense or mean-
ing of the work. 
However, the interpretation I offer here attempts to be internal to the 
text not only in these two ways but in yet a deeper sense. In this sense, 
the internality of my interpretation resides in the fact that the method I 
use in setting forth Marx's thought is the very method Marx himself 
uses in the construction of his system. Thus my interpretation seeks to 
be not only internal to the content of Marx's thought, but beyond this, 
seeks to be internal to his mode of inquiry itself. 
It would be useful to consider briefly here what Marx's method is 
and how I propose to use this very method in the interpretation of his 
work. In this discussion I will also make clear how my approach differs 
from and goes beyond hermeneutical methodology. 
Marx's method, as he outlines it in the introduction to the Grund-
risse and exemplifies it in that work, is one that treats its subject 
matter as a totality. Specifically, Marx begins from what he calls a 
"concrete whole," that is, a given and complex subject matter, of 
which we have only an amorphous conception. The concrete whole 
that Marx studies is that of capitalism. He then proceeds to analyze this 
concrete whole to discover fundamental principles or conceptual 
Introduction xxi 
abstractions from which one can derive a comprehension of its work-
ings and the interrelations within it. Thus in his analysis of capitalism, 
Marx arrives at such conceptual abstractions as exchange value, capi-
tal, and labor, in terms of which he then reconstructs the workings of 
the system, including such phenomena as exploitation, crises, 
technological innovation, and so forth. Such a conceptual reconstruc-
tion of the given subject is what he means by comprehending it as a 
totality. My stl.ldy, in comparable fashion, treats Marx's work itself as 
such a concrete whole. Thus the Grundrisse at first appears to be a 
complex and relatively unstructured mass of details. Following Marx's 
method, I attempt to analyze Marx's own work to discover fundamen-
tal principles in terms of which one can reconstruct this work as a 
systematic totality in which the various dimensions of his analysis are 
seen in their relation to each other. 
A second feature of Marx's method is that it is not a mere recon-
struction of its subject, but a critical one. That is, Marx goes beyond an 
account of the workings of the system of capital to discover its limita-
tions. Thus he argues that the wage labor-capital relation is one of 
increasing exploitation and leads to recurrent economic crises. His 
critique proceeds in terms of a theory of value in which freedom and 
justice are taken to be the central values. Marx holds that these values 
are not imposed by him on the social reality which he analyzes. Rather 
Marx claims that these values emerge in the course of the development 
of society itself, but that present social forms hamper the full realiza-
tion of these values. In this way, the critical or normative dimension of 
Marx's thought is not something added on to his descriptive analysis of 
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social processes, but rather is integral to his reconstruction of these 
processes themselves. 
Similarly, my method of interpreting Marx's work is that of critical 
reconstruction. Thus I not only reconstruct Marx's social ontology, but 
I do so critically. My critical approach to Marx's theory focuses first 
on determining whether Marx in fact has such a philosophical theory of 
social reality and what exactly it is. Because Marx does not articulate 
this theory of social reality explicitly, this limitation in his work needs 
to be overcome by means of a creative reconstruction of what this 
explicit theory would be. In this book I shall attempt to show that such 
a theory can be elicited from Marx's work and I shall attempt to 
articulate it in a systematic way. 
Further, I shall be concerned to go beyond what Marx did say to 
what I think he would have said on certain crucial questions had he 
more fully developed some of his own suggestions and had he been 
more consistent and rigorous in drawing the full implications of his 
own principles. The main concepts that I expand in this way, on the 
basis of what Marx does say, are causality, freedom, and justice. I 
believe that my reconstruction of these concepts carries forward the 
main thrust of Marx's thought. 
However, I do not remain within the limits of Marx's own problemat-
ic in my reconstruction of his system and in my further development 
of his basic concepts. That is, the critical approach I take here is based 
on the external standpoint of my own understanding of social reality 
and my own interest in the problem of how individuality is related to 
community. 
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Two additional tasks in approaching Marx's work critically are to 
assess whether Marx gives a true account of the workings of the 
capitalist system and also whether he gives an adequate ontological 
characterization of the nature of social relations and of human activity. 
I do not take up these critical tasks directly in this book. However, I 
believe that my critical reconstruction of his theory, in which I articu-
late and develop his views further, provides a basis for such an assess-
ment. 
The method of interpretation that I have described as one of critical 
reconstruction may be called a dialectical method of interpretation. By 
way of summary, one may say that such an interpretation of a work not 
only treats the work as a totality, but also approaches it critically. In 
this last respect, a dialectical method of interpretation goes beyond a 
hermeneutic method which restricts itself to the problem of understand-
ing the meaning of the text itself. While the dialectical method also 
gives a reconstruction of the meaning of the text, it does so both from 
the standpoint of an internal understanding of the project that the text 
embodies and from an external critical standpoint based on knowledge 
and interests that are independent of the framework of the text. 
In addition to the foregoing considerations on the specific use of the 
dialectical method of interpretation in this book, one may point to 
another feature of this method that further distinguishes it from the 
hermeneutical approach. I would hold that the hermeneutical method 
presupposes the view that one cannot get beyond interpretations, and 
that alternative frameworks of interpretation set the limits for what we 
can claim to be true. A dialectical method, by contrast, attempts to get 
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beyond alternative frameworks of interpretation by critically examin-
ing a given interpretation in terms of what we know independent! y of 
that framework. Through such critical examination of alternative in-
terpretations, the dialectical method in its fully ramified form aims at 
establishing the truth. These claims obviously raise a number of seri-
ous epistemological difficulties, which I will not deal with here. 
In addition to its other aims, the dialectical method of critical recon-
struction has the aim of guiding practice. In this work, the contribution 
that I hope to make in the interest of a more rational social practice is to 
clarify the ideals of individuality and community and to show how they 
do not conflict but rather mutually enhance each other. In this interest 
of guiding practice, this book shares the aim of Marx's own critique. 
The interpretation that I give of Marx by means of this method sees 
him as effecting a synthesis of systematic philosophy and social 
theory. My interpretation may be contrasted with the two prevailing 
interpretations of his work. The first interpretation focuses on Marx's 
critique of alienation and treats him principally as a humanist 
philosopher. This view is based primarily on the early writings and 
especially on the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. 
Here Marx is held to be philosophical, although not systematic. This 
"humanist" interpretation emphasizes Marx's concern with social op-
pression and exploitation and with the possibilities of human freedom. 5 
The second interpretation focuses on Marx's political economy and 
treats him not as a philosopher but rather as an economic theorist. This 
view is based primarily on the later writings and especially on Capital. 
Introduction xxv 
Here Marx is held to be systematic, but not philosophical. This second 
interpretation emphasizes Marx's analysis of capitalist economy and 
specifically his theories of surplus value, capitalist accumulation, and 
economic crises. 6 
By contrast, my interpretation sees the continuity between these two 
aspects of Marx's work and indeed shows how, in the Grundrisse .iMarx 
develops his theory of alienation as political economy;; Further, my 
interpretation allows us to see how in his concrete socia! theory, 
whether in his early or later works, Marx remains both philosophical 
and systematic. 7 Indeed, I would claim that it is his philosophical 
systematicity itself that accounts for Marx's development of his theory 
of alienation as political economy. That is, Marx's concern for sys-
tematicity leads to his construction of a social ontology that provides a 
single foundation both for his analysis of capitalism and of other social 
forms, and for his theory of being human-of the nature of human 
activity, its alienated forms and the possibilities that may be realized 
by this activity.I\Thus Marx treats human activity in terms of the con-
crete forms that it takes in social life, and human possibilities in terms 
of their development through various historical stages. Conversely, 
Marx treats capitalist economy in terms of the forms of human activity 
and the human possibilities it both realizes and constrains. Thus Marx 
shows how capitalist production involves the alienatio\l of human 
capacities as well as the development of new capacities. V" 
My interpretation of Marx thus attempts to transcend the one-
sidedness of each of the two prevailing interpretations. It does so, 
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however, not simply by adding together the two aspects of Marx's 
thought that each of the alternative interpretations emphasizes, but 
rather by showing how Marx's concern with human possibilities, on the 
one hand, and his economic critique of capitalism, on the other hand, 
are unified in his systematic philosophical theory of social reality. 
Marx's Social Ontology 
1 The Ontology of Society: Individuals, Relations 
and the Development of Community 
In this chapter I show that for Marx the fundamental entities that 
compose society are individuals in social relations. According to 
Marx, these individuals become fully social and fully able to realize 
human possibilities in the course of a historical development. Thus in 
this chapter I also trace Marx's account of the emergence of such 
universal social individuals through various historical stages. 
Surprisingly, Marx claims that it is the capitalist mode of production 
that is the primary condition for h~e developraent of this social indi-
viduality. In the Grundrisse Marx presents in striking fashion a vision 
of the human potentialities that capitalism unleashes and that form the 
basis for the society of the future. In his phrase "The great civilizing 
influence of capital" consists in 
the cultivation of all the qualitities of the social human being, produc-
tion of the same in a form as rich as possible in needs, because rich in 
qualities and relations-production of this being as the most total and 
universal possible social product, for, in order to take gratification in a . 
many-sided way, he must be capable of many pleasures, hence cul-
tured to a high degree-is likewise a condition of production founded on 
capitaL (p. 409)* 
Further, he writes, 
Universally developed individuals, whose social relations, as their own 
communal relations, are hence also subordinated to their own com-
munal control, are no product of nature, but of history. The degree and 
*Page numbers in parentheses in the text refer to Karl Marx, Grundrisse, translated by 
Martin Nicolaus, New York: Vintage Books, 1973. 
2 The Ontology of Society 
the universality of the development of wealth where this individuality 
becomes possible supposes production on the basis of exchange values 
as a prior condition, whose universality produces not only the aliena-
tion of the individual from himself and from others, but also the uni-
versality and the comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities. (p. 
162) 
One may ask how it is possible for Marx to be critical of capitalism and 
at the same time to see in it the sources for the emergence of social 
individuality. The answer to this questions lies in the fact that Marx 
sees capitalism as a stage of historical development. Thus in the Grund-
risse Marx traces this development through three social stages; (l) 
pre-capitalist economic formations, (2) capitalism and (3) the com-
munal society of the future. The universal social individual described 
in the quotations above is presented as a product of this historical 
development. 
In the first part of this chapter, I shall trace the emergence of this 
social individuality and show how Marx characterizes the different 
stages of history in terms of the different modes of social relations 
among individuals that obtain at each stage. I shall argue, in accor-
dance with my first thesis, that in Marx's account of the development 
of these stages, the logic of this historical process follows the Hegelian 
form of the dialectic.! I shall then consider the question of whether 
Marx imposes this logic on history as an a priori form or whether he 
sees history as having an internal logical necessity in itself. I shall 
argue that Marx rejects both of these views and holds a third view of 
the relation of logic and history. In order to be able to determine what 
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Marx's view is, we must first examine the Hegelian dialectic and 
Marx's use of it in his theory of historical development. 
The analysis of Marx's theory of the changing social relations that 
characterize the historical stages is essential for the reconstruction of 
his ontology of society. For unlike traditional ontologists,'Marx con-
ceives of the fundamental entities of his ontology-namely, individu-
als in social relations-not as fixed, but as historically changing': On 
the basis of a reconstruction of this historical development, it becomes 
possible to abstract a philosophically coherent account of Marx's on-
tology of society. This is the task of the second part of this chapter. 
There I shall show that, like Aristotle,icMarx gives ontological primacy 
to individuals-that is, he takes them as the ultimately real beings-
and sees both history and society as constituted by their activities\ But 
in addition, he holds that individuals cannot be understood apart from 
their relations. In this connection I shall examine what Marx means by 
talking about an individual as "universal" and "social" and by his 
description of this individual as the "most total and universal possible 
social product." It will be seen that Marx's conception of individuality 
is not an individualist conception (as is, for example, that of classical 
liberal political theory). 
Social Relations in the Three Stages of Historical Development 
Some preliminary work is necessary in order to establish my first 
thesis, namely, that Marx sees the Hegelian form of the dialectic as the 
logic of historical development. This involves tracing the form of this 
4 The Ontology of Society 
Hegelian dialectic in some detail. This effort, undertaken in the follow-
ing pages, will permit us to discern the ordering principle that underlies 
Marx's concrete discussion of historical stages. 
It may be useful to construct in advance a set of schemata that 
represents Marx's interpretation of Hegel's dialectic as a logic of his-
torical development. These are intended as a guide to the reconstruc-
tion of Marx's argument. But the elaboration of these schemata will be 
undertaken only after tile discussion of Hegel's dialectic and of Marx's 
concrete historical analysis. The three historical stages are those of 
1. Pre-capitalist formations 
2. Capitalism 
3. Communal society 
The forms of social relations that correspond to these are 
1. Personal dependence 
2. Personal independence based on objective dependence 
3. Free social individuality 
These stages can be further characterized as 
I. Internal relations that are concretely particular 
2. External relations that are abstractly universal 
3. Internal relations that are concretely universal 
With respect to the characteristic of equality, the three historical stages 
maybe ordered in terms of 
I. Relations of inequality 
2. Relations of formal equality 
3. Relations of concrete equality 
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Finally, the social relations in the three stages may be characterized as 
I. Community 
2. Individuality and external sociality 
3. Communal individuality 
Each of these schemata emphasizes an aspect of the logic of social 
development. 
My claim is that the logic that is exemplified in this social develop-
ment as Marx reconstnlcts it is Hegel's dialectical logic, as it is found 
in The Phenomenology of Mind, The Science of Logic and other 
works.2 Marx interprets Hegel's dialectical logic as a logic of historical 
development and adopts the form of this logic in characterizing the 
various stages of social life. However, as will be seen, for Hegel the 
dialectic is fundamentally the logic of consciousness, whereas for 
Marx it fundamentally characterizes the development of practical activ-
ity and social relations. 3 For Hegel, the dialectic may be characterized 
as a process in which the stages, or as Hegel calls them, "moments", 
are (1) Being in itself or immediacy, (2) Being for another or mediated 
being, and finally (3) Being in and for itself or mediated immediacy. 
The terms "Being in itself" or "immediate unity" designate the 
case in which something is taken in its immediacy, that is, as a unity 
unrelated to anything external to it. However, according to Hegel, this 
being in itself already contains an implicit self-differentiation, for this 
something taken in itself is a determinate being, namely, it is this being 
and not some other being. As such, it presupposes other being as 
different from it. For Hegel, this is not simply a logical claim, but an 
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ontological one,4 namely that the being of anything as a concrete being 
presupposes a relation to what it is not and therefore posits this dif-
ference from itself as its own condition for self-identity. Its being 
determinate therefore means literally its being limited by, or negated 
by, an other. Hegel quotes Spinoza's phrase to this effect: Every de-
termination is a negation. 5 (I might add that in the Grundrisse Marx 
also quotes this phrase from Spinoza approvingly.) Insofar as the being 
in itself now stands in relation to this other, it is no longer being in 
itself but being for an other, just as the other is now a being for it. Now 
for the first time we can introduce the terms subject and object: The 
other, insofar as it is an other for the being in itself is an object for this 
being, with respect to which the being in itself is now a subject. 6 
Insofar as the subject stands in relation only to itself, it is as Hegel says 
"for itself" or "bare subjectivity." But insofar as this subject stands 
in relation to an other, it is an object for this other and therefore is not 
for itself, but only for another. According to Hegel, since the object in 
this stage is external or wholly other to the subject, it "stands over 
against" the subject or, as he says, is "antagonistic" to the subject. 
Therefore, being in itself is now no longer an immediate unity, since it 
is mediated by this relation to another. (To be mediated is to be 
changed or qualified by the relations into which something enters.) 
In this second stage, consequently, the original unity has become a 
disunity in which the things appear to be related as external to each 
other. However, as we have seen, this otherness between subjects and 
objects is generated by the original being's own self-differentiation in 
which it posited the other as the condition of its own self-identity. Thus 
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the separation of subject and object is not really a separation between 
two wholly different things as it appears, but is conceived by Hegel as 
the self-separation of being. In reality, therefore, this disunity is tran-
scended by the deeper unity in which the object is realized as the 
subject itself in its otherness. In this final stage, the disunity is, so to 
speak, negated and transcended and the unity of the first stage is re-
achieved as a differentiated unity. The immediacy of the first stage has 
now been mediated, that is, differentiated, in the second stage and this 
immediacy reappears in the third stage but as a mediated immediacy. 
This dialectic may also be understood as a process of growing self-
consciousness or self-realization of a subject, as Hegel presents it in, 
for example, The Phenomenology of Mind. In this process, a subject 
that comes to know itself, or comes to self-consciousness, knows itself 
at first only in the form of an other, or as Hegel and Marx both say, in 
its objectified form. In order to come to know itself in the form of an 
other, it must transform or externalize itself into its own "otherness" 
or its own "other-being." But in this way it knows itself as an external 
or alien object and does not know itself as itself. That is, there is a 
mistake being made in which the subject takes the other as wholly 
estranged or wholly external to it. This stage is one of alienation. In the 
third stage the subject achieves self-knowledge in the recognition that 
what it knew in the second stage as all other is nothing but the subject 
itself in its objectified or externalized form. It may be seen that the 
dialectic presupposes an activity by the subject, namely, one in which 
the subject creates its own objects, in terms of which or through which 
8 The Ontology of Society 
it then comes to know or recognize it~elf. This activity is called by 
Hegel and Marx the activity of objectification. 
Finally, the stages in the dialectic are characterized by different 
kinds of relations which obtain at each stage. In the first stage, which is 
an immediate unity (or being in itself), the relations are within the 
unity or are internal to it. This unity is in effect an organic whole. As 
we have seen, there are implicit differentiations within it; but these 
have as yet no independent character, that is, they are not individuals 
but only dependent aspects of the being in itself or the whole. These 
differentiations are the implicit others of being in itself, but others that 
have not yet separated from it as objects separate from the subject. 
They are, so to speak, submerged in the whole from which they also 
derive whatever character they have. The relations within this whole 
are not part-part relations, but rather part-whole relations. As such, the 
relations among parts are not external relations among individuals, but 
rather are dependent relations which derive from their being parts of 
the whole. The relations at this stage are therefore internal relations, 
that is, internal to the whole. In the second stage, the unity or being in 
itself is negated and transformed into a disunity in which there are only 
separate subjects and objects. The only relations that obtain at this 
stage are relations among these apparently discrete or separate indi-
viduals. Therefore, the relations between them are external relations in 
the sense that each is outside the other, or only for an other. Thus each 
appears alien to the other. The only unity that remains, therefore, is 
neither that of a totality, nor of an organic whole, but of an aggregate. 
It is therefore, a system of merely external relations. However, accord-
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ing to Hegel, the externality or disunity at this stage is merely an 
appearance, for it is only the objectified form of the original unity, 
which has transformed itself into this aggregate of external relations. 
In the third stage, the separate subjects who were related to each 
other only as objects, namely, as beings for another, now recognize 
themselves in these objects or recognize these objects as like them-
selves. Therefore they recognize each other as subjects, and the unity 
betv/een subjects a.."'1d objects is reestablished in this recognition. The 
subjects are then related to each other not as alien external others, but 
as aspects of a common species subject. The relations are therefore 
internal, since they are the interrelations within this common or com-
munal subject which is now no longer made up of discrete indi-
viduals in external relations, but rather of individuals who are unified 
through their common subjectivity. Further, it is in the very fact of the 
recognition of each other as subjects that their species or common 
character resides-that is, one comes to recognize oneself as a subject 
through the recognition by the other that one is a subject. Here the 
alienation is overcome. The subjects are therefore mutually interde-
pendent and the relations between them are internal because each sub-
ject is what it is-a subject-through its relation to the other, namely, 
through being recognized as a subject by the other. These individuals 
therefore form a communal but differentiated subject that expresses 
itself in and through each individual. The whole or unity that is recon-
stituted in these internal relations among the individuals is thus 
mediated or differentiated by their individuality, but unified by their 
communality. 
10 The Ontology of Society 
Having reviewed the Hegelian forms of the dialectic, we may turn to 
Marx to see whether his concrete analysis of stages of social develop-
ment does in fact follow the formal structure of Hegel's dialectic. 1 It 
will be recalled that this was my first thesis. 
In the Grundrisse the pre-capitalist stage of society-including the 
Asiatic, the ancient classical and the Germanic forms-is described as 
a stage of community in which the individual "appears as dependent, 
as belonging to a greater whole"(p. 84). In Marx's characterization, 
this stage appears as what we may call an immediate unity, for on his 
view, although there are internal differentiations within this 
community-for example, between master and slave or between lord 
and serf-the community as a whole is self-sufficient, is an organic 
totality and constitutes a relatively static or stable entity. 8 Further, at 
this stage, where landed property and agriculture form the basis of the 
economic order, there is a unity between labor and its objective condi-
tions, or between the individual and nature. Thus the producer is 
identified with and bound to both the materials of his or her produc-
tion, that is, primarily the soil (and tools), and to the mode of his or her 
production, that is, his or her craft or skill. The relation of producer to 
product is also direct and immediate: he Of she produces in order to 
consume and consumes what he or she produces. 9 Because of this 
immediate unity between labor and the natural conditions of produc-
tion, both the mode of production and the relations within which the 
individual stands appear as natural; that is, they appear as being the 
way things are, as pregiven to individuals, not as created by them. In 
reality, according to Marx, these relations are social and historic prod-
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ucts. Because of this, this stage should be qualified as a relative im-
mediate unity, that is, this stage can be seen in retrospect as an im-
mediate unity relative to the next stage of social organization. 
However, production by individuals is at this stage always mediated 
by the producer's relation to the community, in which and for which he 
or she produces, for example, the clan, the tribe, the feudal manor. 
Indeed, according to Marx, it is the community itself that is "the first 
great force of production." Production takes place through a division 
of labor and through hierarchical relations determined by the commu-
nity; property also is held by virtue of membership in the community, 
whose power may be symbolically vested in a chieftain, a feudal lord, 
or a king. The aim of production in these pre-capitalist forms is the 
reproduction of the individual in his or her specific relation to the 
community. Thus these relations take on the force of tradition. 
The relations among individuals within this organic community are 
internal relations. That is, individuals here relate to each other person-
ally and in accordance with their status, role and function within the 
community. According to Marx, they "enter into connection with one 
another only as individuals imprisoned within a certain definition, as 
feudal lord and vassal, landlord and serf, etc. or as members of a caste, 
etc. or as members of an estate, etc." (p. 163). Thus the identities of 
individuals, as well as the character of their relations to each other, are 
determined by their place within the totality. Moreover, in these 
communities-for example, under feudalism and the early forms of 
tribal community-the forms of obligation and of legal right do not 
function primarily through an objective instrument that enforces them 
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from without, for example, a state or legal system institutionalized in 
the form of courts, judges, and so forth. Rather, these social relations 
are internalized in the traditional relations among persons in the local 
community and have their force almost as a natural condition. By 
contrast, relations between one community and the next are bound, by 
and large, only by whatever agreements the communities choose to 
make or are forced to make (by negotiation, contract, or war and 
conquest). In this sense, i'v'Iarx notes that it is only at t~e periphery of 
the community in its exchange with other communities that the notion 
of contract or of relations between two independent parties begins to 
appear. Such relations between communities may be understood as 
external. 
The internal relations within such an organic community are further 
characterized by Marx as relations of personal dependence and as 
relations of domination or as master-slave relations. Thus the social 
relations in pre-capitalist society are unfree and unequal. The form of 
personal dependence that is rooted in the bond between the slave, serf, 
or member of the commune and the soil or nature is always identified 
with the domination of a master-the slave owner, feudal lord, tribal 
leader, or king-and with the personal rendering of service or work to 
this master. Moreover, such relations of domination more generally 
refer to the dependence of the individual on the totality or community, 
in which he or she is "imprisoned within a certain definition" (p. 
163). In this sense, even the "free citizens" of ancient Athens or 
Rome are personally dependent. Furthermore, these relations of domi-
nation are themselves internalized. They constitute a set of static and 
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traditional relations which appear to be natural relations, for example, 
they are based on blood ties, kinship, sex, or hereditary right. 
Thus finally at this stage, individuality remains bound to particular-
ity, namely, to serving a particular function or role without any change 
or possibility of change. Individuals cannot pick up and leave or take 
on a different social role. They are fixed in a stable set of social 
relations and in a particular ~d concrete mode of fulfilling a function. 
-.!n this sense the individual is concrete, particularized a~d unrree:--Uni-
versality belongs only tOtl1e community and this Ui1IVefsalrty isTimited 
to the local, tfie regional, the traditional, and IS thus noftuTIY-iiniYefslll. 
Thus msofar as the community constitutes the whole universe-of-life 
-~9Ivlties for one-generation after the-next~-ihTs __ umverseoflifeis-
s~verclY15oiii1cledbotlilnge~Qlcarand-ciiltur~lj~~. ii- is ; Marx 
~2'S' merely local. The full development of individ~-aTiiuman 
~!II~<lsities therefore_cannot take place -be~~~~--!'i~J'ii!gi:QG~guired 
human activities is fixed within these ~arrow coniiru:s,..·_-
--Tosummarize, then: Stage-~ihestaie-~f-;;;~-capitalist economic[ 
formations, is an immediate unity. Its social form is that of community 
and the social relations are internal relations that are concretely particu-
lar or merely local. These are characteristically relations of personal 
dependence and are unequal and non-reciprocal. Finally, in this stage. 
the social relations appear as natural relations. 
According to Marx, the second stage of social organization, namely, 
that of capitalism, presupposes the dissolution of the immediate unity 
characteristic of pre-capitalist community, both the unity of the pro-
ducer with the community and with the soil. Thus a condition for its 
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development is the emergence of the landless, propertyless worker. 
This worker is no longer a participant in communal production, nor is 
he or she rooted to the source of his or her subsistence in the soil by 
personal relations of slavery or serfdom, nor does he or she own the 
instruments of production. The only thing such~lll1_ il1~i"i.<lll<llh<lsl~ftto 
do~<; to separate his ~:_t:er ibi!ity to work from hi~':J!_~~.EeE~()nas his 
or he7Qli1u<p.~riY .. This becomespos-SThre-Only if he or she can 
exchange it for the means of his or her subsistence. He or she becomes 
a wage laborer. 1o This presupposes on the other side the availability of 
a fund, of capital, which can buy this labor. A further presupposition 
for the emergence of capitalism is the existence of a system of simple 
exchange. This system, which proliferates with the development of 
capitalism, presupposes that the agents in the exchange possess what 
they exchange and are free to contract in the marketplace, that is, to 
agree in exchange on the equivalents. Neither the slave nor the serf 
possessed this freedom. 
e However, for Marx, these individuals are not fully independent. 
Rather, he suggests that their independence is "more correctly called 
indifference" (p. 163). Thus the unity of pre-capitalist community is 
replaced by the disunity of these indifferent individuals. Further, they 
are no longer immediately related to each other as before through 
¥ 
. " internal relations. Rather, they are mediated or socially related through 
external relations. Thus Marx says, "the reciprocal and all-sided de-
pendence of individuals who are indifferent to one another forms their 
social connection" (p. 156). And as he explains earlier, "this recip-
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rocal dependence is expressed in the constant necessity for exchange 
and in exchange value as the all-sided mediation" (p. 156). In ex-
change, the personal or internal relatedness of pre-capitalist society is 
replaced by external relations in the marketplace, that is, between 
values of commodities. In capitalism, "The general exchange of activ-
ities and products, which has become a vital condition for each 
individual-their mutual interconnection- here appears as something 
alien to them, autonomous, as a thing" (p. 157). 
Exchange is therefore an external relation between personally inde-
pendent entities. The independence or freedom of these entities con-
sists in their status as legal persons. Marx describes the freedom to 
exchange in terms that draw heavily on Hegel's discussion of Abstract 
Right in The Philosophy of Right. According to Marx, "Although 
individual A feels a need for the commodity of individual B, he does 
not appropriate it by force, nor vice versa, but rather they recognize 
one another reciprocally as proprietors, as persons whose will pene-
trates their commodities" (p. 243). Thus the worker who sells his or 
her labor time is not coerced to do so, but rather divests him or herself 
of it voluntarily. (Such a free act of divesting oneself of property is the 
mark of a legal or juridical person for Hegel and Marx.) 
In like manner, the system of simple exchange introduces equality 
and reciprocity between the producers. Just as in Hegel's analysis of 
abstract right, the act of contracting establishes the equality of the 
persons who contract, so for Marx, "As far as the formal character is 
concerned ... each of the subjects is an exchanger; i.e. each has the 
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same social relation towards the other that the other has towards him. 
As subjects of exchange, their relation is therefore that of equality" 
(p. 241). 
Thus in contrast to pre-capitalist societies, which were characterized 
by personal dependence and relations of domination, the second social 
stage, that of capitalism, is characterized by personal independence. 
However, this transformation is an illusion to the extent that the de-
pendence is not eliminated, but rather continues in objective form. 
Thus in speaking of the relations between the producers in exchange, 
Marx writes, "These external relations are very far from being an 
abolition of 'relations of dependence'; [rather] ... these objective de-
pendency relations appear in antithesis to those of personal dependence 
in such a way that individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas 
earlier they depended on one another" (p. 164). 
The objective dependence that emerges in capitalism takes three 
forms: first, the objectivity of money or exchange; second, the objec-
tivity of capital, which stands over against labor; and third, the objec-
tivity of the machine. These three forms designate three moments or 
stages within capitalism itself, which therefore should be regarded as 
itself undergoing internal change and development. 
We may begin with the first form-the money form. Marx charac-
terizes the first new form of dependence that emerges with capitalism 
as an abstract relationship that becomes universal. What does he mean 
by this? 
In exchange, the exchangers are free to relate to each other in terms 
of an abstract medium of exchange, that is, the equivalent value of the 
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goods they exchange, which is an abstraction from the particular con-
crete form of use value these goods have for the consnmers. Thus the 
relations between these free persons are all translated into a universal 
medium, or a universal language, that is, value or its embodiment in a 
symbolic form in money. Thus the individuals who remain individu-
ally different outside of exchange and whose different needs and dif-
ferent products are the very basis for exchange come to exist for each 
other not in tt~eir personal relations, but only in the objectified forrn 
of their value to each other in the marketplace, namely, as abstract 
quantities. 
With this development of production for the sake of exchange, ob-
jective dependence develops into the domination of labor by capital. 
This constitutes the second moment of objective dependence. As we 
have seen, the pre-capitalist small proprietor or serf now appears as the 
propertyless, free worker and all property-all materials for production 
and subsistence-is possessed by capital. The worker becomes (objec-
tively) dependent not on an individual, since the particular person to 
whom the worker sells his or her labor is indifferent, but rather on the 
system of capital. The worker must sell the only property he or she has, 
namely, his or her capacity to work, in order to gain the means of 
subsistence. This act of selling the capacity to work is an exchange. 
But this particular commodity-what Marx calls labor power-is dif-
ferent from every other commodity, and as a consequence this exchange 
is ditferent from every other. Marx analyzes the supposed exchange be-
tween labor and capital into two separate acts. The first is the sale of 
the commodity labor power for a price, a sum of money, namely, the 
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wage. This is indeed an act of exchange. The seconQ.jlcL.'.'in-which ... 
---~t individual equality and ~reedom dis;tIm.'ear" (p. 247) Marx 
calls the appropriation of labor by capital. This is the use of labor by 
capital in which labor is "value-positing labor, productive labor," (p. 
298); it is the ~'living source ()~ue" (p. 295). In this act, the 
productive force of labor becomesthC'!.Pf9.du<':tiyeforce 9{cllpital, a 
force that ritalritlliisariaml.irtipfie-s·~apital. This second act gives rise to 
the possibilitylliaf lahar produces SurPlus value, more value than it 
costs to reproduce the worker, that is, to reproduce his or her labor 
power as a commodity. 
The second act, in which labor produces new value that augments 
the value of capital, is an activity of objectification. According to 
Marx,.th(;'.Pr()eess.J:lf.o..bjecti:fi~ni~.9l!~jn which.labor. forms oQjects 
--inJ;hej1l'1ltge . oLHs.n(;'ed~. I.t.is ... itQ!:()ce~o~~!lg .9pjec.ts.thathave 
value. Thtls~~lu:}~_?"j:::~.Q'::~Jltl->or. In capitalist production, objec-
tification takes the form of alienation. Alienation designates this sep-
aration or externality between living labor, whIch appears as pure 
suhjectivit)tT5filSp6Veity, and capital, which appears as ownership of 
objective wealth or as property; here capital is "masteroverJjving 
)ab(j!:' cal?~city" (p. 453). Capital, which gets the us-;;-valueof labor or 
value-creating labor, can realize surplus value and hence grows rela-
tive to labor. Thus for Marx, the worker ",l1ecessarily improverishes 
l.lilllseif ... because the creative power of his labor estiiblishes itseif as 
thep-';wer-orcap'itaCilS"'analien"'pow';;rconrronting him i, (ll. 307). 
But we shall see that this alienated objectification by the worker of 
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his or her creative powers itself sets the conditions for the worker's 
recognizing him or herself in this external objectivity. The third mo-
ment of objective dependence--namely, the dependence of labor on 
"'syst'iiffisofmacninerY::·:---isdeCisiVe f6rlliisrecognitionand thus for the 
transformation to the third social stage. But before proceeding (0 this 
transformation, r shall review the dialectical elements in the transition 
from pre-capitalist to capitalist society, as I have presented them. 
There are a number of ways in which this transition can be expressed 
and which are to be found in Marx. As we have seen,the..genemlform 
.Qf the dialectic is that each stage is the negation of the preceding one. 
That is to say, whereas i~fi~st stag-;;~-e'havepersOniilaependence, 
in the second we have personal independence and objective depen-
dence. In the first we have internal relations that are concretely particu-
lar, and in the second we have external relations that are abstractly 
universal. Similarly, what appear as natural bonds in the first case give 
rise to social bonds created through exchange in the second. Another 
characteristic of the dialectic is that the undifferentiated unity or im-
mediacy of the first stage becomes self-differentiated in the succeeding 
one. And the process of dialectic is seen as one of increasing dif-
ferentiation. Thus, for example, the community as a relatively un-
mediated totality constituted by its internal relations is exploded into 
,!!tm:n-=like frltg_~.!.s which nowstandnolongerin internal relations, 
but\:VblC.hiiandopp-;;seajoea~hoiheriIl external relations. However, 
there is a further dimensio~ioiliisdiHerentiation in the second stage. 
The differences that come to the fore here become,openly .. ilnt!!gonistic 
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and the apparent unity or community of clan or medieval society even-
tnates in the open antithesis of capital and labor which provides the 
moving force of capitalism. 
Thus the transition from pre-capitalist to capitalist society, as Marx 
describes it, can be understood in terms of a number of alternative 
categories, for example, internal relations-external relations, concrete-
abstract. I have suggested that MarD areo"nt of~.1!!l§.itiQlLis dia-
lectical in his use of the Hegelian notio!!..s of n~ation aJ.!.sL differentia-
.-~tioo according Ie "'RieR e'lCb stage arises out of the previous stage by 
such negation and differentiation. Were we to take Marx's account of 
me three stages of historical development as the unfolding of a logical 
scheme, we would expect that the third stage is simply deducible 
from the first two. That is, one would expect that the third stage is a 
negation of the second, as the second is of the first; and thus what 
we would have in the third stage is a negation of the negation. And 
indeed Hegel's dialectical logic has such a form. But the concept of ne-
gation for Hegel is not to be taken in the traditional terms of formal 
logic, in which the negation of the negation would simply yield the 
originally negated first term, that is, where ~ ~ p is equivalent to p. 
On this reading, one would have a circle in which the third stage 
would be a return to the first. Instead, Hegel sees this movement ,-- ~ -----------" ~a"-SlLiral where the third stage h~s~me.,?f the fOfIl]~d ,;ontent 
oJ' the first, but also takes up into itself the developments of The sec-
,on";rs"tage: Therefore the third stage only has a superficial and partial 
~-"--
resemblance to the first stage, or, to put it differently,_repeats it at a 
,.higher level of develOpment. 
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We have seen that in Marx's account the first and second stages of 
historical development follow the form of the Hegelian dialectic. 
However, as I shall argue, it would be wrong to see these stages as 
following each other out of any logical necessity or as exhibiting any 
laws of historical development. Again, Marx's projection of the third 
stage will be seen to involve a negation of some features of the second 
stage and to incorporate on a higher level some of the features of the 
first stage as ,vel! as of tl-te second. But here, too, I shall argue that 
Marx's projection does not have the force of a logical deduction or of a 
historical prediction. Rather, I shall claim that in Marx's view the 
development of the social relations from one stage to the next is a 
contingent one and that it follows from human choices and actions. 
Thus, as we shall see, in Marx's work the dialectical fonn is not to be 
understood as an imposition of logic on history, but rather in a radi-
cally different way. 
Keeping this caution in mind, we may yet see that in Marx's projec-
tion, the third stage stands in the dialectical relation of negation and 
transcendence to the first two stages. Thus in Marx's account the 
internal relations of the first stage may be regarded as negated by the 
external relations of the second, but in the second these external rela-
tions have the formal aspect of equality, whereas in the first they are 
relations of inequality and hierarchy of stations, duties and personal 
attributes. In the third stage Marx projects that internal relations may 
again be established, but now with a realization of the formal equality 
of the second stage as a real or substantive equality. Or again, the un-
free social individuals in the organic communities of the first stage give 
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way to formally or abstractly free individuals who are social only 
externally (that is, relating only through laws or market relations). In 
the third stage Marx anticipates the reestablishment of a community of 
social individuals, but now as concretely free. Furthermore, in Marx's 
projection of this third stage, the individuals are characterized by the 
universality and differentiations that the second capitalist stage intro-
duces into social life. 
Now we are re<idy to return to the quotations with which we began, 
namely, Marx's account of the third stage as it is prepared for by the 
second stage (capitalism). Marx sees capitalism as developing the uni-
versality and sociality of human capacities, but only in external or 
objective form. This development can be understood from the fact that 
capital strives to increase surplus value and this can occur in two ways: 
first, through increasing absolute surplus value-by increasing the 
length of the working day-and, second, by increasing relative surplus 
value-by decreasing the proportion of total labor time that goes for 
necessary labor or the wage, which can be achieved by the increase and 
development of productive forces. Such an increase most often occurs 
through the introduction of large-scale machinery. In order to realize 
the surplus value, the capitalist must be able to sell the goods produced 
and put the surplus value to work again in new production. Therefore 
the increase in surplus value presupposes an increase both in consump-
tion and in production. 
According to Marx, the tendency of capital to create more absolute 
surplus value gives rise to the tendency to propagate production based 
on capital and thus to create the world market, a tendency "directly 
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given in the concept of capital itself" (p. 408). In increasing relative 
snrplus value by increasing productivity, capitalism also produces 
more commodities which must be consumed. To expand consumption, 
the capitalist will strive to discover new use values and to create new 
needs. But this in turn leads to the development of new laboring 
capacities to meet these new needs. Thus labor itself becomes more 
diversified and more internally differentiated. Thus, according to 
Marx, capitalism produces 
Universal exchange of ... products ... the exploration of the earth in 
all directions ... the discovery, creation and satisfaction of new needs 
arising from society itself; ... [further, capit.al creates] a system of gen-
eral exploitation of natural and human qUalities ... the ulliversal appro-
priation of nature as well ~ of the social bond by the memb~rs of 
society. Hence the great civlllZlng mfluence of C~Pltal; Its productIOn of 
a stage of society in comparison to which all earber ones appear as mere 
local developments of humanity and as nature-idolatry. (pp.409-41O) 
But the new laboring capacities that are developed by capitalism are 
developed only one-sidedly, that is, each worker develops only one 
capacity. The universality characterizes only the objective processes of 
production and consumption as a whole. Further, although capitalism 
is the development of all human capacities, activities and needs, thisis 
not yet to say that it is the development of the capacities of all humans. 
Similar! y, Marx describes capitalism as cultivating the social human 
being, but it does this, too, in a merely objective way. That is to say, it 
produces this sociality in increasing division of labor, in exchange and 
later in machines; but this socialization goes on behind the backs of 
subjects, as Marx says. 
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According to Marx, this social combination and cooperation re-
quired by the capitalist work process is embodied in the machine. The 
system of machinery may be regarded as the most extreme form of the 
worker's alienation or objective dependence. For "in machinery, labor 
no longer appears as the governing unity of the production process"; 
rather its unity exists in the living (active) machinery, which "con-
fronts his individual, insignificant doings as a mighty organism" (p. 
693). Indeed, in 111achinerj even knowledge itself-in the form of the 
technological application of science-comes to appear as alien and 
external to the worker; the "general productive forces of the social 
brain" (p. 694) are thus absorbed into capital as against labor. 
However, this development of machinery also has a positive mo-
ment. For machinery serves to increase abundance and, correlatively, 
to increase the workers' free time by reducing necessary labor time. In 
addition, automatic machinery increases the social combination of the 
workers. This capacity will "redound to the benefit of emancipated 
labor" (p. 70 I), as Marx says. Thus in large-scale industry, the product 
is no longer produced by an isolated worker but rather by the combina-
tion of social activity, a combination objectified in the machine. This 
sociality consists in the factory setup itself, in the organization of 
machinery that requires many hands, and in the combination of the 
work of scientists, machinists, miners, and so forth that makes the 
machine possible\Thus, machinery makes individuals interdependent 
in increasingly internal ways in contrast to the earlier external connec-
tion of individuals, who were social only through exchange. 
The machine is thus the objectification of the workers' sociality, but 
The Ontology of Society 25 
in alien form, that is, in a form belonging to capital. What remains is 
for the producers to recognize themselves in this alien object-to rec-
ognize the whole system of capital as their own work. 
According to Marx, this recognition leads to the third stage, in 
which the individuals reappropriate this alien or objective sociality and 
universality." They become subjectively social and universal, that is, 
they become communal individuals. 
The subjectivity t.hat ,:vas made penurious in t..t,e alienation of all its 
capacities in the second stage now has this richness restored to it. The 
many-sidedness of needs and gratifications becomes the cultivation of 
individuals, that is, their self-realization. As Marx says, 
. [Wjhen the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth 
other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, 
productive forces etc., created through universal exchange? The full 
development of human mastery over tbe forces of nature, those of 
so-called nature as well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute 
working out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other 
than the previous historic development which makes this totality of 
development, i.e. the development of all human powers as such the 
end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? (p. 488) 
Thus illdividuais are now free to develop their capacities and are no 
longei constrained to develop thosecapaCltit;sdemandedbyth~'p;:;;:' 
duction process. They thus overcome their objective depeimence. In 
doing so, social combination now becomes the immediate subjective 
relations of mutuality among individuals. The relations again become 
personal relations as in the pre-capitalist stage, but no longer relations 
of domination and no longer mediated, as in the second stage, by 
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external objects. The relations are therefore internal relations in that 
each individual recognizes the others as free individuals like him or 
herself. But in fact, it is this recognition of the other which is a 
condition for the full realization of the other's freedom. Thus freedom 
is realized through social interaction. 
The formal freedom of the second stage becomes substantive free-
dom in the third stage in that the individuals become objectively inde-
pendent. This independence, however, is not the elimination of the 
objective realm of production, but rather the assignment of this realm 
to the fully objectified form of automatic production which is now 
under the communal control of the individuals. They are therefore 
freed to relate to each other not out of needs of objective dependence 
but in terms of subjective needs-that is, in terms of their mutual 
enhancement as well as their personal qualities and achievements. The 
enrichment of this domain of free personal interaction thus encourages 
the full development of differences between individuals and the full 
development as well of differences within each individual. In this form 
of society, therefore, the individuals achieve both subjective and objec-
tive independence. 
Universality here is therefore not abstract universality, that is, de-
fined in terms of those qualities in which all individuals are the same, 
but rather a universality in the sense of a fulfillment of the concrete 
differentiation among individuals. Universality then is a concept of 
open-ended totality in which the potentialities of the species are ful-
filled by the free development of each individual, and where each is free 
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to develop many-sidedly and in cooperation with others. In this sense, 
such universality is concrete and differentiated. 
Thus Marx sees social development through these three stages as a 
process that takes the form of Hegel's dialectic. What is the signifi-
cance of this for a social ontology'? First, it is significant in that in 
Marx's view social reality itself is a process of dialectical change. The 
ontological character of this reality is that it is not fixed or static; rather 
its basic entities and relations are to be understood as changing. Thus 
Marx's theory of the nature of social reality is at the same time a theory 
of social change. Tnat is, his philosophical ontology itself is insepara-
ble from the applied description of social and historical deVelopment. 
If social reality reveals a logic in its developme~t, does this mean 
that Marx (as has often been alleged about him as well as about Hegel) 
simply imposes an a priori logical form on the social reality which 
history then has to fit? Or does it mean that Marx sees the logic of 
history itself as having the internal necessity of logical deduction, such 
that events entail f)ther events? First, it is clear that Marx rejects an a 
priori conception of development and explicitly criticizes Hegel for 
this view. In the Grundrisse he writes, "Hegel fell into the illusion of 
conceiving the real [that is, social reality 1 as the product of thought 
concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out of 
itself, by itself" (p. 101). 
In answer to the second question, it is clear that Marx also rejects the 
view that objective social development has an internal necessity of a 
logical sort. Rather, it is only in retrospect that one can reconstruct 
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this logic as a contingent one based on what has in fact happened. 
Similarly, it is only prospectively that one can project the future in 
terms of contingent possibilities prepared for in the present but to be 
determined by human choices and actions. 
Thus, as against both of these view-attributing logical necessity to 
history-Marx argues for an alternative conception of the dialectical 
form of historical or social reality. First, as we shall see in the follow-
ing chapters, Marx views the course of historical development as en-
tirely dependent on the activity of agents who are fundamentally free. 
Therefore, his conception of historical development should be sharply 
distinguished from that of Hegel. Whereas for Hegel, history unfolds 
with an inner necessity such that the course of its development is 
deterministic, for Marx, by contrast, history is the product of the 
choices and actions of agents and the course of its development is 
therefore possibilistic and contingent on these choices and actions. 
Further, in distinction from Hegel, Marx sees the dialectic of social 
development not as a series of stages in the development of the Idea, 
that is, as a dialectic of thought, but rather as one generated by the 
actions of real, concretely existing individuals. In this respect Marx 
gives ontological priority to such active existing individuals, whereas 
in Hegel these individuals emerge simply as vehicles or agents in the 
service of an autonomous and independent Idea. '2 In giving priority to 
the activity of real individuals, Marx introduces a strongly Aristotelian 
element, which distinguishes his dialectic from Hegel's.13 I shall con-
sider shortly the implications of this move for an ontological account of 
entities and relations. Its importance for an account of the logic of 
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social reality is that the dialectic is seen as produced by the actions of 
concrete individuals. 
Thus Hegel's view seems to imply that what is grasped in thought is 
the beginning point and that the concrete development is only the 
explication of the determinations contained in the abstract conception. 
In a sense, Marx also seems to argue that we have to be able to form 
such abstractions that we will be able to deduce an account of the 
concrete reality from them. But his critique of Hegel bears precisely on 
how such abstractions may come to be formed. He argues in the 
section on "The Method of Political Economy" in the Grundrisse that 
all of these concrete determinations have first to be realized in social 
reality itself before the adequate conception of its dialectical nature can 
be realized in thought. It is on the basis of our experience and knowl-
edge of these real social circumstances that we come to form such 
abstractions as will be adequate to explain them. Another way of 
putting this is that Marx is arguing that one cannot form an adequate 
principle of explanation until one knows what it is that has to be 
explained; and that one cannot know what is to be explained until one 
has the actual circumstances and the experience of them.'4 Thus ac-
cording to Marx it is only in the epoch of bourgeois society that social 
development has reached the point where it is possible to form an 
adequate abstract concept that will enable us to grasp the present stage 
of social development as a development from a previous stage and as 
containing within itself the conditions for a new stage. 
This dimension of Marx's method introduces a further Aristotelian 
element into his analysis. Specifically, Marx's method is Aristotelian 
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in its notion that one cannot read forward, from potentiality to actnal-
ity, but only backward, from the actualities to the potentialities that 
eventuate in them. It is in this sense that Aristotle says that actuality is 
prior to potentiality. 15 Thus for Marx, 
Bourgeois society is the most developed and the most complex historic 
organization of production. The categories which express its relations, 
the comprehension of its structure, thereby also allows insights into the 
structnre and the relations of production of all the vanished social 
fonnations out of whose ruins and elements it built itself up .... Human 
anatomy contains a key to the anatomy of the ape. The intimations of 
higher development among the subordinate animal species, however, 
can be understood only after the higher development is already known. 
The bourgeois economy thus supplies the key to the ancient, etc. (p. 
105) 
This understanding of the dialectic as logical reconstruction also allows 
us to reject the view that social and historical development have an 
internal necessity. The only "necessity" is that the past is past and 
therefore fixed and thus the dialectic is taken as a description and 
explanation of this original! y contingent process. 
The Ontology of Individuals-in-relation 
This contingency of social development for Marx has as its ontological 
foundation the actions of real individuals who produce history in and 
through their relations to each other. These relations are social rela-
tions, these individuals are social individuals, and society is what is 
constituted by these individuals in relations. The questions therefore 
arise: What is a social individual? What are social relations? And what 
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kind of an entity is society? Here I shall characterize Marx's ontology 
of society in an abstract way, which will derive from my preceding 
account. 
Let me begin with two quotations: In the sixth thesis on Feuerbach 
Marx writes, "The individual is an ensemble of social relations. "16 
Correlatively, in the Grundrisse Marx claims that "Society expresses 
the sum of interrelations, the relations in which individuals stand" (p. 
265). From these statements, it would seem as though for Marx there is 
no ontologically independent entity that one could characterize either 
as an individual or as society, but only a system of relations. On such a 
view, the being of the relata would be nothing apart from the relation-
ship, nor would there be a "that which" stands in relation to some-
thing else. We would have an ontology of pure relations, with "en-
tities" having no independent ontological status whatever except as 
nodes of relations or moments of relationship. Yet Marx talks about the 
real concrete individual and of society as a social reality constituted by 
individuals. One therefore might read him as holding the view that 
only individuals are real, and that relations are not real but only deriva-
tive ways of describing how such individuals stand to each other. I 
would argue instead, from a reading of the Grundrisse as well as 
Marx's other works, that Marx is operating with an ontology of both 
real individuals and real relations. What we need to show is that the 
concepts "individual" and "relation" are not separable concepts, and 
that Marx regards the separation of individuals from relations posited 
by the two one-sided interpretations presented above as a conceptnal 
abstraction from the concrete reality. 
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One way of interpreting the view that both individuals and relations 
are real would be to see each as a basic or independent ontological 
entity, which then are somehow coordinated. But if this were Marx's 
view, he would have the traditional problem, posed sharply by Brad-
ley, of how relations could be related, either to each other or to sub-
stances.17 This would lead to an infinite regress of relations relating 
relations, and so forth. But this would be a misreading of Marx. 
For Marx, relations do not exist apart from the individuals who are 
related; they are abstractable only in conception. He writes, "Relations 
can be established as existing only by being thought, as distinct from 
the subjects which are in these relations with each other" (p. 143). 
Relations as disembodied or uninstantiated universals exist only in 
thought as abstract universals. This is in agreement with Aristotle's 
conceptualist view of universals (for example, species and genus, 
which exist only as "secondary substances" and therefore only as 
what can be predicated of primary substances or individuals). Yet 
relations are not unreal or non-actual; rather, they exist in and through 
the individuals related, or as relational properties of these individuals. 
On the other hand, these individuals are ontologically independent 
entities. But that is not to say that their existence can be abstracted 
from the relational properties that they have. Here Marx follows Aris-
totle closely. For both, the concretely existing individual is always a 
this-such, that is, an individual of a given kind. Thus in the Categories 
Aristotle says, "All substance appears to signify that which is indi-
vidual"; and "Everything except primary substances is either predi-
cated of a primary substance or is present in them, and if these last did 
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not exist it would be impossible for anything else to exist." 18 The 
emphasis on the "this" is that the individual is a numerically distinct 
and self-identical entity, that is, a substance, but a substance with 
attributes. The "such" therefore designates those attributes that make 
the otherwise abstract particular into a concrete individual. 
Furthermore, for Aristotle, each concrete individual has as its es-
sence or its species-nature that in virtue of which it becomes in actual-
ity what it is potentially, Thus for Aristotle, a thing achieves or realizes 
its nature in its characteristic mode of activity. For Marx, also, the 
individual is a concrete individual in being of a given kind, but always 
an individual, that is, a numerically distinct, concretely existing person 
characterized by a given mode of activity. If one abstracts this indi-
vidual from his or her attributes or from the mode of activity, one has 
left only an abstract individual, namely, one that is numerically distinct 
from others but without concrete character. 
Although Marx does not present an explicit ontological argument in 
the Grundrisse to the effect that concretely existing individuals are the 
basic entities of social reality, nonetheless such a view is clearly pre-
supposed throughout the work. As I have indicated, such individuals 
are understood by Marx as individuals-in-relations or what he calls 
social individuals. The ontological primacy of such concrete individu-
als in Marx's ontology is evident both in his conceptual constructions 
and in his usage throughout the text. For example, in his general 
remarks about the nature of production at the outset of the Grundrisse , 
Marx writes, "All production is appropriation of nature on the part of 
an individual within and through a specific form of society" (p. 87). 
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Or again, "Whenever we speak of production, then, what is meant is 
al ways production at a definite stage of social development-
production by social individuals" (p. 85). Further, Marx stresses the 
fundamental status of individuals whom he regards as constituting the 
social world through their activity. Thus he writes, "All production is 
an objectification of an individual" (p. 226). This emphasis on indi-
viduals is also evident in Marx's understanding of social forms as 
forms in which "individuals reproduce themselves as individuals" (p. 
832). Moreover, Marx explicates the meaning of "a social relation" as 
"a definite relation between individuals" (p. 239); in this way, he 
suggests that social relations do not exist as abstract entities apart from 
the individuals who are related. 19 
But now we may ask: What are the attributes and what are the given 
modes of activity of these individuals? Here Marx departs from Aristo-
tle's view (as well as from all views of a fixed human nature). Where 
Aristotle conceived of the essence of a given thing as a fixed nature, or 
a natural kind, Marx holds that individuals create this nature in their 
activity and therefore it is neither fixed nor presupposed. This even-
tuates in a conception of a changing and developing essence. He calls 
this creative activity labor, which should be taken in a broad sense that 
I shall specify in the next chapter. 
Furthermore, for Marx, the fundamental mode of this activity is 
social. That is to say, the primary attributes that characterize the con-
cretely existing individual and the primary activity of this individual 
involve his or her relations with other individuals. These relations 
constitute these individuals as social individuals. Since sociality is the 
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mode of being of these individuals, to take individuals simply as 
human and not social is to abstract them from the concrete context that 
makes them the individuals they are. Furthermore, for Marx, since 
these individuals create their mode of being and change it by their 
activity, and this mode of being is sociality, therefore this sociality 
must be taken as changing, that is, as developing historically. To take 
this sociality apart from a given historical and social form is also to 
abstract it. Thus in the Grundrisse Marx criticizes the view that in 
society there are only human beings as such; rather, according to him, 
"they are that outside society. To be a slave, to be a citizen, are social 
characteristics, relations between human beings A and B. Human 
being A, as such, is not a slave. He is a slave in and through society" 
(p. 265). 
For Marx, therefore, the primary ontological subject is, properly 
speaking, a social individual. However, there appears to be an equivo-
cation in the usage of the term "social" in Marx: On the one hand, 
human beings are essentially social through all historical periods, 
though in given forms; on the other hand, Marx often speaks about the 
fully social individual of the third stage as a product of history and 
therefore as existing only in potentiality earlier. In fact, in describing 
the stage of capitalism, he speaks of the social relations between per-
sons becoming transformed into an alien form of relations between 
things (p. 157). In this second usage, the fully universal social indi-
vidual may be seen as a teleological concept, like Aristotle's notion of 
actuality, namely, it is the fully realized form of human development 
or its telos. Thus even though this sociality appears in all stages of 
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social development, these stages are also stages of the development of 
sociality itself. 
To speak of developing sociality is to speak of individuals in de-
veloping or changing forms of social relations (created by these indi-
viduals themselves). And to speak of society, for Marx, is to speak of 
the product and the structure constituted by individuals in given rela-
tions. It thus consists fundamentally of the relations that these indi-
viduals establish among tl}emse!ves and the institutionalized forms of 
these relations. Thus society is a constituted entity and not a basic 
entity; it exists only in and through the individuals who constitute it. 
This is not to say that because society is such a generated entity it is a 
mere appearance or a conceptual abstraction. Rather, it is a real entity 
like the individuals who constitute it. Furthermore, as the product of 
the interactions of these individuals, society is not understood by Marx 
as an aggregate or sum of parts, but rather as a totality or whole that is 
more than the sum of its parts. As such, society cannot be understood 
simply by understanding the individual entities that compose it. It 
requires beyond this an understanding of the interrelations among 
them. On the other hand, for Marx, since the society is the product or 
creation of such social individuals, it cannot be understood apart from 
these individuals and their activities. 
In my analysis, social relations were seen to take three forms in the 
three stages I have examined: internal relations that are concretely 
particular in pre-capitalist community; external relations that are 
abstractly universal in capitalism; and internal relations that are con-
cretely universal in the communal society of the future. For my pur-
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poses in this more abstract ontological treatment, I shall distinguish 
between internal and external relations. 
For Marx, all relations between concretely existing individuals are 
internal relations. Internal relations are those in which the individuals 
are changed by their relations to each other, that is, where these rela-
tions between individuals are such that both are reciprocally affected 
by the relation. In his understanding of social relations as internal 
. h . f' fH l' l' relations, ~v'1arx adopts some of tue mam Aeatures 0 ege .. s anu .. ysls 
of internal relations. But Marx radically differs from Hegel in a cru-
cial respect, as we shall see. Marx draws on Hegel's classic exam-
ple of internal relations, namely, the master-slave dialectic in The 
Phenomenology of Mind. In Hegel's account, the subordination of the 
slave is as essential to the constitution of the master qua master as the 
domination of the master is essential to the constitution of the slave qua 
slave. In Hegel's terms, the internal relations here are phenomenologi-
cal, in the sense that the relation consists in the conscious recognition 
of the other in a certain role and of oneself in relation to this role"O If 
the slave refuses to recognize the master as master, the slave is no 
longer a slave and the master is no longer a master; they have become 
changed in who they are by this change in their relations. This internal-
ity can also be seen in the logic of the concepts of domination and 
subordination in that these terms are dependent on each other for their 
meaning. Thus the term "domination" entails a relationship between 
one who dominates and one who is dominated, just as the relative term 
"larger than" entails a relation between something that is larger and 
another thing that is smaller. 
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For Marx, as for Hegel, the individuals in internal relations are each 
changed in the relation. However, Marx differs from Hegel here in that 
Marx does not regard the individuals as wholly interconstituted by 
these relations. Rather, as we have seen, Marx views these individuals 
as independently real and thus not as coming into being as a result of 
their relations. Thus for Marx, although such individuals do not exist 
apart from their relations, and in fact develop and change themselves 
through these relations, yet the existence and mode of activity of these 
individuals is the ontological presupposition of the relations into which 
they enter. These individuals, who are agents, according to Marx, may 
be regarded as constituting these relations by their activity and there-
fore cannot be seen as products of these relations."1 Thus these indi-
viduals have fundamental ontological status and are not to be under-
stood as mere nodes of relations or as wholly constituted by their 
relations. 22 
But if, according to Marx, in the case of internal relations, the relata 
are reciprocally changed with changes in their relations, what are ex-
ternal relations? For Marx, as for Hegel, an external relations is one in 
which each relatum is taken as a separate self-subsistent entity, which 
exists apart from the relation and appears to be totally independent of 
it. The relata are, in this sense, indifferent to the relation, which they 
can enter into without change in their nature or constitution. Thus the 
relation appears as if it could exist apart from the things that are 
related; both entities and relations are thus hypostatized. However, 
an external relation is only an appearance for Marx in the sense that 
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they are the way internal relations appear from a one-sided or abstract 
point of view. 
But external relations are not a mere appearance; this appearance or 
abstraction becomes embodied in a given stage of the development of 
social relations. Specifically for Marx, society itself presents such an 
appearance in the system of exchange in capitalist society, where indi-
viduals appear as being "ruled by abstractions," that is, where their 
relations to each other are presented only in alienated form. Thus for 
Marx, internal and external relations are not merely conceptual abstrac-
tions with no existence except in the head (as he says), but rather, as 
we have seen, they are real social relations, which characterize dif-
ferent stages of social development. 
We may ask how it is that social life can come to take on different 
modes of relations and how it is that internal relations-that is, the 
immediate relations of a community-can become embodied in reality 
as external relations-that is, the alienated forms of exchange, capital, 
and machinery. How can relations among humans become changed 
into relations among things and how can relations among things be 
transformed into relations among humans? The answer lies in Marx's 
account of the process of objectification, which is the topic of the next 
chapter. 
2 The Ontology of Labor: Objectification, 
Technology and the Dialectic of Time 
In this chapter on Marx's ontology of labor, as it is presented in the 
Grundrisse, 1 shall argue for the following theses: 
I. For Marx, labor is an activity of self-creation, that is, an activity in 
which individnals create themselves or come to be what they are. This 
self-creation, however, takes place not immediately, but rather through 
interaction with other individuals and with nature. Marx characterizes 
this activity as objectification. In capitalism, however. according to 
~v1arx, this activity takes L~c fonn of alienation, in which tile individual 
is separated from his or her own creative power. 
2. III accordance with the theses presented in the first chapter, ! shall 
show that the model of objectification and alienation, though dearly 
drawn from Hegel, is modified by Marx's Aristotelian emphasis on the 
reality of the .individual and the independence of the object. But Marx 
goes beyond both Hegel and Aristotle in the notion that the individual 
creates his or her own nature by his or her activity and that this is not a 
fixed nature or essence, but rather one that is itself changing as a result 
of this activity. 
3. The Grundrisse constitutes the working out of Marx's early theory 
of alienation as political economy. Whereas interpretations of Marx's 
discussions of alienation in the j 844 Manuscripts and the German 
Ideology have most often taken it to be an anthropological, psycholog-
ical or moral conception, I shall argue that the Grundrisse makes clear 
how for Marx alienation in capitalism must be understood in political 
economic terms J Thus it will be seen that Marx develops his concept 
of alienation in the context of his analyses of surplus value, the func-
tion of machinery under capitalism and the theory of crises. 
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4. For Marx. labor is the ongm of time-both of human time-
consciousness and of the objective measure of time. 
5. Marx interprets different modes of economic organization as dif· 
ferent economies of time, and thus Marx regards time as a fundamental 
category in his theory of social development. Thus I shall present the 
three stages of social development described in the Grundrisse as a 
dialectic of time. 
Objectit'ication and Alienation 
Marx characterizes labor broadly as the distinctive activity of human 
beings, that is, their species-activity. He regards this labor as an activ-
ity of objectification. rnis concept needs elucidation. According to 
Marx, objectification is a two-sided process in which an individual 
through labor forms objects in the image of his or her needs and in 
doing so, transforms him or herself. This model presupposes a distinc-
tion between the agent or subject of the activity and the object, but one 
in which the activity itself establishes an interrelation between the two 
terms. Thus the activity of objectification is one in which the subject's 
activity constitutes objects as what they are; that is to say, objects are 
not merely given to or discovered by the subject, but rather are made 
objects by the subject's activity. Objects are therefore constituted or 
given meaning by subjects. But they are not constituted out of nothing, 
that is, they are not merely projections of the subject. Rather, the subject 
works on that which is given to it, as external to it or other than it. 
Thus far I have only characterized the tenns of the relation but not 
yet the activity that relates these terms to each other. This activity is 
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essentially a form-giving or meaning-giving activity, where an agent 
transforms objects to his or her purposes. Therefore it is a teleological 
or intentional activity, and the objects created by the agent embody his 
or her intentions or purposes. This may therefore be characterized as an 
activity of self-realization. Further, insofar as these objects fulfill or 
realize the agent's purposes, the agent finds him or herself in a different 
situation at the end of the process from that in which he or she was at 
the beginning. Subjectively, the agent's situation is different because 
his or her purpose has now been realized in an object that satisfies it. 
Objectively, the situation is different because the object now confronts 
the agent not as simply other, but as his or her own; that is, the object 
becomes, as we say, good for something, it has a use or a value for the 
subject. The subject has thus created this value in its activity and 
recognizes this value in the object. This process of objectification is 
therefore one in which the world becomes endowed with values. 
Furthermore, on this model, this activity of transforming objects is 
at the same time an activity that transforms the agent or the subject. As 
having realized his or her purpose, the agent comes to recognize his or 
her capacity to effect this purpose. Further, one recognizes that a 
certain kind of activity, which meets such purposes, is now at one's 
disposal and becomes part of one's repertoire. One therefore recog-
nizes oneself as a different kind of agent, possessing new skills or new 
modes of action. The agent comes to know this about him or herself by 
recognizing his or her new capacity in the object, which he or she has 
created by means of it. 2 The agent thus recognizes him or herself 
through this objectification of his or her capacities and needs. Or as the 
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Bible says, "By their fruits shall ye know them." Furthermore, the 
agent becomes different through this objectification in that the circum-
stances of his or her agency, that is, the world in which he or she acts, 
have been transformed and now present the agent with a different range 
of problems and opportunities which give rise to new purposes and 
new modes of action. 
For example, suppose the purpose is to get from one place to another 
quickly; the creation of an automobile satisfies this purpose. In addi-
tion, it opens up new modes of action and new opportunities by extend-
ing the regional limits of one's world and thereby the range of one's 
social contact. It gives rise to the feeling of freedom and control over 
one's environment. It also creates the requirements for a new technol-
ogy of road building, the problems of the destruction of the countryside 
and of pollution, and the ubiquitous problem of traffic congestion, in 
which the original aims are thwarted. The agent is also transformed in 
this process, as anyone who drives an automobile can attest. For better 
or worse, a new human character is created. 
We have thus far explicated the concept of objectification in terms of 
the abstract relation of an agent to an object. In Marx, this abstract 
model is interpreted as the relation of laboring individuals to nature and 
to other individuals. Thus the primary sense of objectification for Marx 
is production, where the subject is in his terms "humanity" and the 
object is "nature" (p. 85). However, this relation of humanity to 
nature is always interpreted concretely by Marx. Thus as we saw in the 
previous chapter, he writes, "Whenever we speak of production, then, 
what is meant is always production at a definite stage of social 
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development-production by social individuals" (p. 85). Thus al-
though production as objectification may be described in terms of a 
general model, concretely it always appears in ditferential forms. But 
beyond being a model of production, objectification is also understood 
as a model of social relations among individuals, that is, as we shall 
see later, objectification is the way that individuals create their social 
life. And indeed, for Marx, production itself always takes place in and 
through specific forms of social relations. 
For Marx, "Production is appropriation of nature on the part of an 
individual within and through a specific form of society" (p. 87). This 
process of appropriation forms objects for the sake of satisfying needs. 
Thus "labor is purposeful activity" (p. 311). This purposeful activity 
creates objects that are good for something or have value. Thus Marx 
talks of labor as "value-positing activity" (pp. 274 and 298) and of 
value as objectified labor. But labor itself is not the value; it is only the 
possibility of value or, as Marx says, "the living source of value" (p. 
296). Value is therefore created in the acli vity as a property of the 
object and thus value takes an objective form. This objectification of 
value is of special importance for Marx's account of alienation, for it 
makes possible the separation of value in its objective form from its 
source and from the activity of producing it; and this separation is what 
Marx characterizes as alienation. 
Marx's account of objectification is analogous to Aristotle's account 
of made objects, that is, of productive activity or art. For Marx, as for 
Aristotle, laboring activity is a purposive activity that gives form to 
matter. 
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Thus, according to Marx, in its objectification "Labor is not only 
consumed but also at the same time fixed, converted from the form of 
activity into the form of the object; materialized; as a modification of 
the object, it modifies its own form and changes from activity to being. 
The end of the process is the product" (p. 300). For both Marx and 
Aristotle, produced objects are distinguished from natural objects in 
that the form is given by labor, which transforms nature in accordance 
with its purposes. Thus in speaking of the form of table for wood or the 
form of the cylinder for iron Marx writes, "No immanent law of 
reproduction maintains this form in the way in which the tree, for 
example, maintains its form as a tree (wood maintains itself in the 
specific form of the tree because this form is a form of the wood; while 
the form of the table is accidental for wood, and not the intrinsic form 
of its substance"(p. 360). This is strikingly analogous to the passage 
from Aristotle' s Physics, where in talking about the distinction be-
tween natural objects and made objects in terms of what constitutes 
their nature or form, Aristotle writes (citing Antiphon), "if you planted 
a bed and the rotting wood acquired the power of sending up a shoot, it 
would not be a bed that would come up, but wood-which shows that 
the arrangement in accordance with the rules of art is merely an inci-
dental attribute, whereas the rea! nature is the other, which, further, per-
sists continuously throughout the process of making."3 
But for Aristotle, this process of production, which gives an artifi-
cial form to uatural material, preserves only the nature of the material 
itself through this transformation. Aristotle writes, "Nature means the 
primary material of which any natural object consists or out of which it 
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is made ... e.g. bronze is said to be the nature of a statue and of bronze 
utensils, and wood the nature of wooden things, and so in all other 
cases when a product is made of these materials, the (primary material) 
is preserved throughout. "4 By contrast, for Marx it is not only the 
natural substance or material but also the value that is preserved 
through these transformations. That is, as labor works up raw materials 
into successive forms (for example, cotton spun into yarn and then 
woven into fabric), the value of the cotton is preserved through these 
successive transformations. But the characteristic of the labor process 
for Marx is that the old value is not only preserved but is increased. 
Marx explains this using the model of determinate negation or Auf-
hebung, which he derives from Hegel. Thus Marx writes, "It is there-
fore already a part of the simple production process that the earlier 
stage of production is preserved by the later, and that positing the 
higher use value (or the value which the object has as satisfying a need 
in consumption) preserves the old, or the old use value is transformed 
only to the extent that it is raised to a higher use value" (p. 362). Thus, 
for example, labor preserves the utility of cotton as yarn by weaving 
the yarn into fabric. 
Indeed, there is a broader sense in which the model of objectification 
is derived by Marx from Hegel. Marx follows Hegel in construing 
objectification as a process of self-realization of a subject through its 
transforming objects. But whereas Hegel interprets the object as the 
subject itself in its otherness, Marx regards the object as possessing a 
reality apart from the subject, at least initially. Thus for Hegel, nature 
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is nothing but Spirit's own other-sidedness and has no independent 
existence. But for Marx, nature is given as the material which the 
subject then transforms into his or her other in the image of his or her 
needs. Nature is initially independent of the subject, that is, the labor-
ing individual, but becomes a humanized nature in and through the 
activity of labor. 
Another difference between Marx's conception of objectification 
and Hegel's is the following: For Hegel, what is objectified is already 
"contained in" the subject or implicit in it, and therefore objectifica-
tion is the dialectical elaboration of what is already present (that is, in 
the Idea.) For Marx, by contrast, objectification as labor is "a produc-
tive, creative activity" which creates something fundamentally novel, 
namely new value. But in this creative activity, the subject also creates 
him or herself as something new, that is, as a subject with a new or 
changed nature. 
For Marx, the era of capitalism introduces a distinctive mode of 
objectification, which he characterizes as alienation. In the first chap-
ter, the second stage of the dialectic was described as one in which fhe 
subject appears to be an isolated self or pure "subjectivity" standing 
against an object that is taken to be wholly other than it. The relations 
between subject and object are therefore seen to be external relations in 
that each stands to the other as an object. For Marx, as for Hegel, this 
relation is one of alienation. The subject is "estranged from" the 
object and does not recognize it as its own object or its own other. For 
Hegel, however, every objectification of the subject is an alienation, 
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since the other is nothing but the subject itself iu its objectified form, 
and the other initially appears to the subject not as its own other but as 
an external object. The whole dialectic is a succession of such alien-
ations constantly being superseded by other alienations, but which are 
finally overcome only at the end of the process (where the subject-
object identity is reestablished). For Marx, on the other hand, objec-
tification is the intrinsic character of every productive activity and is 
alienated only when the relation between the subject a."'1d the object 
0ecomes an external one. That is, objectification is nor aiienated when 
the object produced by the subject's activity is related to the subject as 
own. It becomes alienated when the object is separated from the 
subject's activity that creates it, and is no !onger related to the subject 
as its own, 0ut as belonging to another. This alienation presupposes 
objectification as its condition, for the product of one's activity has to 
be distinct from that activity itself in order to be separable from it, and 
it can only be alienated from the subject if in fact this object is the 
product of the subject's activity. 
terms of an act-object analysis, alienation introduces the utter 
separation of the act from its object. In this separation the act itself 
becomes a mere capacity divorced from the conditions of its actualiza-
tion. Marx interprets this separation in political economic terms as the 
hallmark of the capitalist form of social production. 5 For Marx, aliena-
tion is the separation of living labor from objectified labor or of labor's 
capacity to produce value from the means for its realization in produc-
tion (for example, land, materials and instrument) and from the prod-
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uct of its activity. These means or conditions for labor's actualization 
belong to capital, which stands opposed to labor as its objective condi-
tion. Indeed, even the laboring capacity itself along with the products 
of labor stand over against labor as alien powers belonging to capital.. 
Thus the context in which Marx interprets alienation is political 
economy. Here his difference from Hegel can be seen at its sharpest. 
For Hegel, the process of alienation is seen as a process of conscio!!s-
ness~ which then becomes embodied in external form. By contrast J 
Marx sees this process of alienation as a process of real socia! life, of 
which the agents become conscious in and through their activity. 
In the Grundrisse several distinctive features of capitalism, includ-
ing the specific nature of the exchange between labor and capital, and 
at a later stage the function of machinery, are presented as following 
from the alienation or separation between living labor and objectified 
labor or between labor and capital. Because the objective conditions of 
labor belong to capital, which here appears as wealth, the worker must 
sell the only property he or she has, namely his or her capacity to work, 
to the capitalist in exchange for means of subsistence. The worker sells 
this capacity in order to maintain him or herself as living labor. From 
the other side, capital as the set of objective conditions of labor, such 
as raw material and instrument, requires living labor for the work 
process to proceed; therefore capital needs labor as its use value. 
Capital and labor therefore enter into exchange with each other. In this 
exchange, the worker does not sell him or herself, but rather sells a 
temporary disposition over his or her laboring capacity to the capitalist 
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In one respect, this laboring capacity or labor power is a commodity 
like other commodities; as such it has a price. Thus labor exchanges it 
for a specific sum of exchange values or for a wage. 
Now this act is an exchange of equivalents like other exchanges on 
the market. But according to Marx, this exchange is only the surface 
process which masks or hides a deeper process that is not an exchange 
at all, in which Marx says, "apparent individual equality and liberty 
disappear" (p. 247). Marx calls the second process the appropriation 
of labor by capital. This second process results from the first exchange. 
For whereas the laborer soid his or her labor power as a commodity and 
thus for a price that amounts to the cost of its production, in this 
transaction the capitalist receives labor not as a mere commodity but in 
its aspect of being creative activity, "value-positing activity." This 
follows from the distinctive quality of this commodity of being the 
only value-producing commodity. The capitalist obtains the productive 
force of labor, which as now belonging to capital serves to maintain 
and multiply capital. Through this exchange, capital becomes "mas-
tery, command over living labor." 
According to Marx, the alienation of labor, or the separation be-
tween labor and wealth or between labor and property in the product of 
labor, is established in this act of exchange. Thus he writes "It is clear, 
therefore, that the worker cannot become rich in this exchange since , , 
in exchange for his labor capacity as a fixed available magnitude, he 
surrenders its creative power, like Esau his birthright for a mess of 
pottage. Rather, he necessarily impoverishes himself. .. because the 
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creative power of his labor establishes itself as the power of capital, as 
an alien power confronting him" (p. 307). 
This alienation of labor's activity and products which is established 
through this act of exchange becomes actual in the production process. 
In this process, the laborer produces both the value that reproduces him 
or her-paid to the laborer by the capitalist in the wage, as well as 
surplus value, or more value than it takes to reproduce him or her-
which goes to the capitalist and increases the value of capital. The part 
of the worker's time spent reproducing him or herself is called neces-
sary labor time. Tne remainder of the worker's time is called surplus 
labor time and is unpaid labor. The value produced during this time is 
called surplus value. 
Through the alienation of this laboring capacity, the product of labor 
appears as belonging to capital. Further, every increase in the produc-
tive powers of labor "enriches not the worker but rather capital, hence 
it only magnifies again the power dominating over labor" (p. 308). 
The alienation of labor receives its culmination in automatic systems of 
machinery. Here alienation or the domination of labor by capital comes 
to characterize the production process itself. Thus Marx writes, 
The appropriation of living labor by objectified labor-of the power or 
activity which creates value by value existing for-itself-which lies in 
the concept of capital, is posited, in production resting on machinery, 
as the character of the production process itself.... The production 
process has ceased to be a labor process in the sense of a process 
dominated by labor as its governing unity. Labor appears, rather, 
merely as a conscious organ, scattered among the individual living 
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workers at numerous points of the mechanical system; subsumed under 
the total process of the machinery itself, as itself only a link of the 
system, whose unity exists not in the living workers, but rather in the 
living (active) machinery, which confronts his individual insignificant 
doings as a mighty organism. (p. 693) 
1 have thus far treated objectification as in general a process of 
self-creation or self-transformation which proceeds through the produc-
tion of objects in accordance with one's purposes. We have also seen 
that this activity of objectification takes the form of alienation in t~e 
capitalist stage, in which the individuals fail to recognize themselves in 
their own objectification, that is, capital. Their own objectification is 
taken as an aiien other, seemingly unrelated to them. This account of 
objectification is not yet complete, however, for in my first thesis I 
claimed that the activity of self-creation proceeds not merely through 
the production of objects but through interaction with others. Thus I 
shall now sketch briefly Marx's account of this interaction as it relates 
to the process of objectification. 
Marx holds that all objectification or productive activity takes place 
in and through specific forms of social relations' That is, the trans-
formative activity of labor in which individuals work on objects takes 
place through personal relations to other individuals, through in-
stitutionalized social forms, and through given forms of property that 
mark social systems as a whole. In the Grundrisse such social relations 
are analyzed as relations of domination or as reciprocal relations. 
Moreover, social relations may themselves be objectified, that is, be 
embodied in external form in social institutions and rules and in social 
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systems as a whole. In chapter 5, I shall give a general treatment of 
Marx's theory of social relations in the Grundrisse. Here 1 shall only 
present a brief account of the forms of social interaction that charac-
terize the second and third stages of historical development. This ac-
count will provide some basis for seeing how objectification takes 
place through definite forms of social relations. 
I shall focus first on Marx's discussion of the reciprocity in ex-
change in capitalism. The first feature of the reciprocity of exchange is 
that it is mediated by the objects created by labor. That is. individuals 
relate to each other not directly, but rather by means of the products of 
their labor. The preconditions for this exchange are first, that each 
individual has different needs and different products to exchange that 
will satisfy these needs, and second, that each is free to dispose of 
these products as his or her property. Thus Marx sees this rel~tion of 
exchange as possible only at a certain stage of social development, 
when these preconditions can be met. The act of exchange itself estab-
lishes the equality of these individuals as exchangers, that is, they are 
equal because they stand in the same social relation to each other. 
Furthermore, the exchange itself expresses the interdependence of one 
on the other and thus creates a social bond between them. This social 
bond expresses their common nature as needing each other and as 
being able to satisfy each other's needs. Thus Marx writes, 
The fact that this, need on the part of one can be satisfied by the product 
of the .other, ana VIce versa, and that the one is capable of producing 
the object of the need of the other, and that each confronts the other as 
owner of the Object of the other's need, this proves that each of them 
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reaches beyond his own particular need as a human being, and that 
they relate to one another as human beings; that their common 
species-being is acknowledged by all. (p. 243) 
It can be seen that the relations between the individuals in this process 
of exchange are not immediate personal relations. Rather, each recog-
nizes the other in exchange only in terms of their objectifications, that is, 
the products or commodities that they exchange. Thus the relations be-
tween persons appear as relations between things. Furthermore, insofar 
as each person represents to the other only the means by which his or 
her own needs are satisfied, the reciprocal relation within exchange is 
an instrumental one. Thus Marx writes, "individual A serves the need 
of individual B by means of the commodity a only in so far as and 
because individual B serves the need of individual A by means of the 
commodity b and vice versa. Each serves the other in order to serve 
himself; each makes use of the other, reciprocally, as his means" (p. 
243). The individuals thus are represented to each other through their 
products and as means only and relate to each other only in the exter-
nality of exchange between commodities or things. 
In addition to the social relations in exchange, there is another form 
of social bond in the production process of capitalism itself. This bond 
arises from the objectification of the joint or cooperative capacities of 
many individuals. As we saw in the previous chapter, this occurs in the 
division of labor and especially in the use of systems of machinery in 
large-scale capitalist industry. Both the common product of joint work 
and the common nature of the work process are objectifications of the 
combined laboring individuals. 7 
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However, under capitalism this commonality appears only in its 
objectified form, for example, in machinery, and is not yet recognized 
as the subjects' (that is, workers') own social objectification. In 
Marx's view, the recognition of this commonality as the workers' own 
creation is the ground for the reappropriation of the objective commu-
nity of labor as the property of the laborers themselves. The social 
relations would then become communal. The individuals would relate 
to each other no longer through the mediation of exchange or of the 
production process, but rather immediately in personal interaction. 
In the second social stage, what is estabiished is an increasing uni-
versalization and differentiation of human capacities and needs, but 
only in their alienated form in the production process. Once this dif-
ferentiation of their capacities is seen as what it really is, namely, the 
objectified form of the workers' own capacities, it becomes possible 
for them to reappropriate it as their own subjective differentiation and 
universality. Furthermore, in Marx's discussion of a third stage of 
social relations, the social bond consists in part of a common capacity 
for this full self-differentiation or, to put it differently, their full indi-
viduation. Each individual, freed from the abstract one-sidedness of a 
"role" in the objective production process, now is free to choose and 
develop whatever aspects of individuality he or she wishes. As we 
shall see, a condition for this is that labor as a necessary activity has 
become completely transferred to machinery. 
Reciprocal recognition therefore no longer takes place only through 
the external forms of exchange, but rather as the recognition of indi-
vidual differences. The species nature of the individuals is recognized 
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as this very capacity for individuation. Thus each individual'8 self-
development is recognized by each of the others not simply instmmen-
tally as meeting a need of some other, but as an end in itselL Social 
relations in this third stage thus become communal and mutually en-
hancing relati()ns. 
In the relation to other individuals, as in the creation of objects, 
objectification becomes the necessary process through which self-
creation and self-recognition are achieved. But as we have seen for 
Marx, this is a historical process in which labor as productive activity 
and the social relations within which this activity is carried out take on 
specific forms at different stages of development. 
Labor and tbe Creation of Time 
The terms process, development, and change all suggest a temporal 
dimension to the activity of labor. A close reading of the Grundrisse 
reveals that Marx suggests a view of time that is, on the one hand, 
wholly unexpected and original, yet on the other hand, coherent with 
the view of labor as objectification. Let me begin with a very strong 
claim: that for Marx, in the Grundrisse at least, labor creates time or 
introduces time into the world. Thus according to Marx, "Labor is the 
living, form-giving fire; it is the transitoriness of things, their tempo-
rality, as their formation by living time" (p. 361). Is this more than a 
metaphorical passage? I think it is and that it should be taken seriously. 
On the notoriously difficult metaphysical question of the nature of 
time, one well-known view is that of Kant, and it is possible to inter-
pret Marx's view of time in a Kantian fashion. For Kant, time is an a 
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priori form of perception and is introduced into the world as a condi-
tion of our perception and understanding of things. It is thus not a 
condition of things in themselves, but rather something that derives 
from our activity in constituting the world as an object of knowledge. 
But for Kant, this is a mental activity and the only agency involved in 
pure reason is the activity of consciousness. For Marx, however, the 
constituting activity that introduces time is labor, namely, real or prac-
tical activity of the subject in the world. 
In what follows, I shall not be concerned with the question of 
whether time is intrinsic to nature, taken in itself apart from human 
activity. in particular, 1 am not denying that there is sequence and 
change in natural processes independent of human activity. However, ! 
shall argue that human laboring activity is the orlgin of human time-
consciousness; of time as an objective measure; and also that this 
activity is the condition for the understanding of sequences and 
changes in nature and in social life as temporal. 
Laboring activity, as we have seen. is one that changes the world 
and also changes the subject. Furthermore, though it does not create 
from nothing but rather by transformation of what is given, laboring 
activity, according to Marx, introduces real novelty; that is, labor is an 
activity of creating or making new objects. This making of objects is a 
process; it has a distinctive form-determinate negation-which, as 
we have seen, is a concept that Marx borrows from Hegel. In determi-
nate negation, a given or present stage or moment negates that which 
preceded it by preserving it in a new or higher form; but each such 
moment transforms itself in accordance with the Idea as its telos. 
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Marx introduces a very different interpretation of this process of 
determinate negation. For him it is the characteristic form of human 
activity. Such activity is guided by some purpose or end; in anticipa-
tion of the future, the agent changes the pre-existing object by giving it 
new form hy means of present or, as Marx says, living, activity or 
lahar. Thus he writes, "The transformation of the material by living 
labor, by the realization of living labor in the material-a transforma-
tion which, as purpose, determines labor and is its purposeful 
activation ... thus preserves the material in a definite form, and subju-
gates the transformation of the material to the purpose of labor" (pp. 
360-361). He goes on to say, "It is therefore already a part of the 
simple production process that the earlier stage of production is pre-
served by the later, and that positing the higher use value preserves the 
old, or, the old use value is transformed only to the extent that it is 
raised to a higher use value" (pp. 361-362). 
My claim is that in describing activity as the synthesis or connection 
of these three moments, Marx is presenting this activity as the origin of 
the three constituents of time-namely, past, present and future-and 
sees it as providing the ground for their interconnection as the process 
of time. The ground is the synthetic unity of activity. 8 
This synthesis created through laboring activity is not an event, but a 
process. In the forming or making of objects, the given has to be 
worked up and a purpose realized in it. This movement from potential-
ity to actuality is unidirectional. The product or the made object is the 
result of the process of production whicb therefore precedes it. Thus 
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the relation of before and after is established as an asymmetrical one in 
this laboring activity. However, since this activity is human activity, it 
is purposive; therefore the anticipation of a future in the present estab-
lishes the present itself as projective or as directed toward the future. 
Thus the asymmetry of before and after is established with respect to 
the present and future, in that what is anticipated in the present as 
future is not yet. 
All of this, however, presents an abstract structure or a logic of 
time-relation, but not real or living time. For Marx, the reality of time 
is introduced by the activity of living labor which creates the now. 
Such a now is not a static instant but a dynamic unity of past, present 
and future. 
A problem arises here, however: Does this process that unifies or 
synthesizes past, present and future happen only once? To put it dif-
ferently: Is time a one-time thing? No, for on this concrete analysis of 
time as generated by the activity of labor, the process is constantly 
renewed on two grounds: first, because of the boundless variety of 
purposes and modes of realizing purposes characteristic of human ac-
tivity. That is, this laboring activity is creative in the ways in which it 
satisfies needs and in its generation of new needs and purposes. Sec-
ond, this activity is constantly renewed because agents constantly have 
to reproduce themselves by this activity. 
Whereas this constant renewal connotes a succession, or a repetition 
of the now, the continuity of time beyond this mere succession arises 
from the character of the activity as subsuming or preserving the past in 
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the present, and from the ingredience of the futnre in the present, by 
virtue of its anticipation in the present. That is, there is no cut between 
past and present and between present and future. 
The apparent paradox in which time contains both what is and what 
is not, or that the present contains what is no longer and what is not 
yet, is already stated by Aristotle in his discussion of time in the 
Physics. After asking whether time exists or does not exist and what its 
nature is. Aristotle writes, "To start then: the foHowing considerations 
would make me suspect that [time] either does not exist at all or barely 
and in an obscure way. One part of it has been and is not, while the 
other is going to be and is not yet. Yet time ... is made up of these. One 
would naturally suppose that what is made up of things that do not exist 
could have no share in reality. "9 
This apparent paradox is resolved, however, when one takes change 
itself as the condition for the existence of time as Aristotle does. But 
then, too, so does Marx. For as we have seen, the activity of labor, 
which is the foundation of time, is the activity of changing things. To 
change something or to make an object, as we have seen, is a process 
in which the past or what comes before is subsumed or preserved in the 
present and is therefore not simply "left behind." Thus there is no 
sharp demarcation in this activity of creation between "what has been 
and is no longer" and what is now. On the other hand, since the made 
object is an intentional object and its presentness projects it as some-
thing to be used in the future, there is no sharp demarcation between 
the now and what is not yet. 
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The object itself, therefore, qua object is an objectification of the 
temporality of the activity of its production itself. It congeals these 
moments in itself. Things or objects are, in Marx's phrase, "brought to 
life" or animated by living labor. 
In the meantime, the subject or the agent of the activity that creates 
time is him or herself, posited as temporal, since the subject is both 
created by activity and creative in his or her making of objects and 
remaking of him or herself. Therefore the agent is at once subiect and 
object. Insofar as he or she is constituted in part by the object; of past 
making, that is, by the environment that has been created in the past, 
the agent incorporates this past in him or herself; and insofar as the 
agent is creative, that is, both world-transforming and self-changing, 
he or she incorporates his or her intentionality or future-directedness in 
present activity. Therefore the subject bears all the characteristics of 
time withiu his or her own being. The subject, like the objects he or 
she produces, is temporalized by the synthetic unity of activity. 
It may be remarked in passing that Marx's conception of time as 
originating in the creative activity of a subject bears s~me resemblance 
to Heidegger's conception of time in Being and Time. For Heidegger, 
also, time originates in the being of Dasein, a being characterized by 
activity. The activity of Dasein is characterized as one of anticipating 
the future or "being ahead of itself" and in this anticipation incorporat-
ing one's past in a resolute act in which one makes oneself present. 
Temporality arises from the fact that human activity has these three 
moments. Objective time for Heidegger is based on this originative 
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activity of Dasein itself. However, whereas Heidegger identifies this 
activity with temporality, my interpretation of Marx would avoid the 
circularity implied in Heidegger by regarding activity not as time itself 
but as introducing time into things. Furthermore, there are crucial 
differences between Heidegger and Marx in the interpretation of the 
narure of this time-formative activity itself, but I shall not develop 
them here. I shall only suggest that for Heidegger the temporalizing 
activity of Dasein is not understood as an activity of objectification, 
that is, is not understood as a social activity of transforming nature. 
it may be objected that this interpretation of Marx's theory of time 
makes time nothing more than a subjective feature of the agent or of his 
or her activity and that time has no objectivity. But for Marx, objectiv-
ity is what is achieved by an activity that objectifies the subject through 
transformation of a given world, which at least initially exists indepen-
dently of the subject. The stubbornness of nature gives rise to an 
understanding of laboring activity as the overcoming of obstacles. This 
fact also contributes to making time not an event but a process. Fur-
thermore, since the activity of objectification is for Marx not an activ-
ity of an isolated individual but rather a social activity, time is to be un-
derstood as more than a subjective feature of the agent. The sociality of 
this activity contributes to making time into a common measure of this 
laboring activity itself and of the objective conditions of this activity. 
What, then, is objective time? It is the objectified form of the activ-
ity of labor. To give an example, we might initially suppose that the 
time established by the change in seasons, which marks the activities 
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of planting and harvesting, is measured by an independent measure, 
namely, the change of the seasons itself. However, on the view pre-
sented here, the choice of the seasons as ways of marking time is itself 
made on the basis of the activities of planting and harvesting. The 
external reference is therefore an extemalization of a condition of the 
laboring activity itself or its objectification. Thus, more generally, 
what sets the conditions for the establishment of an objective measure 
of time is the objective character of the laboring process itself, insofar 
as such a process is the fulfillment of a goal or a purpose in a product. 
The making of the object thus has a beginning and an end. The choice 
of an external frame of reference to mark the beginning and end of such 
a process is the choice of an objective time reference. The requirement 
for such an external or objective reference arises when the process of 
production itself is both a shared or social process among individuals 
and when the same process has to be repeated many times. In these 
cases the objectivity of time reference is required by and established 
for the sake of a common and objective measure or standard. Thus, for 
example, the measurement of astronomical time was not first estab-
lished and then a use for it discovered in marking the seasons or for 
navigational purposes. But rather the need for such measurement gave 
rise to the use of the stars for this purpose. 
The foregoing elaboration of a theory of time that is suggested in the 
Grundrisse goes beyond what Marx explicitly says. Yet it is coherent 
with his notion of labor as the temporality of things and with his notion 
of objectification. He is more specific, however, in his use of the 
temporal dimension as the category that most fundamentally charac-
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tenzes economy. Thus he says strikingly, "Economy of time, to this 
all economy ultimately reduces itself" (p. 173). 
Marx further suggests that the use of lime as a measure varies 
historically. Thus it might be said that for him time is itself qualita-
tively different at different stages of social development. Although 
time is introduced by labor in all forms of economy, the measure of 
labor in terms of time is not a common feature of all social forms 
production but is introduced \vhen labor itself is realized as a hornogene-
ous and abstract quantity. 
in pre-capitalist societies, labor is nol measured in terms of lime, bnt 
rather in tenns of its qualitative differentiation as expressed in the 
various use values of the goods produced. Further, in these societies 
there is no clear distinction between necessary working time and super-
fluous working time, that is, laboring time beyond production for 
needs, since virtually all productiou is production for use or need. 
The possibility of time as a measure for labor arises only ill the 
second stage of social development-namely, that of capitalism. III 
this stage labor becomes qualitatively undifferentiated; any part of it is 
like any other part. It becomes abstract labor, where this abstraction of 
all the qualitative differences between one kind and another occurs 
through the equivalence established among the products of this labor ill 
exchange. This homogeneous abstract labor now can be measured by a 
universal measure and divided into standard units. The measure of this 
abstract labor is time, but time now conceived as itself a universal and 
homogeneous quantity, any part of which may be substituted for any 
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other ,part in equivalent measure. Thus units of time can be mapped 
onto units of abstract labor. 
Tbe value of a thing produced is measured by the amount of sociall y 
necessary labor time it takes to produce it. As 1 indicated above, this 
total labor time is itself divided into necessary labor time and surplus 
labor time, and the value of the product is similarly apportioned into a 
part that must go to labor as wages and the surplus or extra value which 
is appropriated by capital. 
It is the surplus labor performed by the worker-that IS, laboring 
above alld beyond that required to produce the products for his or her 
subsistence-which is the source of the surplus value for capital. Thus 
Marx writes, "it is a Jaw of capital ... to create surplus labor, disposa-
time; it can do this only by setting necessary labor in motion-i.e. 
entering into exchange with the worker" (p. 399). However, there is a 
second tendency in capital that contradict~ this first one. For capital 
also characteristically attempts to reduce necessary labor time so that a 
larger part of labor time will be surplus time which produces surplus 
value. This diminution of necessary labor time is accomplished 
through an increase in the productive force of living labor, and this in 
IIlrn is accomplished primarily through the introduction of machinery 
or, more precisely, an automatic system of machinery. Marx describes 
this system as "set in motion by an automaton, a moving power that 
moves itself; this automaton, consisting of numerous mechanical and 
intellectual organs, so that the workers themselves arp cast merely as 
its conscious linkages" (p. 692) Here laboring activity merely lrans-
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mits the machine's work onto the raw material----only supervises it and 
guards against interruptions, Thus the machine possesses skill and 
strength in place of the worker and the worker's activity is determined 
by the movement of the machinery, 
This introduction of machinery to reduce necessary labor time so as 
to increase surplus labor time and thus surplus value is of great signifi-
cance for the transition to communal society. For machinery di-
minishes necessary labor time by increasing labor's productivity. Thus 
Marx writes that in the use of machinery, "the amount of labor neces-
sary for the production of a given object is indeed reduced to a 
minimum, but only in order to realize a maximum of labor in a 
maximum number of such objects. The first aspect is important, be-
cause capital here-quite unintentionally-reduces human labor, ex-
penditure of energy, to a minimum. This will redound to the benefit of 
emancipated labor, and is the condition of its emancipation" (p. 701). 
That is, the system of capital through its "mania for wealth," to use 
Marx's phrase, produces abundance and thus tends to reduce necessary 
labor. As Marx explains in The Critique of the Gotha Program, such 
abundance is the condition for a society based on communal produc-
tion, where there would be distribution of goods to individuals accord-
ing to needs. 
In reducing necessary labor time, capital increases surplus or super-
fluous time. In so doing, "it is thus despite itself, instrumental in 
creating the means of social disposable time... and thus to free 
everyone's time for their own development" (p. 708). However, 
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within capitalism, superfluous time has what Marx calls an antithetical 
or contradictory form. For capital's striving toward reduction of neces-
sary and increase of surplus time leads it to crisis (or contradiction), for 
this process necessarily leads to overproduction. The reduction of 
necessary time requires a proliferation of goods, but necessary time is 
paid for by the wage. Thus in diminishing necessary time, capita! is 
also to that degree diminishing the ability of the worker to purchase the 
goods produced. Marx writes, 
The more this contradiction develops, the more does it become evident 
that the growth of the forces of production can no longer be bound up 
with the appropriation of alien labor, but that the mass of workers must 
themselves appropriate their own surplus labor. Once they have done 
so-and disposable time thereby ceases to have an antithetical 
existence-then, on one side, necessary labor time will be measured 
by the needs of the social individual, and, on the other, the develop-
ment of the power of social production will grow so rapidly, that, even 
though production is now calculated for the wealth of all, disposable 
time will grow for all. For real wealth is the developed productive 
power of all individuals. The measure of wealth is then not any longer, 
in any way, labor time, but rather disposable time. (p. 708) 
Thus in this new form of society, there is again production for use, 
but now carried out through social production. It is a society of abun-
dance, according to Marx, where necessary labor is transferred to the 
machine and where "labor in which a human being does what a thing 
could do has ceased" (p. 325). The determination of time remains 
important in this new society, for the associated individuals have to 
distribute their time in ways appropriate to meet their various needs. 
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But now these needs are needs for self-development. Thus here the 
measure of wealth becomes free time or time for the free development 
of individualities. In this society, labor becomes the creative activity of 
self-realization, which according to Marx is "real freedom" (p. 611). 
3 Toward a Labor Theory of Cause: Action and 
Creation in Marx's Social Ontology 
In this chapter I shall argue that Marx transforms the traditional prob-
lem of causality in a radical way by grounding it in his analysis of the 
activity of labor as an ontological category. In this analysis Marx formu-
lates the problem of causality as one that concerns, on the one hand, 
the objective conditions under which human agents realize their pur-
poses in the activity of labor and, on the other hand, the production or 
formation of these very conditions by labor itself. 
Marx's approach shifts the ground of the traditional discussion of 
causality in two ways: first, with regard to the domain of causality 
and second, with regard to the relation of causal to intentional or 
teleological explanation. First, the problem of causality is usually 
posed as one concerning how in general things come into being or how 
one state of affairs gives rise to or is succeeded by another. Human 
action is then situated with respect to such accounts of the causal 
relation, as either conforming to it or as lying beyond it. By contrast, 
Marx locates the problem of causality within the domain of human 
activity itself. He thus transposes the general ontological que~tion of 
causality into the context of what I am calling a social ontology, that is, 
a systematic theory of the nature of social reality whose basic entities 
are individuals in relations. But, as we shall see, this reformulation of 
the problem does not mean that Marx reduces the problem of causality 
to one concerning only the intentions or purposes of agents. Rather, he 
views the activity of labor as a relation between agents and an objec-
tive world, where this objective world includes both nature (as it is 
originally given and as it has been transformed by past human activity) 
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and human history itself. However, Marx does not treat the problem of 
causality in the context of nature taken by itself. Thus the question of 
whether Marx's analysis of causality as a category of social ontology 
has any implication for an understanding of causality in natnre taken 
apart from human activity will not be considered in this chapter. The 
discussion that follows does not bear on the question of whether there 
is causality in nature for Marx. Further, it should be noted that in this 
chapter there will be no analysis of the relations of power, constraint, 
or domination among persons. These relations between persons will be 
analyzed in the discussion of social interaction in chapter 5. However, 
in the present chapter I shall argue that such relations are not to be 
understood as causal, that is, as relations in which one agent causes the 
actions of another. 
The second way in which Marx transforms the traditional problem of 
causality is in overcoming the disjunction between explanations in 
terms of causes and explanations in terms of reasons or intentions, or 
put in more traditional terms, the disjunction between efficient and 
final causes. I shall show that Marx transcends this separation by 
conceiving of labor as a process in which purposes or intentions are 
made effective in the world and correlatively, in which the objective 
conditions of action become transformed in accordance with purposes. 
Further, I shall argue that on the basis of this theory of labor, Marx de-
velops a conception of causality that is consistent with human freedom. 
It should be made clear at the outset that Marx himself does not talk 
about the concept of causality as such and it is not an explicit theme of 
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his analysis. This account of his theory is therefore a reconstruction of 
his views, focusing primarily on the Grundrisse. The basis for this 
reconstruction is an interpretation of Marx's theory of labor as purpos-
ive and productive activity, as well as an interpretation of Marx's use 
of such terms as production, activity, objective conditions, presupposi-
tions and creation. Although Marx's discussion differs from traditional 
accounts of causality, I shall show that it is closel y related to three 
major traditional views: those of Aristotle, Kant and Hegel. Yet I shall 
also show that Marx goes beyond these views in his grounding of 
causality in human creative activity. Marx's view is further distin-
guished from these others in that he sees not merely the concepts of 
causality, but also causality itself as undergoing a development 
through the various stages of history. 
The central focus of this chapter is the reconstruction of what I am 
calling "Marx's labor theory of cause" as an ontological theory. My 
reconstruction is in three parts: first, a discussion of Marx's theory of 
objectification, that is, his theory of labor as a formative process, as 
the basis for his conception of cause; second, an analysis of Marx's 
conception of cause as an internal relation; and third, a discussion of 
how, according to Marx, the ontological reality of labor as cause gives 
rise to the appearance of cause and effect as an external and reified 
relation in a given historical period, namely, that of capitalism. 
Marx's theory of alienation will be important here. On the basis of this 
reconstruction of Marx's view, I shall develop the critique, which is 
implicit in Marx's work, of two prevailing views of causality. It may 
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be useful, however, to sketch these two prevailing views at the outset 
in order to prepare the ground for the later critique and also to permit 
the distinctiveness of Marx's own view to emerge more clearly. 
These two prevailing views of causality are, first, the view that sees 
causality as a merely external relation between a cause and an effect, 
and second, the view that replaces the relation between cause and 
effect with the relation of reasons or intentions to actions. 1 On the first 
view t~e causal relation is regarded as one t.l-tat holds universally for all 
domains, whether natural or social. It is interpreted as a relation that 
holds between two independent entities, whether these are conceived 
to be objects, in an ontological approach, Of ideas or sense impres-
sions, in an epistemological approach. Further, the causal relation is 
conceived to be an external relation between these independent en-
tities; that is, in this view the entities that are related remain essentially 
unchanged by the relation. 
Such a view of the causal relation as an external one holding be-
tween separate entities has its contemporary counterpart in the concep-
tion of the functional relation between independent and dependent 
variables. In the account of human actions this may take the form of 
behaviorism, in which stimulus and response are taken as indepen-
dently definable entities which stand in the external relation of correla-
tion between their observed values. 
By contrast with this first view, which interprets causality as an 
external relation, Marx interprets it as an internal relation between the 
activity of an agent and the object of this activity, in which both are 
essentially changed by the relation. More significantly, Marx's view 
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contrasts with this first one in the understanding of human actIvity 
itself. Whereas the first view takes human actions to be the effects of 
causes external to them and as describable in terms of objective laws, 
Marx takes only human actions to be causally efficacious and does not 
take them to be the effects of causes. Furthermore, he introduces a 
conception of this causal human activity as fundamentally purposive 
and as constituting the social world. 
One may find a similar rejection of t."'1e view that human actions are 
to be explained in terms of external causes or objective laws among 
those theorists who hold that human actions can be understood only in 
terms of the agent's purposes and intentions. This position constitutes 
the second of the prevailing views of causality noted above. In distinc-
tion from the first view, this second approach sharply distinguishes the 
question of understanding human action from the question of causal 
explanation. This approach takes only the contexts of human action as 
its domain. Further, it proposes that the appropriate way for explaining 
actions is by understanding the intentions of the agents in performing 
such actions. This view characterizes contemporary action theory as 
well as the phenomenological and hermeneutical approaches. 
Although Marx would agree with the emphasis that such views place 
on human action, he would be critical of the sharp separation they 
make between understanding human action and causal explanation, for 
Marx understands human action as itself causal. Furthermore, although 
Marx would agree with the interpretation that such views give of the 
nature of action as essentially purposive and intentional, he would be 
critical of the exclusive focus of such theories on the understanding of 
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actions in terms of intentions alone. Rather, as we shall see, for Marx a 
full account of action also requires reference to the objective conditions 
of that action. 
The Causality of Agency 
Marx introduces a theory of cause that turns on his idea of labor as both 
a purposive and productive activity. A reconstruction of Marx's con-
cept of cause should therefore begin with an account of his analysis of 
labor, which Marx understands in a broad sense as human activity 
itself. As I have shown in chapter 2, labor for Marx is a process of 
objectification in which an agent forms objects that embody his or her 
intentions or purposes and in doing so also forms him or herself. The 
agent in this process of objectification is understood by Marx as a 
social individual, that is, an individual in social relations, or as social 
individuals, in the plural, working with a common purpose. The pro-
cess is one in which the agent or laboring subject constitutes objects or 
gives them meaning. Objects are therefore not to be understood simply 
as givens, but are rather to be regarded as produced by the agent's 
activity. However, as noted in the previous chapter, the agent does not 
constitute objects out of nothing. Rather, the agent or subject works on 
something that is given to him or her as external or other. 
Thus for Marx, "labor is purposeful activity" (p. 311). In order to 
realize his or her purposes, the individual in the activity of labor gives 
form to objects such that these purposes are realized. Thus Marx calls 
labor a "form-giving activity" (p. 301). Further, insofar as the objects 
created by this activity realize the purposes or satisfy the needs of the 
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agent, these objects come to have a use or value for the subject. 
Accordingly, as we have seen in chapter 2, Marx characterizes labor 
as "value-positing activity." But perhaps the most significant feature 
that Marx attributes to the activity of labor is that it is productive 
activity in the sense of being creative activity, that is, of creating new 
objects. These objects in turn constitute the objective conditions for 
subsequent laboring activity. 
In this process of creating new objects that realize their purposes, 
agents at the same time create and transform themselves. That is, in the 
realization of their purposes through labor, agents come to develop 
new capacities and skills and come to recognize these new capacities 
in themselves. Thus labor as a process of constituting the world is at the 
same time a process of self-constitution. In the Grundrisse Marx de-
scribes this process as one of "self-realization, objectification of the 
subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labor" (p. 611). 
A final feature of Marx's model of objectification is that it is a social 
process. It is so in two senses: first, that production is always carried on 
in and through specific forms of social relations, and second, that this 
activity of objectification is at the same time the way that individuals 
create their social life as their own product. 
The question is how this analysis of labor provides the basis for a 
theory of cause. If the question of cause concerns how things come into 
being and how one thing gives rise to another, then it is clear that for 
Marx, in the domain of social reality, it is labor that brings things into 
being and connects one thing with another. Thus labor not only pro-
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vides the ground for the concepts of cause, but more fundamentally 
constitntes the ontological domain of causality itself insofar as one is 
concerned with human affairs. Thus the reconstruction of Marx's 
theory of cause may proceed by an interpretation of Marx's analysis of 
labor itself. 
In this interpretation my first thesis is that Marx sees labor as causal 
in four senses; final, efficient, formal, and material. It thus becomes 
dear that one of the historical antecedents of Marx's labor theory of 
cause is Aristotle's doctrine of four causes. 
My second thesis is that for Marx labor is the active connection or 
mediation between final and efficient causes, between a purpose and 
the action that realizes it. Similarly, labor is the active mediation 
between formal and material causes or between the form and the objec-
tive conditions for its actualization. As such a mediation, labor may be 
regarded as an activity of synthesis which unifies these dimensions of 
purpose, agency, form and objective conditions. In this understanding 
of the causal relation as a synthetic activity, Marx's view may be 
compared to that of Kant. But for Kant, the synthetic activity is one of 
consciousness, whereas for Marx, the synthetic unity is one of labor as 
a practical activity of the subject in the world. 
My third thesis is that for Marx only human agency may properly be 
called causal. The environment or the objective circumstances in their 
effects on human actions are therefore not properly conceived as them-
selves causal agents. Rather, in Marx's account they are regarded as 
objective conditions or presuppositions of human action. Moreover, 
such objective circumstances come to be conditions only as they are 
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required for the realization of purposes in a given aCtiVIty. Fur-
thermore, Marx characterizes these objective conditions as themselves 
objectifications of past human agency. This account of the relation 
between human agency and objective circumstances will permit us to 
throw new light on Marx's remark in the third thesis on Feuerbach that 
"the doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, 
and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances 
and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circum-
stances. "2 
I shall now proceed to discuss these three theses in tum. 
First, in Marx's description of the simple production process, that is, 
the general form of laboring activity in which it produces objects for 
use, he analyzes labor as introducing final, efficient, formal and mate-
rial "causes." Thus Marx writes, "The transformation of the material 
by living labor, by the realization of living labor in the material-a 
transformation which, as purpose, determines labor and is its purpose-
ful activation ... -thus preserves the material in a definite form and 
subjugates the transformation of the material to the purpose of labor" 
(p. 360-61). Thus for Marx, the objects that labor produces embody 
the purposes of the agent; these purposes are thus their tlnal causes or 
that for the sake of which they are created. The quotation further 
suggests that labor itself is activated or determined by its purposes. 
Thus in Marx's account labor as transformative activity or as efficient 
cause--that is, what brings about changes in things-is inseparably 
bound up with its purposiveness or with final causality. The activity of 
labor is thus the way in which purposes become causally efficacious. 
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This transformative activity that realizes purposes proceeds through 
the working up or forming of material. Thus Marx calls labor "The 
living, form-giving fire" (p. 360). That is, labor is also the formal 
cause in the sense that it shapes objects to make them useful and to suit 
human purposes. Thus the formal cause is also construed in relation to 
final cause; or, more colloquiall y, what a thing is, is understood in 
terms of what it is good for. 
It is clear in this account that Marx's analysis is strikingly similar to 
Aristotle's in that he makes use of the distinctions that Aristotle intro-
duces between final, formal and efficient causes. Thus Aristotle gives 
an account of how things come to be or why they are what they are in 
terms of (1) "the end, i.e. that for·the sake of which a thing is"; (2) 
"the form or pattern, i.e. the definition of the essence [of the thing]"; 
and (3) "that from which the change or the resting from change first 
begins. "3 Analogously, Marx gives an account of labor as the produc-
tion of things in terms of purposes, the giving of form, and transforma-
tive activity that changes things. Furthermore, Marx follows Aristotle 
in his conception of material cause as the condition for this forming 
activity or as "that which" is formed by the activity. As Aristotle 
describes it, this "material cause" is "that from which, as immanent 
material, a thing comes into being; e.g. the bronze is the cause of the 
statue. "4 In a passage reminiscent of Aristotle, Marx writes, 
Th~ relation of capital, in its content, to labor, of objectified labor to 
hvmg labor ... can, in general, be nothing more than the relation of 
labor to its objectivity, its material ... and in connection with labor as 
activity, the material, the objectified labor, has only two relations, that 
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of the raw material, i.e. of the fonnless matter, the mere material for 
the form-positing, purposive activity of labor, and that of the illstru-
melll of labor, the objective means which subjective activity inserts 
between itself as an object, as its conductor. (pp. 298-299) 
As in Aristotle, so for Marx, the material cause describes what is 
available for forming activity as its objective condition or its presup-
position. However, as is also clear from this passage, Marx, in distinc-
tion from Aristotle, interprets this material not as natural substance but 
as what he calls "social substance." That is, he defines these objective 
conditions as objectified labor, or as the creations of past labor. Thus 
Marx writes, "Raw material and instrument, as substance of values, 
are themselves already objectified labor, products. The substance of 
value is not at all the particular natural substance, but rather objectified 
labor" (p. 299). Thus although objective conditions include what 
Marx calls natural substance, such substance does not become an ob-
jective condition except with reference to a specific activity of labor for 
which it has value. In this relation it is what Marx calls social sub-
stance. 
My second thesis was that for Marx labor is the mediation or relation 
among the Aristotelian four causes and as such may be considered an 
activity of synthesis comparable to Kant's notion of causality as a 
synthesis. Thus an important difference between Marx's and Aristo-
tle's uses of the distinctions among the four causes is the centrality that 
Marx, by contrast to Aristotle, gives to labor. In Aristotle's interpreta-
tion of the four causes in the context of human making, the activity of 
production or labor is only the efficient cause of the object. The pro-
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ductive activity or labor is not the final, formal or material cause of the 
object. For Marx, on the other hand, the activity of labor contains in 
itself all four causes of a made object. As we have seen, not only is 
labor purposive, form-giving and causally efficacious activity, but as 
objectified labor, that is, as result or product, it is also the material 
condition for subsequent laboring activity. Thus labor as an activity is 
the synthesis or unification of all four "causes." 
The recognition t~at for Marx labor is an activity of synt.l-tesis or 
unification vividly suggests a comparison with Kant's view of causal-
ity as such an activity of synthesis. Furthermore, for Kant the specific 
nature of this synthesis is that it is in the category of relation. Simi-
larly, for Marx, labor as a synthetic activity establishes relations be-
tween entities. Further, as we have seen, labor is a process in which its 
own dimensions, that is, the four causes, are internally related to each 
other. It is therefore a synthetic unity of these dimensions. 
However, there is an important difference in the understanding of 
the activity of synthesis between Marx and Kant and therefore in their 
understanding of the category of cause. Whereas for Kant synthesis is 
an activity of the understanding, for Marx it is the practical activity of 
labor. Therefore, while causality is only an epistemological category 
for Kant, concerning the conditions for any possible understanding, for 
Marx causality is at the same time an ontological category or, more 
precisely, a category of social ontology. As such it concerns the condi-
tions for any possible practice. 
My third thesis concerns the relation between human activity as 
cause and its objective conditions. My claim is that on Marx's view 
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only human agency, or what Marx calls labor, is properly regarded as 
causal. The objective conditions for action are precisely that, namely, 
conditions and not causes. Furthermore, they become conditions for 
laboring activity only insofar as agents have to take them into account 
in order to realize their purposes. Moreover, on Marx's view these 
conditions are themselves products of past laboring activity. They are 
what Marx calls "objectified labor. " Thus what appears as external to 
labor, as t.lte objective world, is to a large degree really tllC result of 
labor's own creative activity. But it should be emphasized that for 
Marx labor does not create from nothing, but rather presupposes a 
previously existing world which it works on. 
Marx clarifies the relation between labor as cause and its objective 
conditions in his discussion of the relation between past or objectified 
labor and living labor as activity in the present. He makes the point that 
previously objectified labor is significant only to the extent that it is 
posited as a condition of living labor. Thus Marx writes, "Objectified 
labor ceases to exist in a dead state as an external, indifferent form of 
the substance, because it is itself again posited as a moment of living 
labor; as a relation of living labor to itself in an objective material, as 
the objectivity of living labor (as means and end) (the objective condi-
tions of living labor)" (p. 360). 
Marx gives an example of this relation in his account of the produc-
tion process. In the weaving of the yarn into fabric, labor has as its 
objective conditions the material and the instrument, that is, cotton 
yam and the loom. The yarn and the loom are themselves products of 
previous labor. Further, they become objective conditions only with 
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respect to the purposes of labor, namely, only insofar as they are 
worked on with a view to transforming them into fabric. Thus Marx 
writes, 
When the labor of weaving transforms yarn into fabric, i.e. treats yarn 
as the raw material of weaving (a particular form of living labor)-(and 
twist has use value only if it is woven into fabric)-it thereby preserves 
the use value which cotton had as such, as well as that which cotton 
had obtained specifically as yarn. It preserves the product of labor by 
making it into the raw material of new labor. (p. 362) 
Or, as Marx says, "It preserves it ... only by working it in a purpose-
ful way, by making it the object of new living labor" (p. 362). 
Thus it is Marx's view that the relation of labor to its objective 
conditions or, as Marx says, to "the objective conditions of its effi-
cacy" (p. 363) is a relation of a causal agent, namely, the present 
laboring activity, to conditions that become relevant only insofar as 
they are transformed by this activity. Thus in Marx's example, the use 
value of the colton yarn and the loom are preserved only by the activity 
of weaving fabric. As Marx describes it, 
[The labor of weaving] preserves the utility of cotton as yarn by weav-
ing the yarn into fabric . .. preserves it by weaving it. This preserva-
tion of labor as product-of the use value of the product of labor by its 
becoming the raw material of new labor, being again posited as mate-
rial objectivity of purposeful living labor-is given with the simple 
production process. As regards use value, labor has the property of 
preserving the existing use value by raising it, and it raises it by 
making it into the object of new labor as defined by an ultimate aim. 
(p. 362) 
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This analysis helps us to understand more clearly Marx's conception of 
the relation between human agents and their circumstances, which he 
presents in the well-known third thesis on Feuerbach cited above: 
"[TJhe doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbring-
ing, and that, therefore, changed men arc products of other circum-
stances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change 
circumstances." It would be a mistake to interpret Marx here as mean-
ing that human beings are produced by circumstances just as they 
produce circumstances, or to see this as a simple interaction between 
two causes. We have seen that for Marx circumstances or the objective 
world have no causal efficacy. They must rather be regarded as condi-
tions or presuppositions of purposive human activity. This quotation 
should therefore be understood in the context of Marx's view of objec-
tification. This means that the relation of agents to circumstances is not 
symmetrical or reciprocal, but rather asymmetrical. Thus causal effi-
cacy lies only with agents. 
However, to recognize that only human agency is causal is not to say 
that the conditions contribute nothing to what resul IS. For Marx, a full 
account of an action requires reference to the circumstances or condi-
tions of that action. Conditions provide a range of possibilities for the 
realization of an agent's purposes. Also, the absence of certain condi-
tions makes the realization of givcn purposes more difficult or even 
impossible. Thus we may speak of enabling or constraining conditions 
of action. But the important thing to note in the context of this argu-
ment is that conditions are not causes. Moreover, in view of the argu-
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ment made above that what counts as a condition for an action depends 
on the agent's purposes, it follows that what it is that actions can 
accomplish under given conditions can be discovered only in the 
course of the activity itself. 
What I have been describing above is the fundamental nature of 
causality as agency. This is based on Marx's account of what he calls 
the simple production process, as well as on his remarks concerning 
the nature of activity. As such, t¥larx considers it to be a general 
feature of labor in all historical social stages. However, for Marx the 
forms of human activity, as well as the conditions for this activity, are 
socially and historically differentiated. Thus, as we shall see, the ways 
in which causality appears and is understood vary from one social stage 
to another. 
Thus far I have been concerned with Marx's account of labor as 
objectification understood as a relation of the laboring subject or causal 
agent to the objective world. But as I have noted, for Marx objectifica-
tion is at the same time a process of self-creation of the subject, in 
which an agent realizes and changes him or herself through changing 
the world. As in the previous analysis of action on the world, here, too, 
in the case of self-change, only agency is causal. Further, the four 
aspects of causality hold here as well: namely, in order to realize his or 
her purposes, the agent is efficiently or productively causal by a forma-
tive activity that shapes conditions. Consider the example of a person 
who wants to become a good cook. In order to realize this purpose, the 
person has to practice cooking, that is, has to engage in the activity of 
combining ingredients in accordance with a recipe and has to learn to 
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use the appropriate utensils for specific tasks. It is thus by working on 
conditions in accordance with purposes that the agent acquires new or 
changed characteristics, in this case, a skill. It is also evident that this 
process of self-creation or self-change, as in the previous case of labor 
as the changing of things, requires the mediation of objective condi-
tions. That is, according to Marx, it is necessary to transform one's 
objective circumstances in order 10 change oneself. 
However, unlike t~e previous case of changing ti'1.ings, the case of 
self-creation or self-change should not be conceived as a causal rela-
tion between the agent and himself or herself in which the agent may 
be conceived as a result of his or her previous actions. This would 
be to deny the freedom of the agent to recreate himself or herself con-
stantly or to be in Marx's striking phrases "without a predetermined 
yardstick" (p. 488) or to be "the absolute movement of becoming" (p. 
488). Rather, I would propose that Marx's idea of self-creation through 
objectification should be distinguished from traditional views of self-
causation or of self-determination. For on such views, although the 
agent is not the product of any external causes, the agent's present 
activity is seen as the result of past actions, where only the first cause 
in such a chain is free and all future actions are determined by past 
actions. On such views present activity is not free to choose among 
alternative possibilities. I would claim that since agency is freely 
causal, one cannot regard this agency as caused, not even as self-
caused. Rather, self-creation involves a process in which the agent 
through his or her causal action creates new conditions which present 
possibilities of new choices and purposes and new modes of action. 
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Further, it is only in the exercise of these new modes of activity that the 
agent may be said to have changed, 
We have seen thus far that objectification involves a relation be-
tween subject and object and also between the subject and himself or 
herself. A final dimension that Marx sees in every act of objectification 
is the relation of subject to subject. Thus objectification or labor is 
characterized by Marx as an activity of social individuals who relate to 
each other in definite ways. The recognition of this social character of 
the laboring process requires us to supplement the previous analysis of 
objectification in the following ways: First, Marx characterizes the 
subject or causal agent as either a social individual or as social indi-
viduals in the plural. In chapter I, I interpreted such a social individual 
to be a concrete individual standing in social relations, that is, definite 
relations to other individuals. Marx also speaks of social individuals in 
the plural as the subject or agency in the labor process. In this case, I 
take him to mean that such individuals-in-relation share purposes and 
co-determine the nature and results of the activity. This signifies for 
our account of cause that more than one individual can be the causal 
agent in a single process. But this does not signify a plurality of 
different causes, but rather that these individuals constitute what we 
might call a common cause. 
The recognition of the social character of the process of objectifica-
tion suggests another respect in which the previous analysis should be 
expanded. Specifically, it is not only material circumstances that pro-
vide the objective conditions of an individual's action. In addition, 
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other individuals are equally conditions or presuppositions for such 
action. Thus the needs of others may provide the motives or purposes 
of an individual's action. Or further, others may provide the instrumen-
tality as in the case of exploitation. Again, other individuals or social 
institutions (as the objectified form of their relations) provide the social 
circumstances that an individual may draw upon in terms of skills, 
resources, ideas, and so forth in order to realize his or her purposes. 
A further way in which the previous analysis needs to be elaborated 
derives from Marx's account of objectification or labor occurring in and 
through definite forms of social relations where these take the form of 
property relations. Marx defines property as disposition over the condi-
tions of production. But my previous analysis has shown that labor or 
activity requiTes objective conditions for the realization of its purposes. 
In view of this, the importance of property, as disposition over these 
conditions, becomes evident. Thus in Marx's analysis, in the specific 
form of social relations of capitalism, the conditions or means of 
production are the property of capital, which therefore has the power of 
determining how this property is to be used. Since labor, in this form 
of social organization, does not have control over the objective condi-
tions of its activity, labor's need for these conditions makes it objec-
tively dependent on capital. A more general implication of the impor-
tance of property relations is that in order to understand a given process 
of labor or production in the economic sphere, one must see it in its 
relations to the forms of social organization, that is, the prevailing 
forms of property relations, as disposition over the conditions of pro-
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duction. In this way we can see that Marx's conception of property 
is systematically related to his understanding of the objectification 
process. 
In connection with this analysis of objectification as a relation of 
subject to subject, the question arises of whether this interrelation 
between individuals should be understood as a causal interaction in 
which one individual causes the actions of the other and vice versa. 
From the previous argument it may be seen that 1\1arx takes each 
individual in such a relation as a causally effective agent and, further, 
as a free agent. For Marx, an agent causes changes in other things but 
is not himself or herself the effect of a cause. Therefore we may 
conclude that the relation between agents cannot be one in which one 
agent causes the actions of the other. On this account, the nature of this 
social relation among agents must be conceptualized as other than a 
causal relation. But the analysis of this alternative relation lies beyond 
the scope of this chapter and will be treated in the final chapter of this 
book. 
Causality as an Internal Relation 
I shall now take up a further dimension of Marx's labor theory of 
cause: namely, his characterization of cause as a relation, and specifi-
cally as an internal relation. This implies that the entities in the causal 
relation, namely, the subject and the object, are both essentially 
changed by the relation. Yet I shall argue that on Marx's view this 
recognition that cause is an internal relation does not require one to 
interpret it as a symmetrical relation. Rather, here my first thesis is that 
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Marx preserves the asymmetry of the causal relation while regarding it 
as an internal relation. Thus on Marx's view while the subject acts on 
the object, the object is without agency and does not act on the subject. 
Marx's view may thus be distinguished from those views, like the first 
view discussed earlier, that regard causality as an external relation 
between independent entities, which remain essentially unchanged by 
the relation. But in addition I would like to argue, as my second thesis, 
that Marx's view should also be distinguished from t.l-tat which we may 
attribute to Hegel, which sees internal relations as fundamentally recip-
rocal, such that each element of the relation constitutes the other. For 
Marx, both cause and reciprocity are internal relations in which each of 
the entities in the relation is essentially changed by the relation; but in 
reciprocal relations the changes are not causal and in causal relations 
the changes are not reciprocal. 
First, then, if we consider Marx's account of labor as a causal 
relation between the agent and the object of his or her activity, it is 
clear that the relation is an internal one in which both agent and object 
are essentially changed. In the framework of the earlier discussion that 
analyzed labor in terms of purposes, productive activity, form and 
objective conditions, it may be seen that each of these may be taken as 
a relation between the agent and the object. Thus, for example, pur-
poses may be seen as a relation between the agent and the object 
produced by his or her activity. In this case the purposes of the agent 
determine the kind of activity that will be required to fulfill them and 
thus essentially change the nature of the agent's activity. At the same 
time, the purposes determine the nature of the object produced, since 
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the object that is produced is one that will satisfy these purposes. For 
example, in making a table that will serve for dining, the agent's 
purpose requires among other things that he or she plane the wood to 
produce a flat surface. Also, in accordance with the purpose, the object 
produced will have a flat surface appropriate for the activity of eating. 
Similarly, the antecedent objective conditions may be seen as a 
relation between the agent and what he or she produces. In this case 
what is available as a condition for the activity affects the nature of that 
activity in terms of what conditions the agent chooses to use to produce 
the object and how he or she uses them; also tbe object produced is 
dependent on the conditions available for its production. Thus in our 
example, whether the agent chooses to use wood or metal as the 
material for the table, or again, whether the agent chooses to use plane, 
chisel or sheet metal press as the instrument, makes an essential dif-
ference in the nature of the activity of forming the table. It also obvi-
ously makes an essential difference to what is produced. A similar 
analysis may be carried out to show that the form may also be under-
stood as a relation between the agent and the object, in which both the 
agent's activity and the object are essentially changed in the relation. 
In these cases the claim has been that the agent's activity is essen-
tially changed by the adoption of specific purposes or the use of certain 
material conditions, and so forth. For example, the choice of a plane 
rather than a chisel makes the activity in the one case essentially 
different from that in the other. Such changes in the agent's activity 
can become essential changes in the agent if the activity becomes 
characteristic of that agent. Similarly, when a person adopts and main-
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tains a given purpose, he or she comes to be essentially changed. From 
this standpoint, therefore, productive activity itself may be seen as an 
internal relation between the agent and the object, in which the activity 
not only creates the new object but also changes the agent. 
A further way in which labor as causality may be seen to be an 
internal relation derives from its character of being a synthesis, as 
described above. Specifically, I described it as a synthesis of purposes, 
form, productive activity and objective conditions. But, as we saw, 
purposes, form and productive activity are aspects of labor as a single 
process and are therefore internally related within it. Further the objec-
tive conditions themselves were seen to be objectifications of past 
labor and are thus themselves moments of the laboring 'process as a 
temporal process. As the objectification of purposive, form-giving 
agency, these objective conditions are internally related to the other 
moments of the labor process. 
Thus the account so far has claimed that Marx regards causality as 
an internal relation between entities-that is, subject and object-· -in 
which each is essentially changed in the relation. However, in Marx's 
model of causality as an internal relation, the asymmetry of the causal 
relation is preserved. This may be seen to follow from the account 
given above of Marx's view of the relation between agents and the 
objective conditions of their activity. There it was shown that whereas 
the subject or agent causally acts on the object, the object does not 
causally act on the agent, but rather only provides the conditions for 
the agent's self-change. For the present account of cause as an internal 
relation, this implies that although both the causal agency and its object 
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are changed in the relation, only the object is changed by the subject, 
but the subject is not changed by the object. 
Thus my reconstruction of Marx's view shows that it differs from 
those views that regard causality as an external relation of cause and 
effect between independent entities. Yet it shares their understanding of 
the causal relation as asymmetrical and as holding between independent 
entities. Thus Marx's view also differs from those that characterize all 
internal relations as symmetrical or reciprocal, such that each entity 
causes or constitutes the other. As I claimed in my second thesis, 
this understanding of internal relations distinguishes Marx's ap-
proach from Hegel's. For Hegel, every relation is a relation within a 
"totality" and cannot be taken apart from every other relation except 
by abstracting it from the whole. These are interrelations of elements 
within a whole in which the elements themselves are constituted by 
their relations to each other as parts of that whole. Therefore these 
relations are symmetrical and reciprocal among all the elements of the 
whole. Further, these are internal relations both in the sense that they 
are relations within a whole and that the elements of these relations 
interconstitute each other. By contrast, for Marx, as we have seen, not 
all internal relations are reciprocal; and specifically, cause as an inter-
nal relation is not reciprocal or symmetrical. 
The Appearance of Causality as an External Relation Under 
Capitalism 
Thus far I have reconstructed Marx's labor theory of cause in terms of 
his account of objectification as a process occurring in all forms of 
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social organization. However, Marx sees this labor process as taking 
on differentiated forms in different historical periods. This historical 
differentiation is rooted in two related features of the process of labor: 
First, as we have seen, this process is a developmental one, insofar as 
laboring activity in accordance with purposes gives rise to changed 
conditions that in turn make possible new purposes, and so forth. In 
this sense the process is one of self-transcendence. Second, as we have 
also seen, this activity of labor takes place in and through social and 
property relations, which themselves change. This historical nature of 
the process of labor suggests that the causal relation itself, which we 
have defined in terms of this process, is itself also historically dif-
ferentiated. 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, Marx treats the develop-
ment of the process of objectification through various historical stages, 
and specifically the stages of what he calls pre-capitalist formations, 
capitalism, and the communal society of the future. Here I shall con-
sider briefly Marx's discussion of the specific form in which causality 
appears in the contemporary social stage of capitalism. My thesis is 
that the appearance of the causal relation as an external relation arises 
from the alienation of the activity of labor under capitalism. 
According to Marx, in capitalism the internal relations between 
subject and object and between subject and subject appear as external 
relations among things. Thus he writes, "Their own exchange and 
their own production confront individuals as an objective relation 
which is independent of them" (p. 161). Further, according to Marx, 
the character of the activity of individuals in production appears to 
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them "as something alien and objective, confronting the individuals, 
not as their relation to one another, but as their subordination to rela-
tions which suhsist independently of them" (p, 157), Similarly, Marx 
analyzes the process of exchange under capitalism as one in which the 
products of the causal activity of labor appear only in their relation to 
each other as exchange values. Thus in Marx's account of this process 
of exchange, he writes, 
As much as the individual moments of this movement arise from the 
conscious will and particular purposes of individuals, so much does the 
totality of the process appear as an objective interreiation, which arises 
spontaneously from nature; arising, it is true, from the mutual influ-
ence of conscious individuals on one another, but neither located in 
their consciousness, nor subsumed under them as a whole. Their own 
collisions with one another produce an alien social power standing 
above them, produce their mutual interaction as a process and power 
independent of them. (pp. 196-197) 
These passages not only describe the fact that relations appear as 
external but also suggest the explanation for it. The appearance has two 
aspects: First, what are really internal relations appear as external 
relations between independently existing things; thus the causal rela-
tion of agent to product comes to appear as a relation between prod-
ucts, as an exchange value. Second, the agents themselves come to 
appear as the products or results of objective conditions or external cir-
cumstances, which appear to dominate them, that is, to exercise causal 
agency over them. According to Marx, the explanation of this phenom-
enon lies in the alienated form of the objectification process under 
capitalism. That is, in the organization of production under capitalism, 
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the laborer's own product comes to belong to another, nameiy, to 
capital. Through the capitalist's appropriation of this product in the 
form of surplus value, the laborer's own product comes to rule over 
him or her as an alien and independent power. The products, as the 
objective conditions for his or her subsequent laboring activity, belong 
to capital, on which the laborer is therefore dependent for his or her 
activity. Thus Marx explains, "Labor capacity ... has posited these 
conditions themselves as things, values, which confront it in an alien, 
commanding personification .... [The laborer] has produced not only 
the alien wealth and his own poverty, but also the relation of this 
wealth as independent, self-sufficient wealth (pp,452-453). When the 
process is correctly understood, according to Marx, as the alienation of 
labor, it becomes clear, as Marx writes, that 
this objectified labor-these external conditions of the laborer's being 
and the independent externality (to him) of these objective conditions-
now appear as posited by himself, as his own product, as his own self-
objectification as well as the objectification of himself as a power 
independent of himself, which moreover rules over him, rules over him 
through his own actions. (p. 453) 
In capitalism, the causality that Marx sees as residing only in labor 
as agency now appears in its alienated form as residing in the external 
conditions of laboring activity. Causal agency comes to be attributed to 
these external or objective conditions themselves. But for Marx this is 
a false appearance. The reality is that the external conditions, which 
are the products of labor, have been endowed with this power over and 
against labor. The appearance is such that the agent's activity seems to 
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be the effect or result of these external conditions taken as cause. 
Further, the form of the causal relation in this alienated mode appears 
as an external relation among independent and indifferent entities, 
related to each other in exchange only as abstract quantities of ex-
change value. 
r would like to propose that it is this appearance of causality as an 
external relation, and as belonging to the objective or external condi-
dons of labor or agency, t~at is at the foundation of the conceptions of 
the causal relation as such an external relation. This conception is the 
first of the prevailing views referred to at the outset. Here my claim is 
that this view is an expression of a historical! y limited and alienated 
form of the causal relation, which has mistaken, one might say, the 
appearance of causal relations under capitalism for the reality. 
Thus Marx's account of the appearance of social relations under 
capitalism as external relations between indifferent entities provides 
the basis for a criticism of the first prevailing view of causality. As will 
be remembered, this view sees the causal relation as just such an 
external relation between indifferent entities. According to Marx, this 
notion of cause is produced by an uncritical theoretical reflection on 
the practical experience of the forms of social interaction that are 
characteristic of this historical period. Marx's account provides the 
basis fora similar criticism of the attempt made, on this first prevailing 
view, to explain human actions as the effects of external causes or as 
conforming to objective laws. Just as in the social relations of capitalist 
production, individuals appear to be acting in accordance with objec-
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tive laws, so too, in the theory, actions are explained as the effects of 
external causes. 
There are two further ways in which Marx's approach to causality 
may be contrasted with this first view. These may be seen to derive 
from my reconstruction of Marx's theory of cause as agency. As 
against the first view, Marx does not take antecedent conditions as 
causes. Rather, as we have seen, only agency is causal. Further, by 
contrast to the first view, which characterizes causality as an extelual 
relation! between independent entities, Marx sees the agent as cause to 
be internally related to these conditions in the activity of working on 
them and transforming them. 
By contrast to the first view, the second prevailing approach to 
causality, as noted earlier, takes as its domain only the contexts of 
human actions and proposes that the appropriate way to explain actions 
is by understanding the intentions of the agents. Insofar as this view 
may be regarded as causal, it is concerned only with final causes or 
teleological explanations or with reasons for actions. In place of the 
external connection between two events as cause and effect, this view 
sees the relation of intention to actions as an internal relation in which 
the intention gives the meaning or significance to the action. Some 
versions of this intentional approach-specifically, those of the 
phenomenologists and hermeneuticists-give an ontological ground 
for this characterization of action. They see these meanings as created 
by the constitutive activity of a subject, where this subject tends to be 
taken only as an individual. 
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Marx's first criticism of this second view of causality would be that 
in their exclusive focus on" intentions in explaining actions or on 
meaning-making activity, most versions of this view tend to emphasize 
mbjectivity in a one-sided way. In this one-sided emphasis, this sec-
~md approach is comparable to the first one, which similarly places 
one-sided emphasis on objectivity understood as external law-like con-
nections between events or entities. Marx would see both of these 
views as stating in theoretical form the abstract and one-sided nature of 
social relations in capitalism, in which subjects are separated or alien-
ated from the objects of their activity. According to Marx, this separa-
tion between subject and object is found in the dichotomy between, on 
the one hand, self-interested, isolated and indifferent individuals and, 
on the other hand, the objective and impersonal laws of the market that 
relate these subjects to each other. In Marx's account this separation is 
also found in the dichotomy hetween living labor as subjectivity and 
capital as objectified labor or objectivity. 
Before proceeding to Marx's further criticisms of the intentional 
view, I shall indicate the respects in which Marx is in agreement with 
this view. First, like the intentional view, Marx emphasizes the impor-
tance of intentions or purposes for an explanation of human action. 
Second, Marx is in agreement with this view in seeing the relation of 
intention to action as an internal relation. Again, Marx, like some 
versions of tbe second view, regards the conditions of human activity 
as tbemselves results of human activity, and therefore agrees in the 
understanding of agents as self-creating or self-constituting in their 
activity. 
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However, Marx would criticize this second view for its exclusive 
concern with intentional explanation and therefore for its failure to 
recognize that actions are themselves causally efficacious. Put in more 
traditional terms, Marx's criticism would be that this second view fails 
to see the relation between final and efficient causes. Phenomenologists 
do talk about the activity of subjects as constituting tbe social world by 
giving it meaning and in this sense they may be said to grant efficacy to 
activity. But they do not see this as causal efficacy. Furthermore, from 
Marx's standpoint, the phenomenologists misinterpret the nature of this 
constitutive activity. Specifically, tbey interpret tbe creation of mean-
ing as an activity of consciousness alone. By contrast, Marx regards tbis 
activity of constitution as an activity oflaboring which is causally effec-
tive and gives meaning to things by transfornting a given world in ac-
cordance with the subject's purposes. 
A further criticism Marx would make of the second view of causality 
is that in its focus on intentions, this view does not take into account 
the objective social and historical circumstances that condition action. 
Insofar as the phenomenologists do consider the circumstances of ac-
tion, such circumstances are regarded as the horizon or conscious 
framework for one's activity, and thus from Marx's standpoint do not 
have the requisite objectivity or sociality. For those action theorists for 
whom human action is understood as rule-governed and therefore so-
cial, Marx's criticism would be that they do not see this sociality as 
historicaL 
Thus we have seen that Marx's approach, like the second prevailing 
view of causality, emphasizes the agent's purposes in the understand-
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ing of human actIvity. However, in distinction from this VIew, an 
adequate understanding for Marx would also require reference to the 
agent's activity in shaping and transforming the given conditions, 
where these conditions are understood as socially and historically dif-
ferentiated. 
•• 
4 The Ontology of Freedom: Domination, Abstract 
Freedom and the Emergence of the Social Individual 
Let me begin with a quotation from the Grundrisse in which Marx 
interprets freedom as self-realization through the activity of labor. 
Beginning with a biblical passage, Marx writes, 
In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou labor! was Jehovah's curse on 
Adam. And this is labor for Smith, a curse. "Tranquillity" appears as 
the adequate state, as identical with "freedom" and "happiness." It 
seems quite far from Smith's mind that the individual "in his normal 
state of health, strength, activity, skill, facility," also needs a normal 
portion of work, and of the suspension of tranquility. Certainly, labor 
obtains its measure from the outside, through the aim to be attained and 
the obstacles to be overcome in attaining it. But Smith has no inkling 
whatever that this overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating 
activity-and that, further, the external aims become stripped of the 
semblance of merely external natural urgencies and become posited as 
aims which the individual himself posits-hence as self-realization, 
objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, 
precisely labor. He is right of course, that, in its historic forms as 
slave-labor, serf-labor and wage-labor, labor always appears as repul-
sive, always as external forced labor, and not-labor, by contrast, as 
"freedom and happiness." (p. 611) 
Marx goes on to describe the alternative to this external forced labor, in 
which 
labor becomes attractive work, the individual's self-realization, which 
in no way means that it becomes mere fun, mere amusement, as 
Fourier with grisette-like naivete, conceives it. Really free working, 
e.g. composing, is at the same time precisely the most damned se-
riousness, the most intense exertion. The work of material production 
can achieve this character only (I) when its social character is posited, 
(2) when it is of a scientific and at the same time general character, not 
merely human exertion as a specifically harnessed natural force, but ex-
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ertion as subject, which appears in the production process not in a merely 
natural, spontaneous form, but as an activity regulating all the forces of 
nature. (pp. 611-612) 
We may isolate three themes in this quotation that will be treated in 
this chapter. First, the definition of freedom: Marx contrasts his con-
cept of freedom to the more traditional conception proposed by Adam 
Smith. In contrast to Smith, Marx sees freedom not as the freedom 
from labor, but rather as activity or labor itself, conceived as an activ-
ity of self-realization. Marx's concept of freedom is counterposed not 
only to that of Smit~, but to a number of ot~er historical alternatives. 
The first task of this chapter will be to analyze several alternative 
concepts offreedom in order to isolate what is distinctive about Marx's 
conception. It is clear at the outset that for Marx freedom is integrally 
related to objectification, that is, to the creative and productive activity 
of individuals; and thus many of the themes of my second and third 
chapters concerning the ontology of labor will be seen to be relevant 
here. 
The second theme raised in the quotation, but merely suggestively, 
is the re1ation between labor as value-creating activity and freedom as 
itself a value, and thus, more generally, the relation of value and 
freedom in Marx. Thus there is the suggestion that freedom emerges 
when individuals transform external natural urgencies into aims that 
they themselves posit and that "The overcoming of obstacles is itself a 
liberating activity." Marx regards this liberating activity as one of 
objectification or labor. But as we saw in chapter 2, the very nature of 
this laboring activity is the creation of value. If freedom consists in 
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value-creating activity, is freedom presupposed as the a priori nature of 
this activity itself or is it rather an emergent property that comes into 
being and develops as the product of this activity? Further, given that 
Marx does not have a transcendental basis for values, what is the 
ground of value for Marx, and correlatively, how does the normative-
ness of freedom arise? 
The third theme raised in the quotation is that of the development of 
freedom. That is, Marx suggests that freedom develops through a 
historical process and appears differently in different social stages. 
Further, he suggests that fully realized freedom requires certain condi-
tions, among them the mastery of nature and emergence of universal 
social relations. Accordingly, the third task of this chapter will be to 
trace the development of freedom through the stages of social de-
velopment presented in the Grundrisse. It will be seen that this takes 
the form of a dialectic, as suggested in the first ch~pter. . 
Thus, this chapter is divided into three parts: first, an analysis of 
Marx's concept of freedom in the context of alternative concepts; 
second, a discussion of the ground of value and the relation of value to 
freedom; and third, a characterization of the dialectic of freedom in the 
three stages of social development that Marx discusses in the Grund-
risse. 
The Concepts of Negative and Positive Freedom 
We may begin by locating Marx's concept of freedom with respect to a 
number of alternative classical conceptions which I shall present here 
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only schematically. Marx contrasts his view to Adam Smith's view of 
freedom as "tranquillity" or as absence of toil. That is, Smith defines 
freedom negatively, in terms of what it is not. Labor for Smith has the 
connotations of that which is unpleasant, requires exertion, and con-
sequently is to be avoided. Freedom then consists in the absence of 
exertion and the avoidance of the unpleasantness of work. Freedom is 
therefore defined as not-work, and work is conceived of as an external 
constraint, that is, as a constraint imposed from without by reason of 
having to meet natural needs. 
A second conception with which Marx's may be contrasted is the 
Hobbesian view of freedom, which is related to that of Smith. For 
Hobbes "Liberty, or freedom, signifieth, properly, the absence of 
opposition; by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion." 
In the case of human subjects, liberty "consisteth in this, that he finds 
no stop in doing what he has the will, desire or inclination to do.'" 
Thus for Hobbes, freedom is again defined negatively as the absence of 
external impediments. It does not consist in willing, desiring, or inclin-
ing, but rather in not being stopped from doing what one wills or 
desires. 
In both Hobbes and Smith it is a negative feature, that is, the ab-
sence of external constraint, that defines freedom. It is "freedom 
from" instead of "freedom to." In Smith, however, the distinctive 
character of the constraint is that it arises from the requirement to 
satisfy one's natural needs by labor. For Hobbes, the external impedi-
ments that thwart one's will or desire are interpreted more broadly so 
that they include not only natural constraints but also the imposition 
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from without of another's will; impediments therefore include the 
domination of one subject by another. Insofar as this freedom is de-
fined negatively, simply as the absence of impediments, it has no 
content in itself; its content is given to it by the specific will or desire 
that is enabled to satisfy itself as a result. This desire or will is always 
private or that of an individual. Therefore insofar as this freedom can 
be characterized positively at all, it is the freedom to do as one desires. 
Marx's conception of freedom also contains a negative aspect; like 
the other two, it can be characterized as a "freedom from." But 
whereas for Smith and Hobbes freedom consists in the absence of exter-
nal constraint, for Marx freedom is the overcoming of external con-
straint. Thus he writes, "The overcoming of obstacles is itself a 
liberating activity" (p. 611). In this sense of freedom as liberation, 
freedom is an activity and not only a state of being. As for Hobbes, for 
Marx also external constraint can take the form of either external 
natural necessity or external social necessity, that is, domination. 
However, Marx regards freedom as achieved through the activity of 
liberating oneself from these constraints. 
For Marx, this activity of overcoming external necessity presup-
poses that the agent transforms the external necessity in accordance 
with his or her purposes. In chapters 2 and 3 I treated this activity as 
one of objectification. This gives rise to a second aspect of Marx's 
concept of freedom in which freedom takes on the character of self-
determination by contrast to other-determination. In this regard Marx's 
concept may be seen to be related to that of Kant and of Hegel. 
To put it briefly, for Kant, freedom is not merely negative, but 
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rather is a positive activity of the will. In this sense, for Kant as for 
Marx, freedom is an activity and not merely a state of being. Accord-
ing to Kant, this activity of the will is free insofar as the will is 
self-legislating or autonomous-that is, self-determining-by contrast 
to heteronomous or determined by what is external to it. As autono-
mous, it does not merely act in accordance with its own rule or law, but 
rather acts out of respect for its own law, that is, out of conscious 
recognition of this law as its own, and which, as a law of reason, is 
universal. Thus Kant's view of freedom introduces the condition of 
self-conscious self-determination as the characteristic of free activity. 
But this is a self-determination by a being whose nature is" to be 
rational. Insofar as' the self-legislation is that of reason itself, freedom 
is the activity of a rational being that is in accordance with its nature. 
Hegel develops Kant's view of freedom as self-determination, 
where this self-determination becomes fully free only when the agent is 
aware of him or herself as being self-determining. Every subject is for 
Hegel implicitly self-determining (that is to say, in itself) but this 
self-determination becomes explicit only when the subject realizes that 
what appears as external or other is really itself in its otherness. With 
this realization it becomes free both in and for itself. Freedom is 
therefore the result of a process of developing self-consciousness. For 
Hegel, however, this result is already implicitly contained in the pro-
cess from the very beginning. Since this development of self-
consciousness is an "unfolding" of its own nature as Spirit or the Idea, 
the activity of individual subjects in history is understood by Hegel as 
, 
/ -
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particular ways in which the Idea comes to realize itself. The process 
of this dialectic of freedom is thus one in which the Idea actualizes 
itself through the activities of subjects. 
I indicated that in its second aspect Marx's concept of freedom was 
that of self-determination. In this respect he follows Kant. Fur-
thermore, like Kant he conceives of freedom as an activity, and more-
over, one that involves self-consciousness. But Marx's conception 
differs from that of Kant in at least two important respects: First, 
whereas for Kant self-determination is an activify in accordance with 
one's nature (qua rationai), for Marx freedom is an activity of creating 
one's nature. Second, for Kant (at least as he is usually interpreted) 
self-determination or autonomy is independent of empirical conditions, 
the consideration of which would make the will heteronomous. By 
contrast, for Marx freedom arises through interaction with these empir-
ical conditions, that is, by a transformative process in which a subject 
who is originally heteronomous becomes autonomous by achieving 
mastery over nature, and freedom from social domination. In this last 
respect Marx may be construed as following Hegel. 
But Hegel regards the externality of the empirical world or nature as 
fhe other-sidedness of Spirit, with no independent reality of its own. 
By contrast, for Marx, as we saw in the second chapter, the other or 
nature is (at least initially) really other than, or independent of, the 
subjects who then transform it into their own object. Furthermore, 
whereas for Hegel freedom is only derivatively predicable of an indi-
vidual, that is, only insofar as the individual expresses the develop-
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ment of the Idea of freedom, for Marx freedom is properly and directly 
predicable only of an individual. That is, although an individual cannot 
hecome free in isolation from others, nonetheless it is only individuals 
who are free. This emphasis call be attributed to what I characterized in 
the earlier chapters as Marx's Aristotelian insistence on the ontological 
primacy of real individuals. Thus, for example, although we may say 
that a state or a form of society is free, it is so only insofar as the 
individuals in it are free. 
Purposiveness appears for Marx as for Hegel as a characteristic of 
free activity. This, as we have seen, is related to the notion of self-
determination in which an agent pursues his or her own goals. In Marx, 
as in Hegel, this goal-oriented activity is that of the objectification of 
subjects, who make nature useful or good by transforming it in accor-
dance with their conscious purposes. In Hegel this activity is one of the 
self-actualization of the subject. However, since-ihdividual subjects 
are only moments of the total process for Hegel, this actualization is 
fulfilled only as an aspect of the whole, that is, the totality of the 
process, or Spirit itself. 
For Marx, also, freedom is a process of self-actualization and in this 
respect Marx may be compared t'o both Hegel and Aristotle. However, 
he goes beyond both of them in rejec1:ing the idea of a pre-given or 
fixed nature or essence that becomes actualized. Instead, for Marx 
freedom is the process of creating this nature itself. In this sense, 
freedom is positive or is "freedom to." It is a process of self--
realization, namely, a freedom to r~lize oneself in which an individual 
creates him or herself through projecting possibilities that become 
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guides for his or her actions, where the realization of these possibilities 
leads to the projection of new possibilities to be realized. Thus, prop-
erly speaking, freedom for Marx is not the actualization of a potential-
ity, as it is in Hegel and Aristotle, where the potentiality presupposes 
the actuality (of which it is the potentiality), but rather the realization 
of a possibility, where the reality is not presupposed and where the 
possibility is entirely new. Thus, as we have seen, Marx speaks of 
these possibilities as . ~ aims \vhich th.e individual himself posits-hence 
as self-realization, objectification, hence real freedom whose action is 
precisely, labor" (p. 611). 
This self-transcendence is not a process merely of conscious-
ness nor of the individual within him or herself alone, but is self-
transcendence through transforming the world. Furthermore, since this 
transformation is carried out by individuals in social relations and fbis 
is a social activity, the conditions for this individual self-transcendence 
are themselves social conditions. Thus for Marx, freedom as the pro-
cess of self-realization is the origin~tion of novel possibilities, acting 
on which the social individual creates !lnd recreates him or herself 
constantly as a self-transcendent being._Marx speaks of this process as 
The absolute working but of the individual's creative potentialities, 
with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, 
which makes this totality of development, i.e. the development of all 
human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a pre-
determined yardstick ... [and in which hel strives nbt to remain some-
thing he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming. (p. 
~~ . 
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We have seen that for Marx freedom has both negative and positive 
aspects. It is, on the one hand, "freedom from" in the sense of a 
process of overcoming obstacles or impediments, and specifically, a 
process of freeing oneself from the external constraints of social domi-
nation and natural necessity by one's activity. Freedom is, on the other 
hand, "freedom to" realize oneself through projecting possibilities 
and acting on them. These two aspects of freedom are united, accord-
ing to Marx, in the activity of objectification, in which an individual as 
a social individual realizes him or herself through overcoming obsta-
cles. Thus real freedom, or concrete freedom, as he also calls it, 
consists in the unity of these two aspects. 
To put it more simply, freedom for Marx consists not only in free 
choice among the options available to one, but in the creation of new 
options for oneself (and for others). Thus this view of concrete free-
dom differs from two alternative views: first, from the view that free-
dom is a property of the subject's desire or will, that is, that freedom is 
either intrinsic to the nature of the will or lies in the internal conformity 
of the will to one's natnre; and second, from the view that freedom 
simpJ y lies in the absence of external constraints or whatever one 
happens to will or desire. According to Marx (and Hegel), each of 
these views abstracts one side of the unity of real freedom, and thus 
may be characterized as merely formal or abstract freedom. In contrast 
to these views, concrete freedom consists in the active relation between 
the subject's will or desires and the external conditions for their ful-
fillment. 
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Freedom as Presupposition and Product of Activity 
This formulation of Marx's view of freedom poses a number of con-
ceptual problems. First, if freedom emerges through the activity of 
creating one's own nature in the overcoming of obstacles, then it is a 
product of this process or an emergent. On the other hand, the nature of 
this creative activity itself is that it is a free activity; that is, it presup-
poses the capacity to create new possibilities and the ability to realize 
them. But if this is the case, it would seem as if freedom is already 
presupposed a priori as the nature of this self-creative activity. Thus it 
would appear that the freedom that is produced or created is already 
presupposed in the very act of creating it, or that it is both a priori and 
emergent at the same time. But this is at worst paradoxical and at best 
circular. 
A second conceptual problem arises from Marx ' s claim that there is 
no fixed or pregiven nature or essence but rather that human beings 
create their nature freely and that since this activity is one of constant 
. self-transcendence, their nature is constantly changing. But despite 
itself, this claim seems to attribute a fixed or pregiven nature to these 
individuals, namely, that of freedom. That is, their nature is to create 
their nature. But this claim appears to be self-refuting. 
The third conceptual problem concerns the value of freedom or 
whether freedom is itself a value. For, on the one hand; Marx claims 
that freedom is the activity of objectification and that objectification is 
the activity of creating values. Thus freedom is value-creating activity. 
But, on the other hand, we nsually regard freedom as itself a value. 
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rherefore it, too, would have to be created. Thus freedom as value-
;reating activity creates itself as a value. And this would seem to be 
:ircuIar or question begging. Let us see if any of these paradoxes or 
:ircularities can be resolved. My main focus in what follows will be 
he first of these. 
One approach to the resolution of the first problem is to distinguish 
letween two different senses of freedom as on the one hand what is 
>resupposed and on the other what is produced, that is, bet\veen free-
lorn as a capacity to realize oneself through activity and freedom as the 
:elf-realization achieved through the exercise of this capacity. This 
'ather simple solution of the apparent paradox seems to mark it as one 
lased on equivocation, that is, where the term freedom is used in two 
lifferent senses. But while these two senses are distinct, they are 
;Iosely related. 
l Thus it may be seen that Marx presupposes freedom as an abstract or 
'ormal capacity, which characterizes all human beings as such. This 
;apacity is exercised in laboring activity or objectification, which is the 
listinctive mode of activity of human beings, according to Marx. j'} 
Furthermore, this capacity may be characterized more specifically 
IS the capacity for purposeful activity. What gives this purposeful 
lctivity its character as tree activity is the agent's conscious projection 
)f a future state as a possibility and the practical activity in which the 
1gent takes this purpose as a guide for action. In this sense the agent is 
;elf-determining. But this self-determination goes beyond the mere 
'ulfillment of particular aims and purposes posited QY the subject. Tlle 
)rocess of acting in accordance with one's purposes, as a process of 
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social activity and not merely individual activity, generates not only 
actions but rules of action. Thus social individuals are fundamentally 
self-legislating, that is, they are agents who act in accordance with the 
rules they themselves have created. 
Freedom in this formal sense thus consists in an agent's capacity to 
set his or her own purposes and to act on them. This capacity for 
purposeful activity leads to the transformation of what were merely 
external needs originally at tlJe animal level into purposes. When tlJe 
need becomes conscious or articulated, it is posed as something whose 
satisfaction is in the future and in terms of an activity that may satisfy 
it. This representation of purposes to oneself in the imagination marks 
the distinction between animals and humans for Marx. Marx describes 
this process in which needs become purposes in the passage quoted at 
the outset as a process in which "the external aims become stripped of 
the semblance of merely external natural urgencies, and become pos-
ited as aims which the individual himself posits" (p. 611). Fur-
thermore, in becoming the objects of conscious purpose, natural needs 
come to be transformed and these new needs are thus constituted in 
part by the agents. Thus Marx writes "Hunger is hunger, but the 
hunger gratified by cooked meat eaten with a knife and fork is a 
different hunger from that which bolts down raw meat with the aid of 
hand, nail and tooth" (p. 92). In this sense, the agent produces not 
merely the means of satisfying a given need, but may be said to 
produce the need itself in its specific human form, where this specific 
human form is understood as a social one. Thus, in Marx's example, in 
the purposive activity of satisfying hunger, human beings introduce 
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new ways of preparing and serving food which transform the original 
hunger into one for food prepared in a particular way. In addition, this 
process of transforming the original needs gives rise to other new 
social needs. For example, in this case, it gives rise to the need for the 
cooking techniques and utensils required for food prepared in this way. 
Thus we have seen that needs not only come to be the products of 
conscious agents but are themselves transformed into consciously 
known purposes. Such purposes are the creation of the agents them-
selves and are no longer needs in the sense of "external natural urgen-
cies." The agents may then be described as self-consciously self-
determining-that is, acting in terms of purposes they have set for 
themselves-and thus free in a minimal sense. 
But beyond this, the new or transformed needs or, rather, new 
purposes are transformations of the agent him or herself-namely, they 
are projections of new possibilities. In taking up such newly posited 
purposes as possibilities for future realization, the agent may also 
create new modes of action. But in this way the agent transcends past 
purposes and past modes of action. And insofar as he or she, as agent, 
is identified with these, he or she is self-transcending. This process is 
thus a process of self-realization through which concrete freedom may 
be attained. In this process, the initial bare or merely abstract capacity 
for free purposive activity becomes concretized in the fulfillment of 
purposes and the creation of new ones. Furthermore, this bare capacity 
is itself transformed in this process; it becomes differentiated and 
elaborated as the capacity to do many things and to choose among 
them. 
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According to Marx, this concretization and differentiation of activi-
ties and capacities occurs through the process of objectification. As 
was shown in the previous chapters, in this objectification one makes 
objects in the image of one's needs, that is, as purposive objects. As a 
consequence, one comes to recognize oneself as having the capacity to 
produce these objects. As an ongoing activity, objectification thus 
proliferates objects, capacities and purposes. To use an example that 
Marx himself gives, "The object of art-like every other product-
creates a public which is sensitive to art and enjoys beauty. Production 
thus not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the 
object" (p. 92). Thus the bare or a priori capacity for free activity 
becomes concrete or realized only in this process of self-development. 
Thus in this reconstruction of Marx's view, freedom is distinguished 
as, on the one hand, presupposition, that is, as a priori condition for 
creative activity itself, and as product, that is, as emergent in concrete 
and developing forms. Thus the apparent paradox of freedom as both 
presupposition and product is resolved if one distinguishes between a 
possibility and its realization, where the realization is not simply taken 
as entailed by the possibility but as the result of an activity. 
This conclusion also allows us to cast further light on a distinction 
betweeu Marx and Hegel mentioned earlier and discussed more fully in 
the previous chapters. For Hegel, the Idea in its bare immediacy or 
abstractness has all of its determinations contained within it implicitly, 
and these unfold dialectically with an inner necessity. For Marx, by 
contrast, the bare or immediate capacity for freedom as presupposition 
has no content implicit within it but becomes realized only through the 
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concrete actIVIty of laboring individuals. Thus this capacity has no 
predetermined course of development. The character of this develop-
ment is therefore not deterministic, butpossibilistic. Thus, as suggested 
in the first chapter, the course of thisdevelopment can be reconstructed 
as a dialectic only in retrospect. 
In this section I have distinguished two senses of freedom: first, as 
presupposition and, second, as product. But while freedom 'here has 
two senses, it does not denote two things; and thus the equivocation is 
not simply one between two different denotations of a single term. 
Rather, these are two aspects of one and the same thing, namely, 
,freedom. But this thing taken as a whole is a process. In this sense, 
what is presupposed-namely, the capacity-is what is required to 
account for what emerges in the process itself. And the product or 
the emergent-namely, the differentiated, concretely free activity-
likewise is what defines the real moments of the process itself. Thus 
one cannot separate presupposition and product as though they were 
wholly distinct in themselves, since they are what they are only in 
relation to the process itself. Freedom is therefore not a contingent or 
separable property that may be added or taken away from the activity 
that constitutes this process as a whole. In Marx's thought, then, 
activity or labor as such is always free in the sense that it is a capacity _ 
for change and self-change. But freedom as such a capacity is only 
formal. Freedom becomes concrete when, through the exercise of this 
capacity in specific modes of activity, the individual realizes his or her 
projects. But for Marx, the process of achieving concrete freedom 
requires conditions and does not follow from the formal capacity 
-( 
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alone. As we shall see, Marx .regards the full achievement of concrete 
freedom as the result of a process of historical development. 
The second conceptual problem arising in Marx's view of freedom 
concerns what appears to be a self-refuting claim: namely, that since 
for Marx there is no tlxed nature or essence, but rather individuals 
constantlj create themselves and change ,themselves, then their nature 
is constantly to change themselves; ,and this indeed seems to be a fixed 
nature. One \vay to meet t."'-lis objection is simply to write it off as a 
so~histical argument. Short of that, however, one may approach it as a 
question of levels of reference. If the change that the individuals 
undergo is different from the "nature" that these individuals have af 
self-changing, then the term "self-changing" ha~ two distinct levels of 
reference: first, to the individuals who in fact are changing, and sec-
ond, to this property of self-changing that is taken as the nature of these 
individuals and that itself does not change. 
The argument would be self-refuting if the individuals were self-
changing and not self-changing in the same respect. But this is clearly 
not the case. Yet it may be argued that one could still talk about this 
nature as fixed. But against this one could argue that the alleged fixity 
is in the linguistic fact that we give a fixed description to this process of 
self-changing and that the fixity is a hypostatization introduced by 
discourse and does not denote a "nature" in the thing itself. 
The third conceptual problem arising from Marx's view of freedom 
concerns the claim made above that freedom is value-creating activity 
and at the same time freedom emerges from this activity and is itself 
ordinarily regarded as a value. We thus seem to get the strange result 
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that freedom creates itself out of itself. This problem lends itself to a 
classical teleological argument in terms of which we may also interpret 
Marx's view here. 
Since, according to Marx, values come into being only as the result 
of conscious purposive activity, they have their ground only in this 
activity itself and not transcendentally. But, as we have seen, this 
activity of creative labor is the means by which the individual realizes 
him or herself, that is, becomes free. Therefore the creation of values 
in the fulfillment of purposes serves the goal of self-realization. Thus 
when an agent satisfies a purpose, he or she seems to be satisfying him 
or herself through the mediation of some external object transformed 
for his or her use which is thus a value for him or her, or through his or 
her interaction with other individuals. But this fulfillment of a purpose 
is at the same time, according to Marx, an activity of self-realization. 
In fulfilling specific purposes, for example, getting an education, pass-
ing a course or meeting a friend, one is apparently acting for the sake 
of these purposes themselves posited as external aims. But insofar as 
the fulfillment of these purposes is self-fulfillment or is an activity of 
self-realization, the end that these purposes serve and the ultimate 
value achieved in this activity is self-realization, that is, freedom. 
When this self-realization is consciously taken as the end in itself of 
these activities, freedom becomes manifest as the end in itself. Thus 
freedom is not only the activity that creates value but is that for the 
sake of which all these other values are pursued and therefore that with 
respect to which they become valuable. Thus freedom is both the 
source of value and the highest value as the end in itself. I would 
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suggest that such a teleological value theory is the model in terms of 
which Marx sees the historical development of freedom in the Grund-
risse. Thus the problematic circularity in which freedom appears to 
create itself out of itself is admitted on this interpretation. Freedom has 
no ground as a value outside of itself and all other values are grounded 
in it. It is value itself as the end in itself. Furthermore, since freedom is 
the nature of human activity, this activity has its end in itself, that is, to 
fully realize itself as free. The one qualification to this pure self-
creation is that values come to be created by transformation of the 
external world and that freedom is achieved only in and through this 
process of working on nature in a given form of society. 
The Dialectic of Freedom in the Stages of Social Development 
In the Grundrisse Marx sees freedom as developing historically 
through different stages of social organization. The foregoing analysis 
of the concept of freedom in Marx was abstracted from this concrete 
context in which Marx more fully develops his ideas. Marx charac-
terizes the three social stages of pre-capitalist societi es, capitalism and 
communal society in terms of the degree to which freedom is realized 
in each. Put in terms of the previous analysis, these stages are marked 
by the progressive overcoming of natural necessity and of forms of 
social domination; and insofar as the overcoming of these obstacles is 
itself liberating, there is a growth of freedom through these stages. Full 
or concrete freedom is achieved only in the third stage and thus may be 
regarded as the product of a historical process. Nonetheless, freedom 
in the sense of the creative activity of laboring is present in all stages. 
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But freedom or laboring activity appears in the first two as a means for 
the achievement of other ends, especially wealth. It is only in the third 
stage that freedom appears as the end or aim of social life, that is, as 
end in itself. Thus these stages reveal a development of freedom from a 
bare or abstract freedom of laboring activity that is in the service of 
others aud under external constraint in the first two stages to concrete 
freedom as freedom for self-development of individuals in the third 
stage. Furthermore, as we shall see, t.."'1e meaning of freedom itself 
changes through these stages. It is also clear that Marx understands this 
historical development of concrete freedom as a social process accom-
plished through the objectification and interaction of social individu-
als. Thus in tracing freedom through these three stages it will become 
evident in what sense freedom is not only the self-realization of the 
individual, but is social freedom or the freedom of social individuals. 
In pre-capitalist societies, the individual "appears as dependent, as 
belonging to a greater whole" (p. 84), where this whole is the commu-
nity. The identities of individuals as well as the character of their 
relations to each other are determined by their place within the com-
munity. The relations between these individuals are relations of per-
sonal dependence or relations of domination of one person over 
another. Furthermore, the laboring individuals are also bound to the 
soil and to a fixed mode of work. 
In these societies of natural and social dependence, the individual 
appears as unfree. It is only the community as a whole that could be 
said to be free, where "free" signifies "self-sufficient." Thus both 
Plato and Aristotle write that only the community is self-sufficient. At 
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this stage, the community as the organic totality is a stable and self-
sufficient entity in contrast to and at the expense of the individuals who 
are dependent parts of this totality. Insofar as freedom characterizes 
individuals at this stage, it is only the masters who are free, and their 
freedom consists in their not-laboring, that is, in their possession of 
leisure time. Nonetheless, even in this first stage, all laboring indi-
viduals possess a degree of freedom that consists in their laboring 
activity itself insofar as it is a creative activity. Thus, as Hegel points 
out in the master-slave dialectic in The Phenomenology of Mind, even 
the slave is free in the activity of working on nature for the master. For 
in this activity, it is the slave who overcomes the natural obstacles and 
learns to master nature. The master comes to depend on him or her for 
this ability. 
According to Marx, the second great social stage-that of 
capitalism-is marked by personal independence based on objective 
dependence. He describes this situation as follows: 
In the money relation, in the developed system of exchange (and this 
semblance seduces the democrats), the ties of personal dependence, of 
distinctions of blood, education, etc. are in fact exploded, ripped 
up ... and individuals seem independent (this is an independence which 
is at bottom merely an illusion, and it is more correctly called indif-
ference), free to collide with one another and to engage in exchange 
within this freedom; but they appear thus only for someone who ab-
stracts from the ... conditions of existence within which these indi-
viduals enter into contact (and these conditions, in tum are independent 
of individuals and although created by society, appear as if they were 
natural conditions, not controllable by individuals). The definedness of 
individuals, which in the former case appears as a personal restriction 
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of the individual by another, appears in the latter case as developed 
into an objective restriction of the individual by relations independent of 
him and sufficient into themselves. (pp. 163-J 64) 
Thus the freedom in capitalist society is a liberty of indifference. 
This freedom has its form in free labor. This labor does not belong to 
anyone by right, except the laborer, who offers it in free exchange for a 
wage. This free labor becomes itself equivalent in the exchange to 
what it is exchanged for and thus appears to take on the independence 
of a thing. It no longer functions in a personal relation, since it has 
become abstract labor, that is, impersonal, qualitatively indifferent and 
measured only by its quantity, time. In order to fulfill his or her 
desires, the worker exchanges what he or she owns-namely his or her 
labor capacity measured in time-for something else, namely, money 
that will then be exchanged for the objects of desire. As the medium of 
exchange, money buys time and the entire system of exchange appears 
as external. Further, the only impediments to the worker's freedom 
appear external-that he or she might not be able to sell it where and 
when he or she wants. Such external impediments are, for example, 
unemployment or underemployment. According to Marx, this exter-
nality of exchange is an objectification of individuals who create it 
as external, but it is not known to be such to these individuals. 
Capitalism is thus marked by personal independence where this 
signifies that the worker, unlike the slave or serf, has disposition over 
his or her own capacities and thus can voluntarily alienate his or her 
property. But, according to Marx, this personal independence rests on 
a foundation of objective dependence. For although the laborer can sell 
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his or herlabor freely, he or she is not free not to sell this labor; that is, 
it must be sold in order to gain the means of subsistence. Moreover, the 
laborer depends for selling it on the objective systems of exchange and 
capital. Thus Marx regards fhis freedom as abstract or one-sided, since 
as the freedom of the subject it is separated from the objective condi-
tions of its fulfillment. 
According to Marx, in selling his or her labor capacity to capital, the 
abstract freedom of the laborer turns into its opposite, namely, the 
domination of labor by the objective system of capital. The freedom of 
the marketplace reveals itself as a semblance, which for Marx hides a 
reality of domination in production. For in alienating his or her labor-
ing capacity, the worker's capacity is no longer under his or her control 
but is in fhe service of another. Through this alienation, living labor 
comes to be dominated by objectified labor, by an objective system of 
wealfh that is not under its control. 
Thus the master-slave dialectic described by Hegel appears here, but 
in an impersonal or objective mode. Just as the slave who works on 
nature for the master is in fhe first instance not directly enriched by his 
or her work, so the worker's products are alien to him or her and enrich 
capital. However, in the Hegelian dialectic of master and slave, en-
slavement proves eventually to be a humanizing process that over-
comes the merely natural qualities of the slave. This humanization 
process-which Hegel locates at the outset of history--occurs through 
the objectification carried out by the slave. In the process of serving his 
or her master, the slave transforms nature into his or her own self-
expression and consequently comes to recognize him or herself in it. 
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Similarly, for Marx the objectification of the laborer's capacities in 
capital is a condition for concrete freedom. Thus just as for Hegel the 
encounter with the master is the beginning of the overcoming of natural 
needs, so for Marx the overcoming of natural necessity through pro-
duction of an abundance of goods is accomplished through capital. 
What Hegel locates at the origin of history, Marx finds in the stage of 
capitalism. As described in chapter 2, for Marx this overcoming of 
natural necessity results from the tendency of capital to increase 
surplus labor and thus surplus value by reducing necessary labor 
through increasing productivity. The primary means by which it does 
this is the introduction of automatic systems of machinery. 
Thus, according to Marx, 
With its unlimited mania for wealth [capital achieves a stage of de-
velopment 1 where the possession and preservation of general wealth 
require a lesser labor time of society as a whole, and where the labor-
ing society relates scientifically to the process of Its progressIve re-
production, its reproduction in a constantly greater abundance; hence 
where labor in which a human being does what a thmg could do has 
ceased .... Capital's ceaseless striving towards the general form of 
wealth drives labor beyond the limits of its natural paltriness, .and thus 
creates the material elements for the development of the nch mdlVldu-
ality which is as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and 
whose labor also therefore appears no longer as labor, but as the full 
development of activity itself, in which natural necessity in its direct 
form has disappeared; because a historically created need has taken the 
place of the natural one. (p. 325) 
Thus the first condition for concrete freedom prepared for by 
capitalism is the overcoming of natural necessity through the achieve-
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ment of abundance in production, But concrete freedom, according to 
Marx, also requires the overcoming of social domination, and the 
attainment of universal social relationships, as well as the development 
of manifold human capacities. Capitalism also is instrumental in pro-
ducing such universal social relations, but it does so only in external 
and alien form. Thus the system of exchange establishes social connec-
tions between producers of labor, and most significantly, advanced 
systems of machinery increase the social combination of producers 
insofar a~ they are the product of many individuals and require coordina-
tion oflabof. Further, capital leads to the proliferation of human powers 
by introducing new branches of production and hence new laboring 
acti vities. 
According to Marx, these accomplishments of capital are in reality 
the objectifications of the laboring individuals. The transformation to 
the third form of society occurs when these individuals recognize the 
objective system of capital as their own creation. Marx describes this 
as labor's "recognition of the products as its own, and the judgement 
that its separation from the conditions of its realization is improper" 
(p. 463). 
Further, as we have seen, the differentiation of human capacities and 
needs that was established by capitalism is now recognized by the 
individuals as their own differentiation and many-sidedness. Similarly, 
their social combination, which was previously objectified in ma-
chinery, is recognized as their own internal relation to each other. 
Marx describes the third social stage as that of "free social individu-
ality . " This freedom presupposes as its condition the overcoming of 
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both natural necessity and social necessity, that is, domination. Marx 
describes the freedom at this stage as concrete freedom for self-
development, that is, freedom to realize oneself. Freed from the con-
straints of necessary labor (which is transferred to automated produc-
tion on Marx's account), the individuals are now free to realize what-
ever projects they choose. Further, since labor at this stage is no longer 
engaged in out of constraint, it now appears, as Marx says, "no longer 
as labor, but as the full development of activity itself" (p. 325), which 
is moreover engaged in for its own sake. It is such activity that Marx 
characterizes as concrete freedom. 
Furthermore, this freedom presupposes that domination of one indi-
vidual by another has been overcome, that each member of this com-
munity recognizes the others as free. Thus they recognize their com-
mon character as consisting in this very capacity in each of them for 
free activity. For Marx, as we shall see in the next chapter, the greatest 
freedom of the individual is possible in this situation of the greatest 
sociality . 
I shall now sketch the abstract ontology of freedom that may be 
derived from the preceding analysis, and consider it in relation to the 
ontology of society and of labor presented earlier. But it would be 
wrong to construe this abstract ontology as the whole of Marx's social 
ontology. Thus Marx's social ontology includes not only the concep-
tual analysis but also the concrete analysis of social and historical 
development given in the Grundrisse. 
In the previous chapters I argued that Marx's ontology is closely 
related to that of Hegel and Aristotle. Like Hegel, he understands 
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individuals as individuals in relation. For Marx, these relations are 
characteristically social. Like Aristotle, he affords ontological primacy 
to the individuals and sees them in terms of their characteristic mode of 
activity. For Marx, this activity is labor. But we have seen in this 
chapter that Marx goes beyond Hegel and Aristotle in his conception of 
freedom. The most significant difference he introduces is the idea that 
these real individuals create their own nature in their laboring activity 
and that this nature is therefore not given or predetermined, but 
emergent and self-transcending. 
Since these individuals create themselves and since these individuals 
are always individuals in social relations, these social relations them-
selves change. Consequently, these individuals create their own his-
tory or create themselves as historical. In this creative activity they 
transform nature, endowing it with the temporality of their own labor-
ing activity; they also give it value and human meaning, and in the 
course of this activity become different agents who are socialized, 
universalized, and free. 
Freedom, then, is first of all the characteristic mode of activity of 
these individuals. It is their laboring activity itself. Through this activ-
ity individuals differentiate themselves and realize themselves. 
All the dimensions that Marx attributes to this laboring activity-
that it is creative, self-transcending, historical, self-realizing-
characterize it as a process. This process is a process of freedom. 
A process, as distinct from an entity or a relation, is an activity 
that has continuity. The process described here also is marked by 
emergence, that is, by real novelty as the character of this continuity 
" 
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itself. It is a process of constant change, But it is not sheer flux. 
Rather, it is the preservation of a past state by transforming it in new 
forms in accordance with freely chosen purposes. It is therefore a 
teleological process. Further, this teleology is immanent, since it is 
generated through the laboring activity itself, which is this process. 
This activity is an activity of individuals. Thus this process is 
created by individuals and is their very mode of being. However, since 
such individuals are always individuals in social relations, the charac-
ter of their activity is that it is social labor-namely, labor carried on in 
and through social relations and the character of this process is that it is 
a social process. As such, the process is differentiated by the different 
individuals who compose it and the different social relations that 
characterize it at different historical stages. 
It is in and through the activity and the interaction of the laboring 
individuals in the stages of social development that the conditions are 
developed for the concrete freedom or independence of these individu-
als. In the third stage, free individuals constitute the community as 
their own creation. Moreover, as we shall see in the next chapter, each 
individual recognizes the other as free and acts so as to enhance the 
other's freedom. 
5 The Ontology of Justice: Social Interaction, 
Alienation and the Ideal of Reciprocity 
Marx offers an extensive criticism of capitalism both as an economic 
system that engenders periodic crises and as a social system that is 
based on the exploitation of the working class. His critique of aliena-
tion and exploitation under capitalism is clearly a normative one. 
However, Marx does not systematically articulate the values that 
underlie his critique. In the previous chapter I attempted to show that 
Marx's theory of social reality entails a theory of value whose central 
norm is freedom. In this chapter I shall propose t~at botli l\1arx' s 
critique of alienation under capitalism and his projections of a com-
munal society of the future imply a conception of justice. Furthermore, 
I shall argue that for Marx the realization of freedom requires justice, 
where this is understood in terms of concrete forms of social relations. 
Upon analysis, these just social relations will be seen to be charac-
terized by reciprocity. On the other hand, the various relations of 
domination that Marx sees as typifying class societies may be analyzed 
as forms of non-reciprocal social relations. One may reconstruct 
Marx's view as an account of the historically changing forms of recip-
rocal and nonreciprocal social relations through the different stages of 
social development. 
Although Marx offers no explicit discussion of the concept of justice 
in the Grundrisse, this work provides the basis for reconstructing such 
a conception. Inasmuch as this conception may be derived from his 
view of the very nature of social relations, it is not to be understood as 
an addition which is merely appended to the rest of his social ontology. 
Rather, I shaH argue that it grows out of his account of social relations 
(anal yzed in chapter 1), his treatment of labor (as presented in chapters 
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2 and 3), and his conception of freedom (discussed in chapter 4), 
Indeed, his conception of justice as it is reconstructed here ties together 
the concepts of property, labor or agency, social class, domination, 
exploitation and alienation, and freedom. In this chapter, therefore, I 
shall give an analysis of those concepts that are essential in Marx's view 
of social domination and injustice, namely, property, domination, so-
cial class, alienation, and exploitation. On the basis of this analysis, I 
shall then attempt to show how these various aspects of Marx's social 
ontology are integrated in his conception of justice. 
Marx's view of justice may thus be seen to be grounded in his 
analysis of concrete forms of social interaction. He objects to those 
views of justice that treat it merely as an abstract moral or legal princi-
ple and he rejects those views that take it to be an a priori principle. 
Marx's objections to such views have led certain commentators to 
conclude mistakenly that he lacks a theory of justice altogether or that 
he sees justice as relative to whatever principles prevail in any given 
historical form of social organization.' However, I would argue that 
these commentators are attempting to fit Marx's view into traditional 
frameworks of moral and legal philosophy and fail to see that Marx 
radicall y reformulates the terms of the discussion and the very question 
of what a theory of justice is about. In fact, I would hold that justice is 
central to Marx's view of a possible communal society of the future 
and that Marx's critique of capitalism is an attempt to explain how it 
gives rise to injustice in the form of alienation and exploitation. In this 
critique Marx treats the facts themselves evaluatively and also sees the 
values in terms of their concrete forms in social life. 
The Ontology of Justice 131 
The reconstruction of Marx's theory of justice that I shall give in this 
chapter is divided into two parts: The first and longer part will be an 
analysis of Marx's conception of social interaction and of its non-
reciprocal and reciprocal forms; the second part will draw out the 
implications of this analysis with a view to initiating a reconstruction 
of Marx's theory of justice and will show its relation to the norm of 
freedom. Specifically, in the first part I shall begin with an account of 
pre-capitalist social relations and give an analysis of Marx's concep-
tion of property and of domination (interpreted as a non-reciprocal 
rdation). j shall then proceed to Marx's central critique of alienation 
and exploitation in capitalism and analyze the nature of these relations 
as non-reciprocal social relations. I shall further show the connection 
of these relations in Marx's account to the reciprocal relations involved 
in free market exchange. In this section, too, Marx's conception of 
social class will be seen in its relation to his conceptions of property, 
alienation, and exploitation. I shall conclude this first part with a 
discussion of Marx's conception of social relations in a communal 
society of the future. Here I shall propose that these relations should be 
understood as what I shall call relations of mutuality, which are the 
most fully developed form of reciprocal relations. In the second part of 
this chapter I shall reconstruct Marx's implicit theory of justice, begin-
ning with an account of Marx's critique of abstract conceptions of 
justice. I shall then proceed to argue that he reformulates the traditional 
question of justice as a question that concerns the concrete forms of 
social relations discussed in the first part. I shall then consider Marx's 
conception of justice in its relation to the central value of freedom and 
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it will be seen that for him justice in social relations is the condition for 
the full realization of freedom. Finally, I shall elaborate the meaning of 
justice in connection with the ideal of mutuality understood as fully 
reciprocal social relations. 
Social Relations, Alienation and the Forms of Reciprocity 
Marx's analysis of the changing forms of social relations in different 
historical periods is centrally concerned with the various forms of 
domination that prevail at each stage. As we have seen in chapters 1 
and 4, Marx characterizes the social relations in the three major stages 
of social development as (1) relations of personal dependence in pre-
capitalist society, (2) relations of personal independence founded on 
objective dependence in capitalism, and (3) relations of free social 
individuality in a communal society of the future. Here I want to 
develop further the interpretation of these relations in terms of the 
institutional and personal modes of domination at each stage and spe-
cifically with respect to the forms of property and class relations. In the 
course of this discussion I shall also present an analysis of the forms of 
reciprocal and non-reciprocal social relations that will provide the basis 
for the reconstruction in the second part of this chapter of the concep-
tion of justice implicit in Marx's view. 
In the various types of pre-capitalist societies that Marx describes, 
the relations of domination take the form of personal relations among 
individuals. The subordinated individuals in these relations-for 
example, slaves or serfs-are bound in their servitude to a particular 
master or lord by force or coercion or by the weight of tradition which 
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makes their servile position appear to be part of the nature of things. 
The power that the master or lord exercises over these individuals may 
be seen to be derived from his control over both the objective and 
subjective conditions of their activity. The control over the objective 
conditions consists in the master or lord having the power of life and 
death over his slaves or serfs as well as the power of physical punish-
ment, and, in addition, in the master's possession or ownership of the 
land and instruments of production. Control over the subjective condi-
tions is exercised not only through the threat of force, but also through 
the whole system of social, political, cultural and religious obligations, 
rules, and beliefs. 
Moreover, the slaves and serfs are not regarded as agents or persons, 
but rather as themselves part of what Marx calls the inorganic and 
natural conditions of production. Thus he writes, 
In the relations of slavery and serfdom ... one part of society is treated 
by the other as itself merely an inorganic and natural condition of its 
own reproduction. The slave stands in no relation whatsoever to the 
objective conditions of his labor; rather labor itself, both in the form of 
the slave and in that of the serf, is classified as an inorganic condition 
of production along with other natural beings, such as cattle, as an 
accessory of the earth. (p. 489) 
In this form of social relations, therefore, the slave or serf is treated as 
a mere means of production and is not yet separated as labor or agency 
from the objective conditions of production. 
Marx sees these relations of domination as occurring in the context 
of a specific form of property. He characterizes this form as communal 
property, in which individual proprietors hold their property in virtue 
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of their being recognized as members of the community. Thus he 
writes, "As a natural member of the community he participates in the 
communal property, and has a part of it as his possession .... His 
property, i.e. the relation to the natural presuppositions of his produc-
tion as belonging to him, as his, is mediated by his being himself the 
natural member of a community" (p. 490). However, not all individu-
als are recognized as members; thus, slaves or serfs who are treated as 
"inorganic conditions of production" are not regarded as members of 
the community and have no share in its property. In fact, the slaves or 
serfs are themselves regarded as part of property in one form or 
another. Thus Marx writes, 
In the slave relation, [the individual, real person] belongs to the indi-
vidual, particular owner, and is his laboring machine. As a totality of 
force-expenditure, as labor capacity, he is a thing lSachel belonging to 
another, and hence does not relate as subject to his particular expendi-
ture of force, nor to the act of living labor. In the serf relation, he 
appears as a moment of property in land itself, is an appendage of the 
soil, exactly like draught-cattle. (pp. 464-465) 
Yet slavery and serfdom are not the only forms of domination in 
pre-capitalist societies. According to Marx, all the members of the 
society are bound or unfree in that their roles, functions and obligations 
are set by their place within the totality. Thus Marx writes that "it is 
clear from the outset that the individuals in such a society ... enter into 
connection with one another only as individuals imprisoned within a 
certain definition, as feudal lord and vassal, landlord and serf, etc., or 
as members of a caste etc., or as members of an estate etc." (p. 163). 
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Thus communal property in its pre-capitalist forms is characterized 
by social relations of personal dependence in which some individuals 
are dominated by others and in which all the individuals in the society 
are subordinate to the social totality and are defined by their place 
within it. 
Marx describes this pre-capitalist form of communal property as one 
in which the relation of individuals to the conditions of production 
(which, as we shall see, is Marx's general definition of property) is 
mediated by the community of which these individuals are members. 
Thus he writes, 
Property, then, originally means-in its Asiatic, Slavonic, ancient 
classical, Germanic form-the relation of the working (producing or 
self-reproducing) subject to the conditions of his production or repro-
duction as his own. It will therefore have different forms depending on 
the conditions of this production. Production itself aims at the repro-
duction of the producer within and together with these, his objective 
conditions of existence. This relation as proprietor-not as a result but 
as a presupposition of labor, i.e. of production-presupposes the indi-
vidual defined as a member of a clan Of community (whose property 
the individual himself is, up to a certain point). (p. 495) 
On the basis of Marx's discussion of pre-capitalist societies, I shall 
begin to reconstruct some general features of Marx's understanding of 
domination, social relations, and property. First of all, one may infer 
from Marx's account that for him domination is the exercise of power 
by one individual (or group of individuals) over another (or others), 
that is, direction or control of their actions by means of control over the 
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conditions of their activity. Thus for Marx domination is not causal 
determination of the actions of one individual by another, even in the 
case of the coercion or forced labor involved in slavery. Rather, domi-
nation is a social relation, that is, a relation between agents or persons, 
and not a causal action upon things. Therefore domination operates 
mediatel y, in that it involves coercion by means of the control by one 
agent over the necessary conditions or requirements of the activity of 
another. The tenn activity here should be understood as refeLl~ng to 
production or labor as well as more generally to the exercise of agency, 
following the analysis in chapter 2. Thus, as we have just seen, the 
power that the master or lord exercises over the slave or serf derives 
from the master's control over both the objective and subjective condi-
tions of their activity. In these cases of slavery and serfdom, the 
master's control extends even to the conditions of existence itself. Yet 
it should be emphasized that even where an individual's activity is 
subject to such control and he or she is treated as a mere instrument of 
production, the individual remains an agent and in fact cannot be 
reduced to a mere thing. Thus Marx writes (in a passage in which he 
compares capitalist wage labor and slavery), 
The recognition of the products as [wage labor's] own and the judg-
ment that its separation from the conditions of its realization is 
improper-forcibly imposed--is an enormous [advance in] awareness, 
itself the product of the mode of production resting on capital, and as 
much the knell to its doom as, with the slave's awareness that he 
cannot be the property of another, with his consciousness of himself as 
a person, the existence of slavery becomes a merely artificial, vegeta-
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tive existence, and ceases to be able to prevail as the basis of produc-
tion. (p. 463) 
Such relations of domination may further be analyzed as non-
reciprocal relations. By this I mean a social relation in which the 
actions of one agent (or group of agents) with respect to an other (or 
others) are not equivalent to the actions of the other with respect to the 
first. In the relation of master and slave, the elements of non-
reciprocity are evident: Whereas t.1-te master stands in tl-te relation of 
domination to the slave, the slave does not stand in the relation of 
domination to the master, but is rather subordinate to him. Further, the 
slave has not entered into the relation freely, but rather under con-
straint, whereas this is not the case for the master. Correlatively, the 
slave, in being a slave, acknowledges the master as an independent 
being, whereas the master regards the slave as dependent. 
Such non-reciprocal social relations may further be analyzed as 
internal relations. As we saw in chapter I, an internal relation is one in 
which each agent in the relation is changed by the relation. Thus in the 
master-slave (or lord and sert) relation, the master is a master only in 
and through his relation to the slave, and conversely. However, as in 
the earlier analysis such internal relations should be understood as 
holding between individuals who are agents. Thus even though such 
individuals change through their relations to each other, they are not to 
be regarded as totally constituted as individuals by these relations. 
Furthennore, as Marx suggests, though slaves or serfs may be regarded 
as and used as mere instruments of production or things, they are in 
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fact not really things, but rather agents reduced to this level of 
functioning by the existing social relations. This same understanding 
of internal relations as holding between individuals as agents who are 
not totally interconstituted by their relations has a further implication 
for the understanding of pre-capitalist forms of society in general. 
Namely, while such societies appear to be organic wholes in which the 
individuals are no more than parts and are totally defined by their place 
within the whole, it is clear from Marx's discussion that in fact this 
totality itself, like all social forms, is a social and historical product of 
the actions of the individuals who make it up. Thus the reality of such a 
social form is that it is a constituted totality and not pregiven and the 
individuals who appear as parts are really the agents of its constitution. 
Thus in treating the relation between forms of property and of produc-
tion, for example, Marx writes, "At the very beginning, [the precondi-
tions of production] may appear as spontaneous, natural. But ... if 
they appear to one epoch as natural presuppositions of production they 
were its historic product for another" (p. 97). 
Another general feature of Marx's view which is important for a 
reconstruction of his conception of justice concerns the meaning of 
property. This meaning may already be discerned in his discussion of 
pre-capitalist forms of society. Marx defines property in its most gen-
eral sense as the relation of an individual to the conditions of produc-
tion as belonging to him. These conditions are twofold: on the one 
hand, the natural conditions of land, raw materials, and so forth, and 
on the other, the social conditions, namely, other individuals and the 
existing form of social relations. Thus Marx writes, 
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Property thus originally means no more than a human being's relation 
to his natural conditions of production as belonging to him, as his, as 
presupposed along with his own being; relations to them as natural 
presuppositions of his self, which only form, so to speak, his extended 
body. . .. The forms of these natural conditions of production are 
double: (1) his existence as a member of a community; hence the 
existence of this community .... (2) the relation to land and soil 
mediated by the community, as its own . ... (pp. 491-492) 
Although in this passage Marx specifically refers to the pre-capitalist 
form of communal property, the general features of his view of prop-
erty all emerge here. These general features are evident also when he 
states, "We reduce this property to the relation to the conditions of 
production" (p. 492). Or again, he writes, 
Property, in so far as it is only the conscious relation-and posited in 
regard to the individual by the community, and proclaimed and guaran-
teed as law-to the conditions of production as his own, so that the 
producer's being appears also in the objective conditions belonging to 
him-is only realized by production itself. The real appropriation takes 
place not in the mental but in the real, active relation to these 
conditions-in their real positing as the conditions of his subjective 
activity. (p. 493) 
It is clear that Marx's conception of property is radically different 
from the ordinary conceptions of it. First of all, for him property is not 
a thing, but a relation. That is, it does not refer to objects owned, but 
rather to the relations involved in appropriation itself. Moreover, 
Marx's conception is much broader than the usual ones because of the 
scope of what he includes among "conditions of production." Thus, 
as noted, these consist of both nature and society. This can be under-
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stood most clearly in terms of Marx's conception of labor as objectifi-
cation, discussed in chapters 2 and 3. There the conditions oflaboring 
activity were seen to include both material conditions, that is, raw 
materials, land, and the products of past laboring activity, and social 
conditions, that is, other persons as well as the prevalent forms of 
social organization. Moreover, it is clear that for Marx the conditions 
of production also include what he calls subjective conditions, such as 
the individual's own body. consciousness, language, skills, and so 
forth. 
Marx sees property as integrally related to production. In his discus-
sion of the general features of production at the beginning of the 
Grundrisse, he writes, 
All production is appropriation of nature on the part of an individual 
within and through a specific form of society. In this sense it is a 
tautology to say that property (appropriation) is a precondition of pro-
duction .... [TJhat there can be no production and hence no society 
where some form of property does not exist is a tautology. An appropria-
tion which does not make something into property is a contradictio 
in subjecto. (pp. 87-88) 
Marx is here stating that all production or objectification presupposes 
some form of property. Further, he suggests that the activity of produc-
tion as a process of appropriation or making something one's own 
serves to reproduce the very form of property that it presupposes. 
To say that all production presupposes property is to say that it 
presupposes some mode of control over or disposition over the condi-
tions that are necessary for this production to occur. Most generally, 
Marx understands this as a relation of the individual to the conditions 
I 
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in which they are said to belong to him (ihm gehoren). Marx uses the 
phrase "belonging to him" here not in the narrow sense of private 
ownership or possession (although this does characterize some particu-
lar forms of property), but rather in the generic sense of disposition 
over the means or conditions necessary for productive activity to oc-
cur. The ways in which these conditions "belong to one" and, specifi-
cally, who has control over them are socially defined and vary histori-
cally. Thus the activity of production on the part of an individual is 
al ways mediated by a certain form of social relations that provide the 
context for his or her relation to nature, to other individuals, and more 
generally to the conditions of production. Accordingly, Marx writes, 
"An isolated individual could no more have property in land and soil 
than he could speak" (p. 485). On the other hand, as is evident from 
the passages cited above, it is always concrete individuals who are the 
agents of production and who relate to the conditions of production in 
the . various forms of property. Thus Marx's discussion of property 
agam makes clear that for him the basic entities of social reality are 
individuals-in-relations or social individuals, as I argued in chapter 1. 
The preceding discussion of property shows that it is a central con-
cept of Marx's analysis and that it stands in a systematic relation to the 
other fundamental concepts of his social ontology. We have seen how 
in property, the activity of production is integrated with the social 
relations in which this activity takes place; and how, through a given 
property form, an individual comes to stand in definite relations to the 
natural world and to other individuals. Furthermore, it is now clear that 
there is a very close connection between the form of property and the 
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form of domination. It will be recalled that domination is the control by 
one agent (or group of agents) over the actions of another (or others) 
through the control over the conditions of the other's agency or produc-
tion. But such control over the conditions of production is precisely the 
meaning of property. Thus Marx's analysis shows how a given form of 
domination is to be understood in terms of a particular historical form 
of property and how the criticism of domination thus also requires the 
criticism of the specific property form. Furthermore, the link between 
domination and particular forms of property suggests that a just society 
in which domination is overcome requires an appropriate form of prop-
erty or of control over the conditions of production. This will be 
discussed in the second part of this chapter. In the following section we 
will see that the relation between the form of property and the form of 
domination is centrally important also to Marx's analysis and critique 
of alienation and exploitation in capitalism. 
As will be recalled, Marx's general characterization of the social 
relations of capitalism is that they are "relations of personal indepen-
dence founded on objective dependence" (p. 158). In contrast to the 
pre-capitalist relations of personal dependence in which the slave or 
serf is bound to a particular master and to the land, capitalist social 
relations presuppose the emergence of free labor, in which the worker 
has disposition over or owns his or her laboring capacity. The laborer 
now has the status of a person who can freely contract to sell or alienate 
this capacity in exchange for money. Thus Marx writes, 
The first presupposition [of the bourgeois system of production], to 
begin with, is that the relation of slavery or serfdom has been sus-
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pended. Living labor capacity belongs to itself, and has disposition 
over the expenditure of its forces, through exchange. Both sides con-
front each other as persons. Formally, their relation has the equality 
and freedom of exchange as such .... [E]verything touching on the 
individual, real person leaves him a wide field of choice, of arbitrary 
will, and hence of formal freedom .... The totality of the free worker's 
labor capacity appears to him as his property, as one of his moments, 
over which he, as subject, exercises domination, and which he main-
tains by expending it. (pp. 464-465) 
[TJhe worker is thereby formally posited as a person, who is something 
for himself apart from his labor, and who alienates his life-expression 
only as a means towards his own life. (p. 289) 
However, according to Marx, this formal freedom of the individual 
worker depends on his or her participation in the system of exchange 
and production. But this system is an objective and external system not 
under the control of the individual and yet is one to which the indi-
vidual is bound. Thus the individual worker who has no other property 
to exchange than his or her laboring capacity is not free not to engage 
in this exchange. This dependency arises from the fact that the objec-
tive conditions of production that the worker requires for his or her 
activity and for his or her subsistence belong to capital. The objective 
dependence of individuals on the system of exchange and production 
extends to the capitalist as well, but in a different way. The capitalist 
who owns the conditions or means of production is required to enter 
into production and exchange in order to utilize these conditions for the 
sake of the reproduction and accumulation of capital. The exchange 
here primarily involves the payment of wages for labor power and the 
sale of the commodities produced. Marx describes the impersonality 
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and apparent autonomy of the system to which individuals are subordi-
nated under capitalism as follows: 
[T]he conditions of existence within which these individuals enter into 
contact ... are independent of the individuals and, although created by 
society, appear as if they were natural conditions, not controllable by 
individuals. The definedness of individuals, which in the [case of 
pre-capitalist societies] appears as a personal restriction of the indi-
vidual by another, appears in the latter case as developed into .an 
objective restriction of the individual by relations independent of hIm 
and sufficient unto themselves. (p. 164) 
Beyond this general sense of objective dependence in which indi-
viduals are restricted by the operations of the external system of ex-
change and production, social relations under capitalism are charac-
terized by objective dependence in yet a deeper sense. Specitically, for 
Marx, the mass of individuals, that is, the wage laborers, are domi-
nated by capital as an objective power that stands over and against 
them. It might be said that the analysis and critique of objective depen-
dence in this sense is Marx's central concern. 
As will be seen, the objective dependence of labor on capital, which 
is the distinctively capitalist form of domination, is analyzed by Marx 
in terms of the concepts of alienation and exploitation. As Marx ar-
gues, this form of domination is not apparent in the surface processes 
of exchange in capitalism, in which the agents are free and equal and in 
which they reciprocally exchange equivalent values. Rather, this form 
of domination comes to light when one examines the under! ying pro-
cesses of capitalist production. Marx argues that the capitalist right of 
property, which is the right to appropriate the products of one's own 
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labor or to exchange them for their equivalents, is transformed into its 
opposite in the production process. It becomes instead the right to 
appropriate the products of another's labor without exchange. Such 
appropriation on the part of capital of the products of another's labor 
without recompense is what Marx means by exploitation; correla-
tively, the laborer's positing of the products of his or her own work as 
belonging to another, that is, as the property of capital, is what Marx 
means by alienation. Indeed, exploitation and alienation are the same 
process viewed from two sides: the first from the side of capital and the 
second from the side of labor. It is in Marx's account of this transfor-
mation of property right and in his discussion of the social relations 
involved in alienation and exploitation that we can discern his critique 
of the injustice of the capitalist system and from which we will begin to 
reconstruct the elements of his implicit conception of justice. 
The relation of alienation to property is systematically set forth in 
the Grundrisse. The strategy of Marx's argument is to show how the 
reciprocity of the sphere of exchange, in which the exchangers treat 
each other as free and equal, is undermined by and gives way to the 
non-reciprocal relations of alienation and exploitation in the sphere of 
production, in which the individuals are unfree and unequal. He makes 
this strategy clear in introducing the structure that his argument will 
take in the major portion of the Grundrisse ("The Chapter on Capi-
tal"). Marx writes, 
As we have seen, in simple circulation as such (exchange value in its 
movement), the action of the individuals on one another is, in its 
content, only a reciprocal, self-interested satisfaction of their needs' in , 
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its form, [it is] exchange among equals (equivalents). Property, too, is 
still posited here only as the appropriation of the product of labor by 
labor, and of the product of alien labor by one's own labor, insofar as 
the product of one's own labor is bought by alien labor. Property in 
alien labor is mediated by the equivalent of one's own labor. This form 
of property-quite like freedom and equality-is posited in this simple 
relation. In the further development of exchange value this will be 
transformed, and it will ultimately be shown that private property in 
the product of one's own labor is identical with the separation of labor 
and property, so that labor will create alien property and property will 
command alien labor. (p. 238) 
Marx, like Hegel, characterizes the simple exchange process as one 
in which the exchangers are equal, free, and reciprocally related to 
each other. In this process, the individuals confront each other exclu-
sively in their role as exchangers; as such, their individual differences 
are irrelevant to the exchange. Since each exchanger stands to the other 
in the same relation, they are equal in the exchange. Thus Marx writes, 
"Each of the subjects is an exchanger; i.e. each has the same social 
relation towards the other that the other has towards him. As subjects 
of exchange, their relation is therefore that of equality" (p. 241). 
Furthermore, the objects they exchange are also taken to be equivalent 
in value; in the act of exchanging these equivalents, according to 
Marx, the agents "assert themselves ... as equally worthy, and at the 
same time as mutually indifferent" (p. 242). In addition, Marx sees the 
exchange process as characterized by the freedom of the agents. That 
is, neither of the agents imposes the exchange on the other, but rather 
each recognizes the other as a free agent, who has the choice of 
disposing or not disposing of his or her property. The recognition of 
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the agents' freedom of choice in exchange constitutes this sphere as 
one of formal freedom. 
Another feature of the exchange relation, according to Marx, is that 
it is a reciprocal one. He writes, 
[Ilndividnal A serves the need of individnal B by means of the com-
modIty a only msofar as and because individual B serves the need of 
mdividual A by means of the commodity b, and vice versa. Each 
serves the other m order to serve himself; each makes use of the other, 
recIprocally as hIS means. Now both things are contained in the con-
~clOusness of the two individuals: (I) that each arrives at his end only 
msofar as he serves the other as means; (2) that each becomes means 
for the other (being for another) only as end in himself (being for self); 
(3) that the reCIprocIty m WhIch each is at the same time means and 
end, and attaInS hIS end only insofar as he becomes a means, and 
becomes a means only msofar as he posits himself as end, that each 
thns POSIts hImself as being .foranother, insofar as he is being for self, 
and the other as bemg for hIm Insofar as he is being for himself-that 
thIS reCIprOCIty IS a necessary fact, presupposed as natural precondition 
of :xchange, but that, as such, it is irrelevant to each of the two 
snbJects . In e~change,. and that this reciprocity interests him only in-
sofar as It satisfIes hIS Interest to the exclusion of, without reference to, 
that of the other. (pp. 243-244) 
Most generally, this reciprocity in exchange may be understood as a 
social relation in which one agent acts with respect to another in the same 
way as the other acts with respect to the first. Moreover, each agent is 
aware of the equivalence of their actions. The particular mode of 
reciprocity described here may be called instrumental reciprocity in 
the sense that each agent enters into this relationship out of self-interest 
alone. 2 Each uses the other for his or her own purposes. 
148 The Ontology of Justice 
On analysis it may be seen that the equality and freedom of the 
exchangers are aspects of the reciprocity of their relation, as it is 
described by Marx. Equality is evident in the fact that each exchanger 
acts with respect to the other in the same way. Further, as we have 
seen, since the agents are indifferent to each other in every other 
respect but their relation as exchangers, we may call this formal or 
abstract equality, namely, one that abstracts from all their individual 
differences. In a similar way, the reciprocity of the exchange relation 
may be called formal or abstract reciprocity, in that it is based on the 
abstract equivalence in value of the commodities exchanged. The con-
crete differences between the commodities and between the exchangers 
are irrelevant in the exchange. In addition, the formal freedom of the 
agents in the act of exchange is presupposed in their reciprocal relation 
to each other. Thus each agent enters into the exchange voluntarily, 
freely agrees on the equivalence in value of what is exchanged, and 
freely chooses to serve the other in order to serve his or her own 
purposes. 
An additional dimension of the process of exchange for Marx con-
cerns the property right, of the exchangers. On his view, these prop-
erty rights give legal expression to the economic and social relations 
involved in the exchange of equivalents. Each exchanger has the right 
of property over the products of his or her own labor and has the right 
to sell these products freely. This form of the ownership and salability 
of property constitutes the legal right of private property. Further, 
since the process of simple exchange is an exchange of equivalent 
values, the appropriation or acquisition of the products of another's 
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labor in principle requires that one exchange for it an equivalent value 
in the products of one's own labor. The right of private property thus 
Incorporates the concept of reciprocity in its formulation. Specifically, 
each exchanger stands in relation to the other as proprietor and is 
recognized as such by the other. Further, each has the right to exchange 
what he or she owns at its equivalent value. 
It may be suggested here in a preliminary way that the right of 
pnvate property as a legal expression of economic relations embodies a 
principle of abstract justice. Specifically, it implies the principle that 
equals should be treated equally. That is, property right establishes that 
each exchanger treat the other as a proprietor like him or herself, hence 
as having the right of ownership of his or her product and the right to 
dispose of it freely. Therefore each exchanger is bound, first, not to 
take the other's property by force, and second, to exchange for this 
property on the basis of a free agreement on its equivalent value. 
The process of exchange just described, with its features of equality, 
freedom and reciprocity, is seen by Marx as applying also to the 
exchange between labor and capital. On Marx's view, the free laborer 
has disposition over his or her own laboring capacity and sells it as a 
commodity to the capitalist in exchange for a wage. Marx understands 
this process as an exchange of equivalents. In the sense discussed 
above this exchange may be regarded as a fair or just one. Marx goes 
on to show, however, that the deeper relations between capital and 
labor, namely, those in the sphere of production, are in fact charac-
terized by the very opposite qualities from those that mark the ex-
change process. These social relations in production are nonreciprocal 
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relations, which are unfree and unequal and which, as I shall argue, 
may also be characterized as unjust. As Marx puts it, "In present 
bourgeois society as a whole, this positing of prices and their circula-
tion etc. appears as the surface process, beneath which, however, in 
the depths, entirely different processes go on, in which this apparent 
individual equality and liberty disappear" (p. 247). 
This contrast between the surface processes of exchange and the 
deeper processes of production, discussed in chapter 2, may be recon-
sidered here for the implications that it has for an analysis of the 
injustice of alienation and exploitation. 'fhe contrast between the pro-
cesses of exchange and production is shown by Marx to follow from 
the separation between labor and property which is a major presupposi-
tion of the capitalist mode of production. By this Marx means that 
property as the objective conditions of production ("means of produc-
tion") is owned and controlled by capital. Labor, on the other hand, is 
propertyless in this sense and owns only its productive capacity. This 
contrast between labor and capital is also described by Marx as a 
contrast between living labor and objectified labor. The products of 
past laboring or productive activity or objectified labor which consti-
tute wealth are owned by capital. By contrast, what remains to the 
laborer is only labor as subjectivity, that is, the capacity for value-
creating, productive activity. Marx describes the labor that confronts 
capital as follows: 
Separation of property from labor appears as the necessary law of this 
exchange between capital and labor. Labor posited as not-capital as 
sucb is: (1) non-objectified labor . .. labor separated from all means and 
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objects of labor, from its entire objectivity. This living labor ... this 
complete denudation, purely subjective existence of labor, stripped of 
aU objectivity. Labor as absolute poverty: poverty not as shortage, but as 
total exclusion of objective wealth .. , . (2) Not-objectified labor . . , i.e. 
subjective existence of labor itself. Labor not as an object, but as activ-
ity; not as itself value, but as the living source of value. (pp. 295-296) 
Because of this separation of labor from the objective conditions of 
its activity, which belong to capital, the laborer, in order (0 gain means 
of subsistence, has to exchange the only thing he or she owns with 
capital. This is disposition over his or her laboring capacity which be 
or she sells to the capitalist for a given period of time in exchange for a 
wage, On Marx's analysis, as we have seen in chapter 2, the wage 
is a specific sum of money that is in general equivalent to the cost 
of reproduction of the laborer's capacity to work, The capitalist thus 
purchases disposition over this laboring capacity, that is, labor power, 
as a commodity, just as he does with any other commodity in the 
market. According to Marx, this exchange of labor power for a wage 
follows the principles of the exchange of equivalents and falls entirely 
within the sphere of circulation or exchange, 
However, this particular commodity bas a distinctive character, 
namely, that its use creates value. What capital acquires as a conse-
quence of the exchange is the use of labor as value-creating activity. 
Thus Marx writes, "The capitalist obtains labor itself, labor as value-
positing activity, as productive labor; i.e., he obtains the productive 
force which maintains and mUltiplies capital, and which thereby be-
comes the productive force, the reproductive force of capital, a force 
belonging to capital itself" (p. 247). Again, Marx says, "Through the 
exchange with the worker, capital has appropriated labor itself; labor 
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has become one of its moments, which now acts as a fructifying 
vitality upon its merely existent and hence dead objectivity" (p. 298). 
Thus in gaining disposition over the worker's laboring activity for a 
given time (for example, the working day), the capitalist also gains 
possession of the values created by this activity during that time. 
Marx thus analyzes the relation of labor to capital as involving two 
separate processes: first, that of exchange, and second, the use of 
laboring capacity by capital in the production process. Marx em-
phasizes the difference between these processes and argues that a rec-
ognition of this difference is crucial for an understanding of the nature 
of the capitalist mode of production. "In the exchange between capital 
and labor, the first act is an exchange, falls entirely within ordinary 
circulation; the second is a process qualitatively different from ex-
change, and only by misuse could it have been called any sort of 
exchange at all. It stands directly opposite exchange; essentially dif-
ferent category" (p. 275). 
This second process of production is the sphere of alienated labor, as 
I have described it in chapter 2. In alienation, both the laborer's pro-
ductive activity during a given time and the products of this activity 
belong to another and not to the laborer. Thus, as Marx says, "the 
creative power of his labor establishes itself as the power of capital, as 
an alien power confronting him. He divests himself of labor as the 
force productive of wealth; capital appropriates it, as such" (p. 307). 
Because the capitalist gains control over this value-creating activity, he 
is able to reproduce and increase his capital in the following way: The 
capitalist pays the worker a wage that is equivalent in value to what it 
The Ontology of Justice 153 
costs the worker to reproduce his or her capacity to work. However, 
the capitalist receives in return value created by the laborer's activity in 
excess of the value represented by the wage. The capitalist receives 
this excess or surplus value by requiring that the laborer work beyond 
the time necessary to create the value equivalent to the wage; this, as 
we have seen, is what Marx calls surplus labor time. It is thus labor's 
own capacity to produce more value than it takes to reproduce itself 
t'lat is the source of surplus value. This surplus value serves to increase 
capital, that is, it increases both its control over additional means of 
production (or objectified labor as its property) and command over 
additional living labor or workers. 
On the basis of this analysis, Marx goes on to show that alienation 
does not simply refer to the separation of labor from its products and to 
labor's lack of control over its productive activity. Marx argues that 
beyond this, alienation underlies the whole production process of 
capitalism. In this systemic sense, alienation refers to the process by 
which labor produces capital and also constantly reproduces its relation 
to capital, in which it is dominated by capital. Marx describes this 
process as follows: 
[The] absohlte separation between !lropert~ m:d labor, between living 
labor capacity and the condItIOns of Its realIzatIOn, between objectified 
and IIvmg labor, between value and value-creating activity ... now 
appears as a product of labor itself, as objectification of its own 
moments .... Labor capacity ... has posited [the conditions of its own 
realization] as things, values, which confront it in an alien command-
ing personification. The worker emerges not only not' richer, but 
emerges rather poorer from the process than he entered. For not only 
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has he produced the conditions of necessary labor as conditions belong-
ing to capital; but also the value-creating possibility, the realization 
which lies as a possibility within him, now likewise exists as surplus 
value, surplus product, in a word as capital, as master over living labor 
capacity, as value endowed with its own might and WIll, confrontmg 
him in bis abstract, objectless, purely subjective poverty. He has pro-
duced not only the alien wealth and his own poverty, but also the 
relation of this wealth as independent, self-sufficient wealth, relative to 
himself as the poverty which this wealth consumes and from which 
wealth thereby draws new vital spirits into itself, and realizes itself 
anew. All this arose from the act of exchange, in which he exchanged 
his living labor capacity for an amount of objectified labor, except that 
tbis objectified labor ... now appears as posited by bimself, as his own 
product, as his own self-objectification as well as the objectification 
of himself as a power independent of himself, which moreover rules 
over him, rules over him through his own actions. (pp. 452-453) 
Viewed from the side of the laboring subject, this process in which 
labor produces capital as the power that dominates it is the process of 
alienation. This very same process, when viewed from the side of 
capital, is that of exploitation. Exploitation for Marx refers to the 
appropriation by capital of alien labor without exchange, that is, with-
out giving any equivalent in return for it. That portion of the labor time 
that is appropriated without exchange in this way, or unpaid labor, is 
what was previously described as surplus labor time. Correlatively, the 
value created by labor during this time is the surplus value which 
increases capital. It is thus by means of this process of exploitation/ 
alienation that capital reproduces and increases itself. Furthermore, it 
is through this process that capital comes to increase its domination 
over labor, since in this process capital acquires greater and greater 
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control over means or conditions of production. In other words, the 
property accumulated as capital is the result of this exploitation. Yet 
this accumulation of property by capital may also be understood as the 
product of labor's alienated activity. Marx writes, "The product of 
labor appears as alien property" (p. 453). Further, "The greater the 
extent to which labor objectifies itself, the greater becomes the objective 
world of values, which stands opposite it as alien property" (p. 455). 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis, it is now possible to recon-
struct Marx's conception of the specific form of domination involved in 
alienation and exploitation. This form of domination, as we have seen, 
is based on the separation of labor from the objective conditions of labor. 
These objective conditions that are required for labor's activity are 
under the control of capital as its private property. Human activity as ob-
jectification, however, requires not only the subjective purposes and 
capacities of the agent, but also the exercise of this activity upon the ob-
jective world in order to transform it in accordance with the agent's pur-
poses. In the property form characteristic of capitalist production, where 
capital controls these objective conditions, the worker is dependent on 
capital for the conditions of his or her self-objectification. The conse-
.quence of this dependence is that the laborer has to put his or her creative 
activity at the disposal of capital. Thus objectification takes the form of 
alienation. 
In the previous chapter it was seen that for Marx freedom as self-
realization is tied to objectification. Positive freedom was seen to re-
require not only agency, but also the conditions for the exercise of this 
self-transformative activity. The analysis in the present chapter makes 
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clear how essential the form of property is to the development of free-
dom. The full development of freedom requires a relation to the condi-
tions of production as belonging to one. But in the form of private 
property under capitalism, these objective conditions of one's own 
agency or production belong to and are under the control of another. 
The sense in which Marx refers to capitalism as a system of' 'personal 
independence founded on objective dependence" may now be more 
fully interpreted in this context. Personal independence consists in the 
fact that the laborer owns and controls his or her laboring capacity as 
property. However, since the laborer lacks all other property in the form 
of control over the conditions or means ofthis agency, he or she is objec-
tively dependent on capital for these conditions. Capital here is under-
stood by Marx as an institutionalized and systemic mode of control over 
these conditions. That is, it takes the form of an objective and external 
economic system in which power resides in the objective conditions of 
wealth themselves. The dependence of labor on capital is to be under-
stood not as a personal dependence of the laborer on this or that capi-
talist, but rather on the objective system of capital. The laborer is 
dependent on the forces of production which capital owns (including 
land, raw materials, and instruments of production) as well as on the re-
lations of production which capital controls (the system of wage labor). 
The capitalist mode of production may thus be regarded as an institu-
tionalized and objective form of domination. 
Within this objective and institutionalized system of capitalist pro-
duction and exchange, the social relations are such that individuals re-
late to each other in terms of their functions or roles within the system. In 
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their fulfillment of these abstract functions, their individual differences 
and purposes are irrelevant. The social relations among individuals are 
reduced to functional economic relations or what Marx characterizes as 
the class relations of capitalism. These class relations are for Marx fun-
damentally defined in terms of relations to the means or conditions of 
production, that is, in terms of property. Thus in capitalism the two prin-
Cipal classes are, on the one hand, those who own and control the means 
or conditions of production (capital) and, on the other, dIose who are 
propertyless in this sense (labor). 
It will be recalled that domination in general is defined as the control 
by one agent (or group of agents) over the actions of another (or others) 
by means of control over the conditions of their agency. In capitalism, 
domination takes the form of control by the capitalist class over the ac-
tivity of the working class by means of their control over the objective 
conditions of laboring activity. Thus in capitalism domination consists 
of the domination of one class by another. And, as we have seen, it takes 
the specific form of the relation of exploitation or of alienation. 
On Marx's view, labor and capital are internally related. That is, 
these classes are interdefined in that capital is objectified labor and 
functions as disposition over labor time in the process of capital's own 
reproduction and accumulation. Correlatively, labor can only be actu-
alized in being used by capital and in working on the material that 
belongs to capital. Furthermore, in alienation and exploitation, both 
capital and labor are changed in the relation. Specifically, capital in-
creases Its wealth and grows in power and labor is impoverished and fur-
ther subordinated through the appropriation of labor by capital in which 
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labor posits its own product as belonging to capital. Thus Marx writes, 
"It here becomes evident that labor itself progressively extends and 
gives an ever wider and fuller existence to the objective world of wealth 
as a power alien to labor, so that, relative to the values created or to the 
real conditions of value-creation, the penurious subjectivity of living 
labor capacity forms an ever more glaring contrast" (p, 455). 
The capitalist form of domination, as alienation and exploitation, 
may now be analyzed as a non-reciprocal social relation which is also 
unfree, unequal, and as we shall see, unjust. By contrast to the reciproc-
ity in the sphere of exchange, the sphere of production reveals a non-
equivalence in the social relations between labor and capita\. Alienation 
and exploitation are non-reciprocal relations because capital controls 
and directs the productive activity of the laborers, whereas the laborers 
have no equivalent power to direct the processes of capita\. While it is 
the case that capital depends on labor for its reproduction and growth, 
and labor depends on capital for the conditions of its activity, 
nevertheless labor is subordinated to the direction of capital in 
production. An additional aspect of the non-reciprocity lies in the fact 
that in appropriating surplus value, capital enriches itself and gains in 
power while the worker is impoverished and is further subordinated in 
this same process. The non-reciprocity in this process is based on the 
nonequivalence between what the worker is paid as a wage and the value 
of what he or she produces, which is appropriated by the capitalist. Marx 
highlights the non-reciprocity involved in this process by calling surplus 
value the appropriation of unpaid labor or "the theft of alien labor time" 
(p. 705). It is evident that this non-equivalence in production, in which 
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the capitalist's gain is the worker's loss, involves also the inequality of 
the two, by contrast to the sphere of exchange, in which they appear as 
equals. In addition, the production process contrasts with the exchange 
process in that it entails the lack offreedom of the worker. As was noted, 
the worker is not free to realize his or her own purposes in his or her 
productive activity, but rather is constrained to act under the direction 
and control of capital. 
In the transition from the sphere of exchange to the sphere of produc-
tion, there is, on Marx's view, a fundamental violation and transforma-
tion of the right of property upon which exchange itself is based. In this 
connection, Marx's criticism of capitalism amounts to the criticism that 
it is unjust in that it does not measure up to its own standards of justice. 
Specifically, the property right that lies at the basis of exchange, as was 
noted above, entails that each person has the right of property over the 
products of his or her own activity or labor and has the right to sell these 
products freely and at their equivalent value. Moreover, this property 
right was seen to embody a principle of abstract justice, namely, that 
equals should be treated equally. However, according to Marx, this very 
right is violated in the processes of alienation and exploitation in produc-
tion. In these processes, labor loses the right to the products of its own 
activity and loses the right to an equivalent exchange for the values it 
yields to capital. Thus although labor appears as an equal with capital in 
the process of exchange and is said to retain this equality in production 
as well, in fact the laborer is not treated as an equal in the process of pro-
duction. In this sphere labor is constrained to yield surplus value without 
equivalent exchange as a condition for its participation in production. 
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Correlatively, the capitalist appropriates the products of another's labor 
without paying an equivalent. Marx argues that in this way the proprie-
tary right of the laborer to the products of his or her labor and to a freely 
agreed upon exchange for them is being violated in the production pro-
cess. In effect, then, Marx's critique here amounts to the claim that capi-
talism is unjust in that it violates the very principle of abstract justice 
which it enunciates in its principle of property right. 
In his discussion of the appropriation of surplus value as an inherent 
and ongoing feature of capitalist production, Marx describes this viola-
tion and transformation of the right of property that governs the ex-
change of equivalents. He writes, 
[B]y a peculiar logic, the right of property undergoes a dialectical 
inversion, so that on the side of capital it becomes the right to an alien 
product, or the right of property over alien labor, the ri!l,ht to appro-
priate alien labor without an eqUivalent, and, on the Side of labor 
capacity, it becomes the duty to relate to one's own labor or to one's 
own product as to alien property. The right of property is inverted, to 
become, on the one side, the right to appropriate alien labor, and, on 
the other, the duty of respecting the product of one's own labor, and 
one's own labor itself, as values belonging to others. The exchange of 
equivalents, however, which appeared as the original operation, an 
operation to which the right of property gave legal expreSSIOn, has 
become turned around in such a way that the exchange by one Side IS 
now only illusory, since the part of capital which is e~chang~d for 
living labor capacity, firstly, is itself alien labor, appropnated Without 
equivalent, and, secondly, has to be replaced with a surplus by living 
labor capacity, is thus in fact not consigned away, but merely changed 
from one form into another. The relation of exchange has thus dropped 
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away entirely, or is a mere semblance. Furthermore, the right of prop-
erty ongmally allpeared to be based on one's own labor. Property now 
appears as the nght to alien labor, and as the impossibility of labor 
appropnatmg Its own product. The complete separation between prop-
erty, and, even more so, wealth, and labor, now appears as a conse-
quence of the law which began with their identity. (p. 458) 
This critique of the inversion of the right of property is not the only 
respect in which Marx may be said to criticize the capitalist system as 
unjust. In his critique of alienation and exploitation, Marx goes beyond 
what may be called an internal critique of capitalism, concerning its 
failure to abide by its own principles. One may interpret his analysis of 
alienation and exploitation as showing the injustice of these relations in 
yet a deeper sense. In this sense, these relations are unjust in that 
through them one individual (or group) deprives another of freedom. 
This is what I previously characterized as domination. Thus in aliena-
tion and exploitation, as modes of domination, some individuals con-
trol the range and direction of the actions of others by means of control-
ling the conditions of their activity. In this way, some individuals 
deprive others of the conditions for the full realization of their freedom 
and thus deny them positive freedom (in the sense discussed in the 
previous chapter). Since the capitalist mode of production systemati-
cally engenders such unjust relations of alienation and exploitation, 
this system as a whole may also be characterized as unjust. It may be 
added that pre-capitalist society should also be regarded as unjust 
inasmuch as the social relations that characterize it are relations of 
domination. 
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From this reconstruction of Marx's critique of the injustice of 
capitalist alienation and exploitation, one may see that there is a close 
connection between the conception of freedom that underlies Marx's 
analysis as its central value and the conception of justice. It is also 
clear from this analysis that it is the non-reciprocity of the social 
relations of alienation and exploitation that constitutes the formal 
character of the injustice of these relations. For on this analysis, it is 
their character as relations of domination that makes them unjust aud 
domination is paradigmatically a non-reciprocal relation. 
I shall now briefl y sketch Marx's projection of a third stage in the 
development of social relations in what he sees as a communal society 
of the future. As is well known, Marx's discussion of this third stage is 
highly schematic and undeveloped. Nonetheless, the major features of 
the social relations in this stage emerge clearly in his account in the 
Grundrisse. 
On Marx's view, the social relations in a communal society of the 
future will be radically distinct from those in capitalism, although he 
sees the new social relations as developing out of this earlier stage. 
Whereas in capitalism the relations are those of personal independence 
founded on objective dependence and the system of commodity produc-
tion engenders alienation and exploitation, in communal society the 
relations are those of mutuality among free individuals and production 
is under the control of these associated individuals. Thus, as we have 
seen, Marx describes this stage as follows: "Free individuality, based 
on the universal development of individuals, and on their subordina-
tion of their commuual, social productivity as their social wealth, is the 
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third stage. The second stage creates the conditions for the third" (p. 
158). 
Marx characterizes the subjects of this society as "free social indi-
viduals" (pp. 197,705), which he explicates as "individuals in mutual 
relationships" (p. 712). The relations among these individuals may be 
analyzed as reciprocal relations in which each recognizes the freedom 
of the other and acts so as to enhance it. Thus no individual or group of 
individuals dominates another. Rather, the mode is one of social coop-
eration in the realization of common projects and in support for the 
differentiated projects of each individual. Thus the central value and 
animating principle of this form of society is positive freedom, under-
stood as the fullest self-realization of social individuals. The reciprocal 
relations in which this positive freedom is realized are no longer those 
of formal and instrumental reciprocity, which were examined in the 
process of exchange. Rather, they may be called relations of mutuality, 
by which I mean reciprocity in its most fully developed form. 
Marx presents this conception of social relations not only as an 
ethical ideal but also as the conception of a possible mode of social 
organization. The form of organization of such a society follows from 
the above conception of its subjects as free individuals in mutual rela-
tionships. It consists of communal control over the processes of social 
life and over social production. Marx presents a view of this form of 
social organization in a passage in which he critically contrasts 
capitalist production with it: 
[In capitalism) production is not directly social, is not "the offspring of 
association," which distributes labor internally. Individuals are sub-
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sumed under social production; social production exists outside of 
them as their fate; but social production is not subsumed under indi-
viduals, manageable by them as their common wealth. There can 
therefore be nothing more erroneous and absurd than. to postulate t~e 
control by the united individuals of their total prodUCtion, on the basts 
of exchange value .... The private exchange of all products of labor, 
all activities and all wealth stands in antithesis not only to a distribution 
based on a natural or political super- and subordination of individuals 
to one another. .. but also to free exchange among individuals who are 
associated on the basis of common appropriation a."'1d control of the 
means of production. (pp. 158-159) 
In this communal form of society, therefore, individuals are no 
longer principally related to each other indirectly and externally 
through the exchange of the products of their labor or through the sale 
of their labor time as exchange values. Rather, their relations are direct 
and internal, that is, personal relations in which the individuals recog-
nize and act on their common interests. However, unlike the internal, 
personal and communal relations in pre-capitalist societies, here the 
relations are among free and equal individuals who do not stand in 
relations of domination and subordination. 
Marx explains that in this form of society the individual has a share 
in determining social production and has a share in the distribution and 
consumption of products in virtue of being a member of the commu-
nity. This contrasts with the capitalist form of social organization in 
which an individual comes into relation to others only by entering into 
an exchange of commodities with others and by entering into the 
production process. Marx writes, 
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In the first case, which proceeds from the independent production of 
individuals ... mediation takes place through the exchange of com-
modi ties, through exchange value and through money; all these are 
expressions of one and the same relation. In the second case, the 
presupposition is itself mediated; i.e. a communal production, com-
munality, is presupposed as the basis of production. The labor of the 
individual is posited from the outset as social labor. Thus, whatever the 
particular material form of the product he creates or helps to create, 
what he has bought with his labor is not a specific and particular 
product, but rather a specific share of the communal production. He 
therefore has no particular product to exchange. His product is not an 
exchange value . ... In the first case the social character of production 
is posited only post festum with the elevation of products to exchange 
values and the exchange of these exchange values. In the second case 
the social character of production is presupposed, and participation in 
the world of products, in consumption, is not mediated by the ex-
change of mutually independent labors or products of labor. It is 
mediated, rather, by the social conditions of production within which 
the individual is active. (pp. 171-172) 
The changes in social organization and in production that charac-
terize a communal society of the future go along with changes in the 
meaning of property as the relation to the conditions of production. In 
capitalism, as we have seen, the form of property is one in which the 
laborers are alienated from the conditions of production; they relate to 
them as belonging to another. In a society founded on mutual relations, 
the means of production belong to the associated producers. This is not 
to be taken as a return to the communal property of pre-capitalist 
society, in which the individuals are subordinated to the totality and in 
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which relations of domination prevail. Instead, in the third stage, prop-
erty in the sense of a relation to the conditions of social production 
belongs to the community, understood not as a totality over and above 
the individuals, but as these individuals themselves in their mutual 
relations. Thus this community does not rule over the individuals and 
is nothing in itself heyond the concrete individuals in their social 
relations to each other. Thus Marx writes , 
[WJith the suspension of the immediate character of living labor, as 
merely individual . .. with the positing of the activity of individuals as 
Imm.edlately g~neral or s~)cial activity, the objective moments of pro-
ductIon are stnpped of thIS form of alienation; they are thereby posited 
as property, as the organic social body within which the individuals 
reproduce themselves as individuals, but as social individuals. (p. 832) 
The Meaning of Justice and Its Relation to Freedom 
It is now possible to draw the implications of the foregoing analysis of 
Marx's critique of the injustice of capitalism and of his projections of a 
communal society of the future for a reconstruction of Marx's implicit 
theory of justice, These implications, together with the analyses of 
Marx's social ontology in the earlier chapters of this book, will enable 
us to sketch the outlines of Marx's positive conception of justice, 
which I have claimed is embedded in his account. The discussion that 
follows will necessarily be brief because Marx says very little 
explicitly about justice and therefore what I present is almost entirely a 
reconstruction based on what is implicit in his account. 
Before proceeding to the reconstruction of Marx's positive view of 
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justice, we may consider why Marx himself did not explicitly present a 
conception of justice and why, despite this, one may claim that he has 
such a conception. It is reasonable to suppose that Marx says so little 
about the concept of justice because of his polemical opposition to 
those who substituted abstract moralizing for the criticism of society. 
Marx's critique of the use of abstractions in this way is mainly aimed at 
two groups of writers: first, the classical political economists (Smith, 
Malthus, Ricardo. Say, and J. S. Mill, for example), whom he 
criticized for taking bourgeois society ahistorically as an essential or 
natural form of social organization; and, second, the utopian socialists, 
especially the French (Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Proudhon, for exam-
ple), who, he claimed, saw socialism as no more than a realization of 
the ideals of bourgeois society. 3:; 
Marx's argument against merely abstract values such as formal free-
dom, abstract equality and abstract justice is that their very abstract-
ness serves to mask the concrete problems that obtain in a given form 
of society. Thus, as we have seen, Marx argues that if one uncritically 
observes only tbe formal freedom and abstract equality of exchange 
which is the surface appearance of capitalist society, then one fails to 
see the deeper social realities of concrete unfreedom, inequality and 
injustice in the sphere of production. Moreover, Marx argues· that such 
a conception of values as merely abstract does not recognize the con-
crete and differentiated forms that these values take in various social 
and historical periods. 
Nonetheless:Marx does not reject the use of abstractions entirely. In 
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fact, he holds that abstractions are useful insofar as they permit one to 
grasp the elements common to different situations. Thus in talking about 
how one should analyze production in political economy, he writes, 
Whenever we speak of production, then, what is meant is always 
production at a definite stage of social development-production by 
social individuals. It might seem, therefore, that in order to talk about 
production at all we must either pursue the process of historic de-
velopment through its different phases, or declare beforehand that we 
are dealing \vitl:l a specific historic epoch such as e.g. modem 
bourgeois production, which is indeed our particular theme. However, 
all epochs of production have certain common traits, common charac-
teristics. Production in general is an abstraction, but a rational abstrac-
tion insofar as it really brings out and fixes the common element and 
thus saves us repetition. Still, this general category, this common 
element sifted out by comparison, is itself segmented many times over 
and splits into different determinations. Some determinations belong to 
all epochs, others only to a few. [Some] determinations will be shared 
by the most modern epoch and the most ancient. No production will be 
thinkable without them. (p. 85) 
I would claim that the view expressed here, and which in fact struc-
tures part of Marx's analysis, implies that abstractions do have a place 
in Marx's theory of value. They specify values that are common to all 
historical periods, but that at the same time take on forms specific to 
each historical period. Thus these values must be understood not 
merely in their generality, but in the concrete embodiments and dif-
ferent significances that they have in various forms of society. More-
over, Marx sees such values as that of freedom as developing histori-
cally. Thus Marx's rejection of merely abstract values should not be 
taken as implying that he lacks a conception of justice. Rather, it 
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signifies that for Marx justice, like other conceptions, must be under-
stood in relation to its concrete and differentiated historical forms. 
Furthermore, Marx's rejection of abstract morality should not be 
taken to mean that he is advocating a purely descriptive or value-free 
approach to the study of society, in which values such as justice are 
seen as historically relative! That Marx is not a historical relativist is 
evident from the fact that his social ontology is a normative one. That 
is, as I argued in chapter 4, Nlarx views freedom as a fundamental 
value which has its basis in the very nature of human activity. As the 
capacity for self-transcendence, it characterizes all individuals in all 
historical periods, though it is realized to varying degrees in different 
forms of society. Furthermore, this value of freedom provides the 
ground for Marx's critique of the different social forms in terms of the 
degree to which they realize this value. Likewise, it will be seen that 
Marx's conception of justice has a normative force and is not merely 
descriptive. 
From the foregoing considerations, we may conclude that although 
Marx does not present an explicit theory of justice, this fact cannot be 
used as an argument to the effect that there is no implicit conception of 
justice in his work. Indeed, I have suggested that the basis for such a 
conception is present in Marx's normative and historical approach to 
value theory. I will go on to argue that Marx has a conception of 
justice, though an implicit one. However, this should not be taken to 
mean that his views fit into one or another of the traditional theories of 
justice, for example, the Kantian or utilitarian ones. Rather, Marx 
should be understood as changing the very terms of the traditional 
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discussion of values, and specifically of freedom and justice. In place 
of treating values only abstractly apart from the social contexts in 
which they change or develop, Marx studies values in their concrete 
embodiments in human practice. Furthermore, he bases his approach 
to values on an ontology that is distinctively social and historical. In 
addition, Marx goes beyond the traditional dichotomy between facts 
and values in seeing the essentially valuational character of human 
actions and social institutions. Thus as we saw in the discussion of his 
concept of freedom and in his critique of alienation and exploitation in 
capitalism, Marx's description of the social facts is at the same time a 
consideration of their normative import. 5 
The question now arises: What is Marx's conception of justice? How 
is it related to his view of freedom as the central value in social life? 
And how is it related to his concepts of property, class, domination, 
alienation and exploitation, analyzed in the first part of this chapter? 
This reconstruction of Marx's theory of justice is primarily derived 
from three features of his analysis: his critique of capitalist alienation 
and exploitation as unjust, his projection of a communal society of the 
future and his conception of positive freedom. Marx's critique of the 
injustice of capitalist social relations was interpreted as a critique of 
alienation and exploitation as modes of domination. That is, Marx's 
analysis is that in these relations, one class by its control over the 
conditions of production deprives the members of the other class of 
their positive freedom through denying them the conditions for the 
realization of their own purposes. This domination consists, on 
the one hand, in the capitalists' control and direction of the work-
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ers' laboring actIvIty in the production process and, on the other 
hand, in the capitalists' appropriation of a portion of the workers' 
product without exchange. If unjust social relations are relations of 
domination, namely, those that deprive some agents of the conditions 
for their positive freedom, then we may infer that justice in one sense 
of the term refers to social relations in which no agents deprive any 
others of the conditions for their positive freedom. It follows that 
justice in this sense is itself a condition for the full development of 
positive freedom, that is, a condition for the self-realization of all 
individuals. But beyond this, r shall argue later that justice has a 
further meaning for Marx, namely, it designates social relations in 
which agents mutually enhance each other. Justice in this sense of 
mutuality will be seen to be a further condition necessary for the full or 
complete development of positive freedom. 
The first meaning of justice according to which no one deprives 
another of the requirements for his or her agency may be elaborated 
and expanded by considering the implications of Marx's conception of 
positive freedom. It will be recalled that for Marx freedom does not 
only refer to the abstract capacity for choice and its correlative re-
quirement for freedom from constraint; it also refers to self-realization 
through transformative activity and its correlative requirement for the 
conditions necessary for this activity. Freedom in this latter sense is not 
merely negative freedom, namely, absence of constraint, but is posi-
tive freedom, as the freedom to realize oneself through objectification 
as an activity of transforming conditions in accordance with one's 
purposes. 
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We have seen in chapters 1 and 2 that Marx views this activity of 
self-transformation or self-realization as the distinctive characteristic 
of human beings. Every individual is therefore to be taken as having 
the capacity for such activity. Freedom as this capacity is thus the 
fundamental ontological feature of human beings that underlies Marx's 
theory of social reality. As I have argued, although thi~ capacity is 
universal, and as capacity is undifferentiated from one individual to 
another, this does not entail that human beings have a fixed nature, but 
rather that they freely create their natures through their activity (both 
in production in the broad sense and in social interaction). This com-
mon capacity is thus the basis for differentiation, of both individuals 
and historical social forms. 
In his social ontology, Marx does not merely treat this capacity for 
freedom descriptively; he also recognizes its normative force. That is, 
this capacity by its very nature demands the realization of this freedom 
through activity. This capacity for freedom is the disposition to realize 
oneself through transformative activity. This capacity therefore entails 
the demand for the conditions for this activity. Further, as argued in the 
previous chapter, freedom for Marx is an end in itself. In this teleolog-
ical value theory, whatever serves this end, that is, whatever is a 
condition for freedom, is valuable in virtue of this function. Having the 
conditions, that is, possessing them or having access to them, is thus 
also valuable. 
Since each individual has this (abstract and undifferentiated) capac-
ity for self-u'anscendence or self-realization simply in virtue of being 
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human, no individual has more of a right to the conditions for the 
fulfillment of this capacity than any other. Or put differently, each 
individual has an equal right to these conditions, that is, to the con-
ditions of positive freedom. I would argue that this principle of equal 
positive freedom constitutes an important meaning of justice for Marx. 
The equality that is required by this principle is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for the full development of positive freedom. 
It is also evident from this argument that justice in this sense of equal 
rights to the conditions for freedom derives its value from the value of 
freedom itself. 
This meaning of justice is in accord with the conception of abstract 
justice discussed earlier in this chapter as characteristic of the process 
of exchange on Marx's view. It is the principle of treating equals 
equally. However, the form of this principle in Marx goes beyond a 
major traditional formulation of it. This traditional formulation simply 
states that equals should be treated equally ,but does not specify who 
counts as equal. 6 By contrast, Marx's conception of equal positive 
freedom, as I have reconstructed it, specifies that every individual is to 
be treated equally. Such an insistence on universal equality is found in 
various systems of universalist ethics, for example, that of Kant (in 
which all persons are to be taken as equals since they are all ends-in-
themselves) and is also characteristic of traditional democratic theory 
in the political realm, as well as of much of modem legal theory. 
However, Marx's approach is distinctive in that he extends the domain 
of this equality to the social and economic realms as well. Further, 
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Marx extends the meaning of equal treatment beyond any of its tra-
ditional interpretations to include equal access to means of production 
as among the conditions required for freedom. Moreover, he sees equal 
treatment as requiring also an equal right to determine the forms of 
social organization. 
This emphasis on equal access to the means of production and on the 
equal right to participate in social decision making as requirements for 
freedom is evident in Marx's account of the communal society of the 
future. In this account, as we saw, the means of production belong to 
the associated producers. Each of them stands in the same relation as 
the others to these conditions of production as belonging to him or her 
by virtue of membership in the community. Furthermore, each of them 
participates in the communal control over social and productive activ-
ity. Insofar as property in general for Marx is defined as the relation to 
the conditions of production (both natural and social) as belonging to 
one, it is clear that production in the third stage requires a social form 
of property, both as the producers' communal relation to the means of 
production and as a form of democratic decision making about the 
processes of social life. 
One may now also note the close connection between Marx's im-
plicit conception of abstract justice as reconstructed here and his views 
on property. That is, for him private property in the sense of private 
ownership of the means of production is incompatible with justice in 
that it denies equal access to the conditions for positive freedom. 
Likewise, justice for Marx requires the overcoming of class domina-
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tion, in which one class controls the conditions of production that 
another class requires for its productive activity. 
Abstract justice. in the sense of equal rights to the conditions of 
positive freedom, is an essential part of the meaning of justice for Marx. 
But it is not the whole meaning of justice for him. I would argue that 
for Marx concrete justice consists, beyond this, in mutuality in social 
relations. This can be understood by considering his conception of posi-
tive freedom. As we have seen, it signifies the fullest self-realization 
or self-development of individuals. Since these are social indi-
viduals, their self-development consists in realizing both individual 
and common purposes and projects. As we have seen, this positive 
freedom requires an instrumental relation to the conditions of produc-
tion, both natural and social, in which natural materials and forms of 
social organization serve as means for the realization of agency. In 
addition, however, positive freedom requires a non-instrumental rela-
tion among agents. We shall see that for Marx the full development of 
positive freedom requires a form of non-instrumental relations among 
agents which I will call mutuality. 
Mutuality may be characterized as the most developed form of recip-
rocity. It will be recalled that Marx discusses reciprocity as a feature of 
the process of exchange in capitalism. Here it signifies the recognition 
by the exchangers of each other's equality and freedom and of their 
common interest in the exchange, in which each serves as a means for 
the other. I characterized this as formal and instrumental reciprocity. It 
was seen that Marx analyzes this reciprocity in exchange as masking 
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the deeper relations of non-reciprocity in the sphere of production. We 
have seen further that Marx describes the relations in a future com-
munal society as mutual relations among free individuals. 
On the basis of these characterizations by Marx, I would propose 
that mutuality may be understood as a reciprocal social relation that 
goes beyond instrumental reciprocity and beyond merely formal recip-
rocity. Mutuality goes beyond instrumental reciprocity in that each 
does not take the other as a means only, but also as an end in him or 
herself. Further, it goes beyond the recognition by each of the other's 
equal capacity for freedom although it presupposes this recognition. 
Beyond these, mutuality consists in the conscious recognition and 
respect by each agent for the individual differences and projects of the 
other. That is, each recognizes and respects not only the other's capac-
ity for freedom, but also the specific ways in which the other is ful-
filling or realizing this capacity, that is, the other's development 
of his or her positive freedom. In addition, mutuality is the ac-
tive relation of enhancing the other through practical actions that 
help the other to fulfill his or her needs and purposes. Mutuality 
in this sense of enhancement thus contributes to the other's develop-
ment of his or her positive freedom. Since positive freedom is the 
self-development of social individuals, the more each individual en-
hances the other, the greater the development of each of them. This 
provides richer possibilities for the social interactions among them and 
also for each one's own further development. It is through such rela-
tions of mutuality that, in Marx's words, "the free development of 
each is the condition for the free development of all. ,,' 
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This proposed reconstruction of Marx's conception of concrete jus-
tice can be extended to social life more generally in the following way. 
As applying to social relations, concrete justice as a condition for 
freedom consists in mutuality. As applying to social organization, 
justice would mean a form of social life that would serve to realize full 
positive freedom by embodying mutuality in its institutions. Indeed, 
Marx emphasizes that mutuality should be embodied in such concrete 
social forms. And in his discussion of a comnlunal society of the 
future, he gives some suggestions as to what such social forms might 
be. First of all, he sees such a communal society as differing radically 
from capitalist society in that the primary form of the connections 
between people would shift from economic relations to immediately 
social relations. It is in such direct relations among individuals that 
mutuality as I have described it becomes possible. Correlatively, the 
activity of production itself becomes the activity of a community, as 
the differentiated, creative activity of its members in which they jointly 
determine the purposes of productive activity and the form of the 
distribution of its products. Distribution does not, for Marx, constitute 
a separate sphere, but rather derives its character from the communal 
organization of productive activity itself and from the mutual relations 
among the members of the community. Thus concrete justice for Marx 
is not limited to the equitable distribution of goods but has its primary 
locus in the mutual social relations among agents, through which these 
agents carry out their communal productive activity and their distribu-
tion of society's benefits. 
Within these communal activities of production and distribution, 
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joint determination of purposes and procedures is achieved only hy a 
process in which each memher of the community takes the others' 
purposes, needs and individual differences into account. That is, the 
mode of social decision-making is one of mutuality. Yet this social 
production and distribution itself and the mutual interactions within it 
have as their end the fullest possible development of each of the indi-
viduals who constitutes it. The importance of the development of each 
individual in the community in his or her own distinctive ways is 
clearly expressed by Marx (in discussing the communal society of the 
future) in his formulation of the principle, "From each according to his 
ability, to each according to his needs. "8 
Such a community is made up of individuals-in-relations where the 
relations are those of mutuality and the individuals are agents who 
constitute this community through their social interaction. For Marx, 
justice in its concrete sense may be identified with such relations of 
mutuality. Justice in this sense, together with abstract justice as dis-
cussed above, is the condition for the fullest development of freedom. 
That is, the full self-realization of individuals, as their freedom, requires 
a community in which justice as mutuality is realized and in which the 
equal right of each individual to the conditions for positive freedom is 
recognized. This relation between justice and freedom is one in which 
justice as the most fully realized form of social relations is the condi-
tion for freedom as the fullest realization of individuals. This reveals 
the deep ontological connection between individuality and community 
in Marx's theory of social reality. 
Notes 
Notes to Introduction 
L Marx wrote the Grundrisse in 1857-1858, but the book was not published until 
1939, when a Gennan edition appeared in the Soviet Union. However, this edition was 
a very limited one, and the book did not become widely available until 1953, upon its 
publication in Gennany. The first complete English translation appeared in 1973. 
2. Although Hegel introduces the concept of self-creation and self-change through 
labor (for example, in The Phenomenology of Mind and in the Jenenser Real-
philosophie), I would hold that he cannot ultimately claim that such self-creation is the 
activity of independently real individuals or that these individuals are fundamentally 
free. 
3, This hermeneutic method originated as a mode ofimerpreting the Bihle as a text. hs 
aim was to penetrate beneath the surface of the literal text in order to reveal its deeper 
meanings. It has more recently been developed as a method of interpreting any text 
(although it has been used primarily on philosophical and literary texts). In this use, the 
interpreter tries to grasp the inner sense of a text by recreating the author's project 
through an examination of what is given in the texl it'ielf. For discussions of this 
method see, for example, Hans~Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, especially part II, 
and Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Intelpretation. 
4. In this respect, the Grundrissl' is comparable to the early Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844, which also were written for self-clarification and not for publica-
tion and which are also explicitly philosophical in approach. However, these early 
writings are fragmentary and are not as systematic and comprehensive as the Grun-
drisse. 
5. Interpretations of Marx along these lines may be found in E. Fromm, Marx's 
Concept of Man; H. Marcuse, "The Foundation of Historical Materialism"; M. Mar-
koviC, From. Affluence to Praxis; S. StojanoviC, Between Ideals and Reality; G. 
Petrovic, Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century; I. Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Aliena-
tion; E. Bloch, On Karl Marx; R. Garaudy, L'Humanisme Marxiste; E. Kamenka, The 
Ethical Foundations of Marxism; L. Dupre, The Philosophical Foundations of Mar-
xism; and E. Fromm, cd,. Socialist Humanism. Clearly there are many important 
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differences among these interpreters. But all of them share an emphasis on the 
philosophical and humanist aspects of Marx's work, particularly in his early writings. 
6. Such an interpretation of Marx is found-although in very different ways-in L 
Althusser, For Marx; L. Althusser (with E. Balibar) Reading Capital; E. Mandel, The 
Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx, 1843 to Capital and An Introduc-
tion to Marxist Economic Theory; and earlier in R. Hilferding, Bohm-Bawerk's Criti-
cism of Marx, among others. 
7. There are some other commentators who see this continuity in Marx's work. One 
may mention O. Lukacs. History and Class Consciousness and Ontologie-Marx; B. 
Ollman, Alienation; 1. Plamenatz, Karl Marx's Philosophy of Man; I. Fetscher, Marx 
and Marxism; S. Avineri. The -<;ocial and Political Thought of Karl Marx. To varying 
degrees these authors interpret Marx's later systematic political economy as continuous 
with his earlier concept of alienation. However, I believe that my study goes beyond 
these interpretations in proposing that Marx is Jundamentally philosophical not simply 
in the early work but in the later political economy as well. Furthermore. I attempt to 
work out Marx's distinctive synthesis of philosophy with social and political economic 
theory as a social ontology. 
No!es to chapter 1 
1. G.A. Cohen similarly proposes that Marx's account of the three stages of social 
development in the Grundrisse is in the form of a Hegelian dialectic. However, 
Cohen's interpretation of this dialectic and his understanding of the difference between 
Hegel and Marx are different from mine. Cf. G. A. Cohen, "Marx's Dialectic of 
Labor. " 
2. It should be noted that Hegel's logic is presented in somewhat different forms in 
these various works. Thus in The Phenomenology of Mind Hegel begins his dialectic 
with the immediacy of ordinary sense experience and develops the dialectic of con-
sciousness from this beginning to its fully realized form as Absolute Spirit. In The 
Science of Logic, on the other hand. Hegel begins from "pure knowing" as what he 
calls an abstract or absolute beginning. The account that I give of Hegel's dialectic in 
what follows is based primarily on the version in The Science of Logic, but is 
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supplemented by considerations drawn from the version in The Phenomenology of 
Mind and from The Philosophy of Right and The Philosophy of History. The use of 
Hegel'S alternative versions of the dialectic is not problematic, however, since these 
versions are complementary and the form of the dialectic is the same in all of them. 
3. This is not to say that for Marx practical activity is not conscious or that for Hegel 
the logic of consciousness does not have a social and h.istorical dimension. Indeed, in 
Marx's view. practical activity and social relations are the activities and relations of 
conscious agents and thus Marx also addresses himself to the dialectic of the develop-
ment of consciousness_ Similarly, on Hegel's view. tl}e dialectic of consciousness 
takes place through social and historical activity and thus is also a dialectic of the 
development of social relations and institutions. However, the difference between 
Hegel and Marx is dear, as we shall see: They differ both in their focus and in their 
ontologies. FurthemlOre, they differ in their understanding of how the dialectic is 
generated or where it has its source. Thus Hegel conceives of the dialectic as the form 
of the process by which the Idea comes to know it~elf through it~ self-activity; this 
activity is exhibited in external form in social and historical processes as well as in 
nature, art, religion. and so forth. For Marx, on the other hand, the dialectic is the 
reconstruction of the contingent form that social and historical practice it~elf reveals 
when it becomes the object of philosophical or scientific reflection, that is, when 
human beings come to understand their own conscious practical activity. 
4. For Hegel logic is ontology, that is, the categories of logic are the categories of 
Being, since for him, thought is Being and Being is thought. Thus Hegel comprehends 
Being as the Idea itself as an object of its own awareness. And he sees logic as the form 
of the process by which the Idea comes to know Being as identical with it<;elf. 
5. Cf. Hegel's The Science of Logic, book I, section one, chapter 2 ("Determinate 
Being"), This reference to Spinoza occurs in Hegel's discussion of self-differentiation 
as a condition for self-identity as described above. Hegel develops this idea further in 
the Logic, especially in book I, section one, chapter 3 and book II, section one, 
chapter I. 
6. In The Phenomenology of Mind. Hegel develops the relation between subject and 
object a<; a dialectic in which consciousness is related to what it is aware of as its 
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object. Tn The Science of Logic, on the other hand, Hegel does not begin with the 
subject-object relation, but rather with Being (as abstract and undifferentiated) a<; the 
"Absolute beginning" and on this basis generates the subject-object relationship a'i 
one of reflection. Cf. note 2 above. 
7. Here and elsewhere in this work I use the term "concrete" in a way that is similar to 
Marx's own usage, namely, to refer to what is practical, empirical, or actually exist-
ing. This usage of the term is close to the commonsense one. It should be noted that 
Marx's use of this term differs from Hegel's. Hegel uses "concrete" to characterize 
that which is known in thought in all of ito.; systematic interconnections, whereas 
"abstract" connotes that which is taken out of context, apart from its relations. In his 
view, empirical phenomena are abstract in this sense in that they have no systematic or 
inner connection with each other; these connections are only achieved in reflection in 
thought. However, there is a dimension of Hegel's meaning that Marx retains. Marx 
also interprets "concrete" as referring to what which stands in relation to other things. 
For Marx, however, the practical and empirical world is concrete in that the things in it 
are interconnected and thought is concrete when it grasps these interconnections. 
8. Although Marx distinguishes various forms of pre-capitalist societies in the Grund-
risse, he characterizes them all as having certain fundamental features in common. 
Following his analysis, I am drawing these common features together into what we 
might call a model of pre-capitalist society. It is clear that there are many historical 
exceptions that do not fit this model and Marx himself notes some of the important 
ones. Thus, for example, Marx points out that in the ancient communitie.., of Greece 
and Rome, exchange is already developed to some degree and that in Roman law, the 
juridical concept of the person already exists. But his point is that these are not the 
dominant forms of social relations in these societies. Furthermore, it is evident that the 
stage of pre-capitalist forms of society as described in the Grundrisse is not equivalent 
to a stage of primitive communism and in fact does not include such a form. Thus the 
immediacy that characterizes such pre-capitalist forms is an immediacy relative to the 
following stage of capitalism. 
9. This direct relation of producer to product should be understood as holding generally 
and for the most part, as indicated in the previous footnote. There are, of course, 
historical exceptions, such as, for example, landless peasants in ancient Rome who 
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worked on the large estates and produced commodities for trade or export and not for 
personal consumption. 
10. The wage laborer was historically in the first instance male. On the whole, in 
Western capitalism women entered the work force later. 
II. On this point, ct. Marx, Grundrisse, pr. 450-454. 
12. There are interpretations of Hegel that take him a.:.; holding that the individual does 
in fact act independently and not merely as an expression of the Idea. On this view, the 
Idea is understood as no more than the species-nature of these individuals. Such an 
interpretation is suggested, for example, in Kojeve's Introduction to the Reading of 
Hegel. I do not agree with such interpretations since I believe, first of all, that they 
ignore Hegel's own formulations to the effect that individuals are the finite moments of 
Absolute Spirit's or the Idea's self-development; and second, that they do not recog-
nize how Hegel's system itself entails such a conclusion (though I shall not develop the 
argument for this point here). Finally, I might suggest that such interpretations of 
Hegel in fact read back into him conceptions that were introduced later, especially by 
Marx and Heidegger. 
13. As will be seen, it is Marx's emphasis on independently real individuals, and not 
his conception of the constitution of the social world by these individuals, that I am 
suggesting is the Aristotelian element. It may also be noted that although this Aristote-
lian element is present in Marx and not in Hegel, there are, of course, other dimensions 
of Hegel's analysis that are Aristotelian. 
14. This appears to be similar to Hegel's view about philosophical reflection in the 
preface to The Philosophy of Right, where he writes that "philosophy ... is its own 
time apprehended in thoughts." Or again that "As the thought of the world, 
[philosophy] appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried after its process 
of formation has been completed .... The owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with 
the falling of the dusk" (pp. II, 13). However, Marx and Hegel arrive at this notion of 
retrospective reconstruction from radically different perspectives. For Marx, history 
can only be understood retrospectively because of the very contingency of concrete 
human actions and events. That is, since it is the free choices of agents which cOI1.,ti-
tute history, one cannot know these choices in advance. For Hegel, on the other hand, 
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the ground for such a retrospective method is not contingency, but rather necessity. 
Philosophical reflection is the moment of the Idea's own self-consciousness and there-
fore essentially the recognition by the Idea of its own necessity. In philosophical 
reflection on history, the standpoint of philosophy in its own time can only be retro-
spective since it can only reflect on what the Idea or Spirit has presented to it as an 
expression of the necessity of the Idea's own nature. For Hegel, philosophical reflection 
on history is therefore always bound to a given stage of the self-objectification of the 
Idea and thus cannot transcend it. 
15. See, for example, Metaphysics, Book IX, chapters 7 and 8, (1048b35-1051a4); 
Pblitics, Book I, chapter 2 (l253a); De Anima, Book II, chapters I and 2 (412al-
414a28). 
16. Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach," in R. Tucker, The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 109. 
17. Cf. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality. 
18. Aristotle, Categories, 3blO, 2b4-6. 
19. Further examples in the Grundrisse of Marx's emphasis on concrete individuals 
may be found on pages 239, 282, 323, 488, 491,515,705,708. 
20. Cf. the discussion in Hegel's The Science of Logic, book II, section two, chapter 3 
and section three, chapter 3. 
21. See the related discussion in chapter 3 below. 
22. It is clear from this how my interpretation of internal relations differs from the 
interpretation that B. OIlman gives in his study, Alienation. OIlman attributes to Marx 
a view of internal relations that is essentially the same as Hegel's. He proposes that 
Marx sees individuals (and things) as constituted by their relations. In my view, 
OIlman fails to recognize Marx's departure from the Hegelian model. This consists in 
Marx's Aristotelian emphasis on the independent reality of the individuals who enter 
into these social relations with each other. Thus I argue that although Marx makes use 
of Hegel's theory of internal relations, he transforms it in a way that is ontologically 
and methodologically very significant. 
Notes to chapter 2 
1. This is not to say that Marx overlooked the political-economic dimensions of 
alienation in his early works. In fact I would claim that this dimension is fundamental 
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in his early analyses as wen. The point here is that alienation becomes fully elaborated 
as a political economic category in the later works. 
2, Here, as elsewhere in this chapter, the term creation is not used in an honorific 
sense, but rather descriptively, to denote the making or forming of new objects through 
activity. 
3. Aristotle, Physics, 193aI2-17. 
4. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1014b 27-82. 
5. Although the tenn alienation has been used in a wide variety of ways, both in studies 
of Marx and in more general discourse, it is clear from the Grundrisse that Marx's use 
of it is highly specific. He uses it to refer to the particular form of domination that 
fundamentally characterizes the capitalist mode of production. Although in Marx's 
analysis there is domination in pre-capitalist societies, there is no alienation strictly 
speaking, since the presuppositions of alienated labor do not exist as characteristics of 
the society as a whole. As I show in the text, these presuppositions are basically the 
existence of free labor, as well as the separation of labor from the objective conditions 
of production. I might also suggest that such a political-economic conception of 
alienation is present in the earlier Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Yet 
in these manuscripts and in the Grundrisse the concept of alienation is not interpreted 
in any reductive sense, but rather represents a synthesis of systematic philosophy and 
political economy. 
6. This suggests an important distinction between Marx and Aristotle. Marx sees the 
process of objectification or production as a process of transfomring objects through 
specific social relations. Thus objectification is an activity that involves both making 
and social interaction or, in Aristotle's sense, both poiesis and praxis. By contrast, 
Aristotle treats production or the making of things apart from social interaction. Thus 
he takes these two modes of activity to require separate sciences. 
7. In other works Marx characterizes this as "the socialization of production. " 
8. The relation between Kant's conception of synthesis as an activity of consciousness 
and Marx' s conception of labor as a practical activity of synthesis is discussed by J. 
Habermas in Knowledge and Human Interests, chapter 2. 
9. Aristotle, Physics, 217b33-218a3. 
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Notes to chapter 3 
1. One may mention another position that seems to provide a third view on causality, 
but I believe that it can be treated as a variant of the first view. This position, most 
closely associated with Donald Davidson, holds that reasons are causes of human 
actions. It attempts to reconstrue the conception of causality and to accommodate 
rear.;ons to such a causal model. 
2. "Theses on Feuerbach," op. cit., p. 108. 
3. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1013a27-33. 
4. Ibid., 1013a21-25 
Note to chapter 4 
1. Hobbes, Leviathan, chapter 21, p, 159. 
Notes to chapter 5 
1. Cf. R. Tucker, The Marxian Rc:vo!utionary Idea, chapter 2; A. Wood, "The 
Marxian Critique of Justice"; D. P. H. Anen, "The Utilitarianism of Marx and 
Engels. " 
2. A fuller arlalysis of i~strumental reciprocity and of' other aspects of the relation of 
reciprocity is given in C. Gould, "Beyond Causality in the Social Sciences: Reciproc-
ity as a Model of Non-exploitative Social Relations" . 
3. See, for example, Grundrisse, pp. 83, 248. 
4. It may be useful to summarize some of the recent arguments to the effect that Marx 
does take such a value-free and historical relativist approach to the study of society. 
The argument that Marx takes a value-free approach has two a,'>pects: first, that Marx 
conceives of his project as an objective scientific analysis of capitalism and exploita~ 
tion and therefore refrains from making judgment'> concerning the justice or the injus-
tice of the system. Rather, it is argued, Marx sees justice as defined by the system's 
own rules and thus not as an external or transcendent norm. Second, it is pointed out 
that Marx explicitly criticizes those who, like Proudhon, claim that capitalism is 
unjust, and asserts that such an approach is utopian and an example of abstract rnoraliz-
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ing. Two recent commentators who present such an argument are R. Tucker, The 
Marxian Revolutionary Idea and A. Wood, "The Marxian Critique of Justice." They 
also argue that Marx is a historical relativist in that he regards each social system as 
estab1ishing its own norms of justice. Thus on such a view there is no external standard 
of morality or justice which one can use to criticize a given form of society. It is clear 
from the text that I do not agree with these interpretations of Marx. The arguments 
given by Wood and Tucker are discussed in W. McBride, "The Concept of Justice 
in Marx., Engels and others." 
, 
5. This is not to say that Marx was the only theorist to recognize this dichotomy and to 
go beyond it. He was certainly not the only one to' recognize that social facts are 
value-laden (for example, Vico and Fichte before Marx; Scheler and the, "Verstehen" 
tradition, Wittgenstei;, Heidegger and others after Marx). But Marx was a crucial 
figure in grasping the critical force of a method that integrates facts. and values. 
6. Cf. H. L. A. Hart's discussion of this point in The Concept of Lqw, p. 155. 
7. K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto in R. Tucker, ed.",'the Marx~ 
Engels Reader, p. 353. 
8. K. Marx, "Critique of the Gotha Program," _in R. Tucker, The Marx-Engels 
Reader, p. 388. 
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